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This dissertation presents three innovations that suggest an alternative approach
to structuring information systems: a multidimensional heuristic workspace, a resonance
metaphor for information, and a question-centered approach to structuring information
relations. Motivated by the need for space to establish a question-centered learning
environment, a heuristic workspace has been designed. Both the question-centered
approach to information system design and the workspace have been conceived with the
resonance metaphor in mind.
This research stemmed from a set of questions aimed at learning how spatial
concepts and related factors including geography may play a role in information sharing
and public information access. In early stages of this work these concepts and
relationships were explored through qualitative analysis of interviews centered on local
small group and community users of geospatial data. Evaluation of the interviews led to
the conclusion that spatial concepts are pervasive in our language, and they apply equally
to phenomena that would be considered physical and geographic as they do to cognitive
and social domains. Rather than deriving metaphorically from the physical world to the

human, spatial concepts are native to all dimensions of human life.
This revised view of the metaphors of space was accompanied by a critical
evaluation of the prevailing metaphors for information processes, the conduit and
pathway metaphors, which led to the emergence of an alternative, resonance metaphor.
Whereas the dominant metaphors emphasized information as object and the movement of
objects and people through networks and other limitless information spaces, the
resonance metaphor suggests the existence of multiple centers in dynamic proximity
relationships.
This pointed toward the creation of a space for autonomous problem solving that
might be related to other spaces through proximity relationships. It is suggested that a
spatial approach involving discrete, discontinuous structures may serve as an alternative
to approaches involving movement and transportation.
The federation of multiple autonomous problem-solving spaces, toward goals
such as establishing communities of questioners, has become an objective of this work.
Future work will aim at accomplishing this federation, most likely by means of the IS0
Topic Maps standard or similar semantic networking strategies.
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Part One

CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION AND SPACE,
FORCES AND STRUCTURES

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

I would like to begin by inviting you to imagine that asking a question could be
like tossing a pebble into a pond, then watching the waves and ripples go out until they
disappear and merge with the surrounding stillness in the waters, or until they touch the
tips of submerged rocks or reflect back from the shore, the waves echoing back in return.
Through imagining that the process of posing questions and receiving answers may be
more wavelike than it is like the transfer of objects or than the following a paths, a new
metaphor for information processes began to take shape, the "resonance" metaphor that is
one of the themes that is developed here. This now seems to be a useful complement to
the more customary metaphors for information, the conduit and the pathway. Together,
these three metaphors provide for a multidimensional approach to information processes
generally, suggesting the facets of communication, documentation and learning.
The chapters that follow attempt to consistently present a person-centered
approach to information processes that rests in some measure on the resonance metaphor.
In the next chapter, several common concepts and metaphors for information will be
presented with a view to understanding their implications for thinking about the design of
environments for information processes. In particular, the spatial aspects of these
constructs are considered in terms of how they may influence the choices we have when
participating in information processes. Whereas the conduit and pathway metaphors
imply movement of bodies through space and time in the form of information objects or
as a searcher traversing a path from uncertainty toward the known, movement in terms of
the resonance metaphor is of another order; something moves, but the going out and
coming back of waves is of a different character than objects moving on paths. Rather,

the overall image is one of interacting forces that may become harmonics or standing
waves when several sources are interacting together.
In addition to suggesting a different order of movement from the conduit and
pathway metaphors, the resonance metaphor embodies the concept of center, o having a
center or an origin, that serves as an important dimension of the space described by the
resonant waves. There is not evidence of center in the conduits for information objects
concept, nor is center to be found in the idea that pathways are traveled in accomplishing
the changed state from uncertainty to knowledge. Rather, these have spatial origins and
endpoints, the input and output portals for the transmission channels, or the place where
the questioner is "coming from" on the way to finding where the answer "is at." These
metaphors are often accompanied by spatial constructs that compost complex networks
and dendritic trees.
Movement and center are two of the spatial aspects of metaphors for information,
one focus of the study presented here. The research questions from which this work
originated asked broadly whether there may be spatial aspects that influence information
processes generally, especially the processes involved in what is often called "access to
information." Most of the remainder of this introductory chapter will be devoted to an
outline of the evolution of these questions within project settings in which they were
being asked.
Before beginning that review, mention should be made of a theme that recurs
throughout this work, the centrality of questions. This has already been introduced in
terms of imagining questions as being like pebbles tossed into a pond. Questions such as
"What is 'information'?" and "What distinguishes question-oriented from answer-driven
information systems?" were present at the beginning of this program of study (Schroeder,
1995). The results presented here are composed of a synthesis of the various approaches

taken toward these questions, and suggest a practical direction toward implementing
solutions consistent with this synthesis.
The primary tangible product of this effort is the structuring of a digital space that
began to take form in terms of a "question space." Striving to put questions at the center
of information processes led to consideration of what sort of space could be constructed
that would best let these processes take place. For now, the space that is suggested is the
"multidimensional heuristic workspace" detailed in Chapter 8 below. The concept of
heuristic, here, is meant to connote problem solving, and asking questions is included in
problem solving generally. It is also meant to imply a place for the activity of problem
setting as well as that of problem solving; lack of attention to the means by which
problems are defined is as responsible for failure to achieve of adequate solutions as is
the absence of capacity to adequately follow the implications of the questions at hand.
In this way, the heuristic workspace is a candidate for what a "question space"
might be. In analyzing question processes generally (see Chapter 6 below), it became
increasingly apparent that questions and answers, uncertainty and knowledge, are all
wrapped up intimately with each other. One particular form, the "tensegrity" structure
popularized in the work of R. Buckminster Fuller, is a defining figure in the workspace
offered here. Because the emergence of a question implies a sort of tension, and the
attainment of answers implies a moment of stability or resolution, the tensegrity form
which balances containing forces of continuous tension and discontinuous regions of
compression seems a good physical and geometric match for representing the
interpenetration of questions and answers in a mutually dependent structure.
These are the main themes and results that will be presented here, that questions
rather than knowledge can be conceived as the center of many information processes, and
that the existing repertoire of metaphors for information might be expanded with benefit
for the creation of such question-centered spaces. A particular structure is offered that is

thought to be robust enough to accommodate the great variety of forms and relationships
that might be forthcoming in many questioning or problem solving situations.
An additional motivation that accompanies this work is the desire to conceive of
information systems that are pluralistic, that allow people who have a stake in their own
knowledge and local understandings of the world to autonomously preserve that
knowledge against prevailing tendencies toward standardization and universalization.
The particular solution given here, if implemented along the lines that are suggested,
represents a "polycentric" approach to preserving autonomy and diversity, while
affording visibility to others who may share in some measure the questions and answers
organized in any particular space. By a process of bringing questions into mutual
proximity through defining communities of questioners, the existing hierarchies that
separate those who want to know from those who already do might be mitigated.

Backmound
and Context for This Work

The rest of this chapter will be devoted to a review of some earlier approaches
that were taken and of the groups and projects which provided context for the emergence
of the results reported here. The most immediate and relevant project is an
interdisciplinary experiment named New Directions Downeast (NDDE), which will
receive the most detailed description of the projects reviewed here.
At its earliest stages, this research began with the intent of mapping information
networks, or the "information infrastructure," especially with a view to the expanded
capacities for local institutions such as libraries and schools to locate and retrieve
information resources from an increasing number of sources due to the expansion of the
Internet and related information and communications technologies. Initial focus was on
the expansion of Internet points of presence through telephone dialup and direct
connections to shared public networks in the setting of rural Maine, see (Schroeder,

1996a). The important distinction between an "communications infrastructure" and an
"information infrastructure," which are often confused in everyday speech, became clear
through this work. An example of ongoing work concerned with innovations in charting
the global communications networks is Dodge's Atlas of Cyberspace (2001).
As the focus turned toward charting the information infrastructure, particularly
mapping of "public information access," the need for better understanding of core terms
such a "information" became apparent. Attempts were made to visualize information
access by means of a geographic metaphor expressed through contours, valleys and flow
networks, as might be implemented in approaches such as friction surface mapping
supported in geographic information systems (GIs). This approach was in the spirit of
Mitchell's suggestion, in City of Bits, that the character of Nolli's early 1 8'h century map
of Rome, which Mitchell claims depicts that city's "customs, norms, and laws governing
rights to privacy, access to public and semipublic places," could find expression in a
digital environment: "Perhaps some electronic cartographer of the future will produce an
appropriately nunaced Nolli map of the Net7'(Mitchell, 1995, p. 13 1).
It became clear that "access" itself is a problematic term for what is meant by
participation in an environment of common information resources. Access turned out not
to be dependent on quantifiable conditions such as distance and barriers, as often
conceived, and relied much more on situational needs, motivations, and social standing
and relationships among participants. If any "access" structure were to be mapped, it
would need to be based on a broadly participatory mapping process. Participatory
approaches to information access mapping were suggested in (Schroeder, 1997b). Work
on the use of geographic metaphors for visualizing nongeographic relationships is a
continuing research theme in the geographic information sciences, see Skupin and
Fabrikant (2003). The approaches they report are aimed at creating innovative and

effective visualizations of existing data sets, a goal that is somewhat different than the
goal that is adopted here.
The participatory theme was also one concern of a community of researchers who
were addressing the social effects of the proliferation of new information and
communications technologies such as GIs, particularly those involved in National Center
for Geographic Information and Analysis (NCGIA) Initiative 19: GIs and Society (Harris
& Weiner, 1996). This effort included the organization of a workshop on the theme of

"public participation GIs" (PPGIS), see (Schroeder, 1996b) and the crafting of a
theoretical basis for PPGIS in terms of the "criteria for the design of a GISI2" reported by
Sheppard, Couclelis, Graham, Harrington, and Onsrud (1999, p. 8 11). The main tangible
outcome presented here, the multidimensional heuristic workspace, embodies several of
these criteria, including an increased emphasis on the role of participants in creation and
evaluation of data, the equitable representation of diverse views while preserving
contradictions against premature resolution, reflecting the objectives held by each
participant, allowing integrated media and informal sources, and allowing for the use of
alternative coordinate systems.
In these ways, attempts to visualize information relationships changed during the
course of this work, from the geographic, to networks, to the federation of autonomous
workspaces. Consistent with the focus on public participation, an empirical research
project was undertaken with support from the Federal Geographic Data Committee. This
was an effort of learn from qualitative sources (open-ended interviews and small group
discussions) about how information resources were being managed and shared among
GIs users in rural and coastal Maine communities. The goal of the interviews was to
learn if there might be a particular "spatial" component influencing information sharing
behavior across communities and projects. At the wrap-up meeting for this project (May,
1999) an attempt was made to correlate geographic locations of community-based

participants with their primary sharing partners, through an exercise in which participants
drew social network sketches in correspondence with sketches of geographic regions of
interest. Some of the motivation for this came from the work of Paulston and Liebman in
the "social cartography" concept they have advanced in (Paulston & Liebman, 1993) and
in the essays collected in (Paulston, 1996). At the same meeting there was discussion of
alternative metaphors (then termed models) for information, including billiard ball,
digestive and reflection metaphors. This may have marked the effective end of the
empirical stage of this research, and beginning of a rethinking of the dimensions of the
problem that is being addressed.
The effort to systematically evaluate the data texts gathered from these interviews
and from participation in many other community-based meetings focused on information
sharing (particularly meetings of the Gulf of Maine Environmental Information
Exchange, see (Schroeder et al., 2001)) stalled due to the absence of any theoretical
frame within which this spatiality of information sharing could be evaluated. The
development of a list of core concepts related to space and to sharing with which to code
the expressions found in the interviews (see Appendix A: Spatial Terms from Codebook
3) led to a growing sense that spatial concepts and thinking pervade all human
dimensions, and are as intrinsic to the social/cognitive world as found in sharing
processes as they are to the geographic and physical dimensions. The texts were used to
clarify exactly how to identify "questions" that came up during the interviews, as raised
by any of the participants. This approach reflected the overall sense that attention to
questions might provide an avenue toward analysis of sharing relations, and the
recognition of spatiality across questions and involving communities of questioners
became a main focus of investigation. Part of the process of identifying questions, and
learning about the difficulties in specifying questions, was undertaken in the form of an
intercoder agreement exercise. Foi details on the place of intercoder agreement in

qualitative text analysis, see Carey, Morgan and Oxtoby (1996) and Harris, Pryor and
Adarns (Harris, Pryor, & Adams, 1997).
The attempt to analyze the interviews and public meetings sharpened awareness
that what are often considered to be "barriers to information access" are mainly social
rather than technical or physical. The need to reframe access in terms of inclusion and
exclusion rather than in terms of access is an important perspective to have emerged in
this work (Schroeder, 1999). The workspace outlined below is meant to allow the values
of autonomy, transparency and inclusion to be part of the design of the information
system.
An important outcome of the attempt to perform text analysis was the exploration
of various means to manage codebook terms. These codes were managed at first within
the text analysis software being used, AnSWR: Analysis Software for Word-Based
Records (U.S. Centers for Disease Control, 2003), which allowed the terms to be
structured in lists and in simple hierarchical network trees. Visualizing links among the
code terms was not possible. Cross references could be embedded in the text descriptions
of each code, but there was no way to physically see those relationships. In a first step
toward this visualization, all terms were entered in cross-referenced form in the semantic
visualization software SemNet (now discontinued; superceded by Semantics, see
(Semantic Research Inc., 2002) improving on the scheme offered in AnSWR but limited
to views that allowed only one core concept to be seen at a time, with its immediate firstorder linked terms. No overview of the entire network was possible. In addition, SemNet
required the establishment of explicit defined links - a requirement that worked against a
dynamic re-arrangement of concepts. The Axon Idea Processor was then found to resolve
these problems, allowing total network views and management of relations in the form of
clusters as well as explicit links (Axon Research, 2003). SemNet and Axon were located
through Kathleen Fisher's Concept Mapping /Semantic Networking / Knowledge

Representation online resource page (Fisher, 2001). Though Axon provides a multi-level
environment within which to organize concept relations, how to put Axon's levels to
effective use was not apparent until its undifferentiated space was used as environment
for the creation of a multidimensional structure as described in detail below, and in
Chapter 8. One of the significant outcomes of the present work, pointing toward future
directions, is the creation of a flexible three-dimensional space within which to manage
codebook terms for qualitative text analysis.
Given this background, the catalyst for the results given here was found within
the questions and discussions of New Directions Downeast (NDDE), part of a national
effort supported by the National Science Foundation and other sponsors that seeks to
bring earth scientists and humanities scholars together in interdisciplinary team projects.
The particular project of NDDE is titled Visualizaing a Digital Library for the Gulfof
Maine Region. Details about New Directions Downeast, including links to meeting
summaries and information about the national project, are available online (New
Directions Downeast, 2001-2003); a summary report after the project's first year has
been written, that also sketches some of the outcomes presented in this paper as they
relate to the NDDE (Schroeder, 2003). Particularly important were the emergence of the
"resonance metaphor" from these discussions7partly based on a graphic that had been
created within the project for discussion purposes, This Corner of the World (Figure I).
The following paragraphs detail some of the discussions which led to the
production of this graphic, and then relate it to the emergence of the "resonance metaphor
for information" within the NDDE process as a whole. One of the main motivations for
the digital library discussion was toward expanding the usefulness of an existing resource
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under development, the United States Geological Survey's Marine Realms Information
Bank, begun as a facility to provide access to USGS coastal and marine programs
research results (USGS, Coastal and Marine Geology Program2003). Early in the
process, one aspect of visualizing a digital library received particular attention, the goal
of creating an interactive learning environment of which the resources of a digital library
would be a part.
Early discussions included questions about who the intended users of this
expanded information resource might be, and what real needs of local communities,
resource managers and other scientific researchers might be served. To the extent that
very different communities of interest would be invited to participate and make use of
this resource, how could the ranges of interest be accommodated by means of an
improved MRIB? Was there a way to define the dimensions of a "common language"
across the communities of interest in order to make the resource more welcoming and
more useful? The development of this common language would seem to depend on the
availability of a setting for the negotiation of shared meanings, a setting that also does
not yet exist except indirectly in the legal and political process. Another pattern that
emerged was the assumption, in the construction of a knowledge-based information
resource, that its function would be to provide knowledge on behalf of those who have
created it, for the benefit of others for whom this knowledge is absent.
Questions that emerged about both of these assumptions are part of the
background for the particular solution that is offered in the present work. First of all, it
became apparent that a "common language" (sometimes referred to as a shared
"ontology") could not be defined prior to the establishment of an interactive environment
within which this language could be spoken. The first task seemed to be one of creating
an environment for the emergence of shared meanings, rather than by specifying a shared
ontology by means of user studies, analysis of information categories, and so forth.

In addition, the pattern of thought that set one community of participants aside as
being those with expertise, somehow distinguished from others presumed to be lay
learners, would perpetuate a hierarchical structure that would stand in the way of the
open discourse that would need to precede the emergence of a common language. It was
this insight that led toward redefining questions as being interwoven with answers. All
knowledge, it became clear, rested in some measure on prior questions, and all questions
are based on significant though at times limited pools of knowledge. Any solution toward
creating an interactive learning environment would have to level the field in terms of
knowledge held by all participants. An initial attempt to explain the dimensions of a
proposed question-centered approach to information system design was presented as a
contribution to the Foundations of Information Science 2002 online conference
(Schroeder, 2002a).
Discussions among NDDE participants from the Orono group in the early
summer of 2002 began to point toward a synthesis in keeping with the concerns outlined
above: "How do you have discussion between people with very different frames of
reference and modes of thought? . . . Looking for a metaphor that can be translated into a
form that is helpful in bringing people and their questions into closer proximity. . . . How
can questions maintain their self-identity while moving in an environment of other
peoples' questions and answers? . . . Perhaps most important, defining communities of
discourse and who is part of them. . . . MRIB's organization speaks to differentiation, to
'hermetic separation.' Does not speak to commonalities, integration and synthesis. Are
there processes that cut across these disciplines: studies of cyclic process; perhaps
needed, a way to present this, highlighing linkages in a nonhierarchical form. . . . Always
aware of how limited are the horizons and knowledge of [one's] own discipline. . . .
Goal: actualizing people's contributions."

Eventually, a direction suggested by the following question emerged: What if we
thought of asking a question as being analogous to throwing a pebble into a pond? This
became the "generative metaphor" (Schon, 1979) from which many of the results
described in detail below followed. A generic graph that might be of help in situating
questions was created, taking on a shape reminiscent of intersecting great circles on a
sphere, with wavelike lines traversing the enclosed space, all overlain upon three nonintersecting branching tree networks. The basic overlay was obtained from the public
domain design resource, Design on File the form of a graph titled Scatter Graph 1
(Diagram Group, 1984, p. 4.014), whereas the dendritic branches were drawn from a
grape stem that had been used earlier as a physical model that gave substance to the
concept of a hydrographic network. The result became This Corner of the World (Figure
I), which will be referred to throughout the paper below as the two-dimensional base for
what became the multidimensional workspace.
One participant recognized the need for imagery not only to represent things that
are present, but the importance of all the factors that may have been left out of any
particular description or representation, often of as great importance for ongoing work
than what everyone has agreed to include. He noted (see NDDE Orono minutes of
August 30,2002) that conversations of people who have very different interests results
"in a few nodes of intersection, but most of it is [pause] nothingness. [pause] To me
the vast nothingness [signifies] the missed opportunities of communication. So, how do
we bring them into sync with one another, so that they will resonate? I think that's really
what our problem is, what our brief is in this project."
This statement, in tune with the relationships expressed in the graphic, seems to
have been the first appearance of the "resonance" concept within NDDE discussions. It
would be brought into much sharper focus during the meeting of participants from all

three project nodes a few weeks later; see detailed meeting transcript at (New Directions
Downeast, 2002).
Explanation of the graphic began with the generative metaphor of questions7
being like stones thrown into a pond, the result represented in the figure by wave
propagation across its surface, a surface already suggesting other dimensions. The lack of
defined elements and regions would leave room for ambiguity, another objective that had
been raised. The three corners could represent three dimensions, with waves emanating
from each combining forces in three directions. In this way, the harmonics, resonances,
standing waves and dead spots between the waves could be considered. The figure is also
reminiscent of a Venn diagram; intimates relationships across phenomena whose
locations and paths might not be known; and suggests the presence of disturbances and
reflecting surfaces. In addition, the intersecting waves suggested the possibility of
defining a coordinate system in terms of what appeared to be great circles, an approach to
global map projection used by R Buckminster Fuller (1975bp. 710 ff.) that was just
becoming known to members of the NDDE discussion.
At this point it should be noted that This Corner of the World also portrays three
nonintersecting root and branch stems that were originally conceived as a visualization of
various pathways that might be taken in information searching, or that might be usehl in
categorizing nested concepts that often are appropriate when identifying information
conceived as objects arranged in hierarchical levels. Of particular importance is the fact
that these never intersect, that no direct path linking the branch structures is possible
within the terms of the graphic. These nonintersecting branches were taken to represent
the necessary discontinuity of various aspects of cognitive process - the same
discontinuity that Dervin makes a core condition of her "sense-making" process of
information; see (1992, p. 62). The branch structures also modeled, or represented, ideas
about information exploration that had been discussed in NDDE sessions, including such

notions as "tunneling" and the idea that relevant information resources might be viewed
from distances, or seen in illuminating "pools of light" (a pattern in Alexander and
colleagues' Pattern Language (Alexander, Ishikawa, & Silverstein, 1977, p. 1160 ff.))
without affording direct physical access from one position to the others. The importance
of dendritic patterns is noted by Prescott and Richards, who comment about their
sculpture Arbor Vitae in these terms: "Making sense of the world is a process of making
connections, using analogy, metaphor and the noticing of patterns. Many of the patterns
we recognize and our processes of organizing them are dendritic in form" (1999, from
explanatory plaque). The incorporation of such forms into the workspace is intended in
future work.
After the presentation of the graphic, Fausto Marincioni of the USGS coastal and
marine center in Woods Hole, MA remarked that it reminded him of a "reverberation"
model of information suggested in a work by Sarah Michaels as part of an explanation of
how information related to natural disasters, particularly earthquakes, was disseminated
(Michaels, 1992). There was no graphic illustration of this concept in Michaels' article,
but Fausto thought that the This Corner graphic might be a good candidate to illustrate it.
In the article, Michaels suggested that a process of "reverberation" might characterize
passage of information within "issue networks," the informal cross-cutting connections
between researchers and managers that were critical in preparing for and during natural
disaster emergencies. Viewing the earthquate policy community as a whole, Michaels
suggested that "information does not flow through such communities, it reverberates
among various nodes of the networks and often gets lost along the way" (p. 161).
It seems particularly appropriate that the present set of questions being asked by
geologists, now attempting to be resolved through a new metaphor and related
experimental structures, has been advanced with the assistance of a "reverberation"
concept of information as suggested by a student of earthquake information -

earthquakes providing information about their own existence known through resonances
propagated across and through the entire globe.
The heuristic workspace presented here is a variant on a structure or facility that
has been termed "participant observatory." This idea was first presented at a conference
in 1997 (Schroeder, 1997a) and an update on its progress was recently (2002b). That
concept was included in the experimental organization Gulf of Maine Environmental
Information Exchange, and was mentioned in the published summary of that effort
(Schroeder et al., 2001). There is also a similarity between the overall idea presented here
and the "cognitive laboratory" that was suggested as a setting for a program of "heuristic
research" by Herbert Brun (1974).

Conceivinp a Unified Coordinate Svstem
The section above details the attempt to visualize a space that could accommodate

an "interactive learning environment" to complement the functions of a regional digital
library. A shift away from knowledge-based information systems toward questioncentered learning environments is attempted. This reflects the figure-ground shift
between data-centered and human-centered approaches to information, a prominent
theme in Chapters 2 and 4 below.
Beyond the motivating situation of the New Directions Downeast discussions,
one additional theme that recurs throughout this work needs to be introduced here. This is
the intuition that we humans inhabit a single world that has physical and geographic as
well as social and cognitive dimensions, and that these are interrelated much more
closely than our everyday distinctions often suggest. The intimation of this single field,
that suggests the possibility of an approach to crafting a coordination of coordinates, first
came from exploring the spatial terms that might be used in descriptions of information
sharing processes (see list of terms in Appendix A).

As Mark Johnson puts it, "as animals we have bodies connected to the natural
world, such that our consciousness and rationality are tied to our bodily orientations and
interactions in and with our environment" (Johnson, 1987, p. xxxviii). Difficulties
encountered in maintaining distinctions across these dimensions has led to a growing
sense that we live in a single, unified space; that space and spatial terms pervade all
aspects of our existence; and that any approach to understanding spatiality in human
terms should attempt to look at these as the several dimensions of a single coordinate
system. This sense is expressed by Hutchins in stating his own goals, aimed at relaxing
the boundaries that "have been erected, primarily for analytic convenience, in social
space, in physical space, and in time" (Hutchins, 1995, p. xiii).
There is a tradition of similar thought within the discipline of geography. Entrikin
addressed the problem of how to reconcile two major trends in geography, which he calls
the empirical and the phenomenological. He notes that in contrasting the existential space
of the phenomenologists and the metric distances of the empirical geographers, "the
question arises as to whether these two distinct spatial perspectives can be reconciled
within one philosophical framework or represent two divergent paths of geographic
thought" (Entrikin, 1977,209). Each of these approaches assumes that the spatial
concepts used by the other are extensions of its own, as for instance we may uncritically
assume that discussion of space in social domains is essentially a metaphoric extension
from physical geographic space.
This question persists in discussions of geographic theory until today. Doreen
Massey proposes that a thorough reconsideration by geographers of the concepts of space
and time may help to build a bridge between the natural and social sciences, including
their expressions in geography (Massey, 1999). An intimation of this bridge may be seen
in the use of regular polyhedral forms in the heuristic workspace presented below,
compared with a similar base now being explored by geographers who are exploring

alternatives to the dominant Cartesian latitudes and longitudes in use today; see for
example the approaches of Sahr, White and Kimerling (2003) and Dutton (1991 ; 1999).
The possible coordination of the present approach with these is suggested in the section
on future work in Chapter 10.
This chapter has introduced some of the motivations that have prompted the
present work, and has detailed some of the contexts from which these motivations came
and in which they have meaning. The chapters that follow will present the theoretical
considerations that were pursued, given the questions that arose in these project settings.
The major outcome, a structured multidimensional workspace based on a resonance
metaphor and question-centered orientation, is described below in Chapter 8, with a
sample application given in Chapter 9. A summary of conclusions and indication of
future work are presented in the final chapter.

Chapter 2
CONCEPTS AND METAPHORS FOR INFORMATION

This chapter will review several familiar concepts and metaphors for information,
suggesting some of the practical consequences that these may have for the choices that
we make about negotiating within and designing for our information environment.
Lakoff and Johnson, whose work forms the basis for many of the ideas that are
presented in this chapter, point out that our concepts "govern our everyday functioning,
down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get
around in the world, and how we relate to other people" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 3).
We are often unaware of how our concepts are structured, often in the form of basic
metaphors, and how these structures determine our approach to everyday situations and
activities. Because our most familiar concepts are embedded in our customary patterns of
speech, the opportunity to have access to alternative constructs may be to some extent
unavailable, or even inconceivable, to us.

A simple example is given by Lakoff and Johnson to illustrate this point. After
elaborating what they call the "argument as war" metaphor, which is a well-established
structure of thought in our culture, they suggest that we might imagine a hypothetical
culture where "arguments are not viewed in terms of war, where no one wins or loses,
where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground. Imagine a
culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as performers,
and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way" (p. 5).
In this spirit of imagining alternatives, after the more familiar concepts and
metaphors for information are presented, an approach is made toward alternative
constructs, in an attempt to extend our working repertoire of metaphors. These
alternatives are not intended to be replacements for the existing, established constructs,

which do fit many of the processes involved in what we think of as information. Rather,
understanding the implications or consequences of our present constructs, their
"entailments" as Lakoff and Johnson term such consequences, may indicate how
alternatives might expand choices that are perhaps less available to us now.
Three concepts of information (here termed the transmission, natural resource,
and cognitive / constructivist approaches to information) with three metaphors (conduit,
pathway, and resonance) are presented here. The overall approach of this thesis
emphasizes the importance of the third concept of information, the cognitive /
constructivist approach, which is often neglected or not fully exploited even when
recognized as being important for the design of information systems. The resonance
metaphor is offered as an alternative or supplement to the more familiar conduit and
pathway metaphors. The alternative approaches to design that are suggested in later
chapters, including the concept of question-centered learning environments in contrast to
knowledge-based information systems, and the potential of a new "heuristic workspace"
that aims to operationalize some of the new possibilities made available through
examining and extending our concepts and metaphors of information.

Three Concepts of Information

Before exploring the metaphors that often frame our everyday approach to what
we think of as information, information processes and our information environment,
three distinct concepts are presented that are frequently encountered in the information
sciences literature and related formal thinking about information. These share some
characteristics with the metaphors that are described in later sections, though the
metaphors are generally less explicit, and are more embedded in other contexts of
everyday thoughts and actions that extend beyond issues of information.

The sections that follow outline three approaches that address the question,
"What is information?"

Information 1: The S i ~ n aIl Channel, or Transmission Concel~t
Of the commonly recognized concepts of information, the one that is most
technically oriented and closest to the information sciences is based in Claude Shannon's
"mathematical theory of communication" (Shannon & Weaver, 194911964). Reference to
this approach to information occurs widely in information science literature. The brief
outline presented here is based largely on explanations of Shannon's work and its
ongoing importance as provided by Jeremy Campbell (1982).
Campbell summarizes Shannon's primary concerns as being "order and disorder,
error and the control of error, possibilities and the actualizing of possibilities, uncertainty
and the limits to uncertainty" (p. 17-18). Shannon's problems were set in the engineering
of communication systems. The occurrence of terms such as signals, messages, channels,
noise, feedback, communication and control, variety, order and entropy are common in
the Shannon tradition, and in the cybernetics of Norbert Wiener (19481196 1). Most of
these terms, as well as information itself, have technical definitions within
communications theory that for the most part are not understood and that even go against
everyday understandings of their meanings.
Shannon observed that energy and information both could be seen as exhibiting
the process of entropy. His theory was based on the physical laws of thermodynamics
describing the behavior of energy. deriving from the work of Clausius and elaborated by
Bolzmann. These are expressed in what Campbell calls the "famous couplet" of Clausius,
"The energy of the universe is a constant, the entropy of the universe tends to a
maximum" (Campbell, 1982, p. 37). "At the heart of the second law is the insight that
order has value. It enables new forms to be created out of old forms. It makes life

possible, and civilized societies. And it is intimately connected with meaning" (p. 41).
Shannon extended the physical operation of the laws of thermodynamics to
communication processes. For him, "nature" is no longer just matter and energy, but
"Nature must be interpreted as matter, energy, and information" (p. 16).
Campbell suggests the example of the organization of books in a library as one
means toward understanding the relationship between the concepts of information and
entropy in Shannon's theory. Information and entropy act as reciprocals for each other. If
there is only one way that the books can be arranged, and that order is maintained, then
there is a condition of low entropy, disorder is minimized. If the books are randomly
scattered (recalling one image of the organization of the World Wide Web as a library
that contains all the books in the world but they are scattered on the floor) there is a
condition of high entropy, or disorder. The natural tendency toward disorder is expressed
in the second law, above, "the entropy of the universe tends to a maximum." Thus,
information tends toward a minimum. "In the library, high entropy means lack of
information. It means uncertainty" (p. 46-47).
The relationship between information and order is a concept that occurs
throughout discussions about information. The tendency toward disorder helps to define
the actual tasks facing information specialists; since entropy is "an irreversible process. It
does not decrease unless some extra source of energy intervenes to push it back . . ." (p.
49) then information professionals may be considered to be negentropists, working
against the push of natural forces to maintain an world that is informationally useful. As
will be seen in discussion of the third concept of information below, this process of
making order is not just the task of information specialists, but is intrinsic to all human
activity related to expression and understanding.
Among the problems that accompany this approach to information, as noted by
Campbell, is that "disorder is not a wholly objective property" (p. 32) For purposes of

this theory, concerned as it is with the coding and decoding of signals passed through
channels of communication, there is a relationship between probability and information,
"because the first cannot be defined without the help of the second. In Shannon's theory,
entropy is a probability distribution, assigning various probabilities to a set of possible
messages. But entropy is also a measure of what the person receiving a message does not
know about it before it arrives. Entropy is an index of his uncertainty as to what to
expect. If the entropy is a maximum, that is to say, if all the possible messages are
equally probably, then his ignorance is also a maximum."
In cartography, and the realm of geospatial information systems generally, maps
and other systems of geographic representation have sometimes been considered as being
channels for the transmission of information, and as control and feedback devices in the
Shannon tradition. Robinson and Petchenik devote a chapter to the "map as
communication system," providing detailed descriptions from the cartographic literature
in terms of the Shannon model (1976, pp. 23-42). In a more recent work, MacEachren
(1995, p. 459) critically evaluated the "communication paradigm" for maps as having
"floundered due to a fundamental assumption that matched only a small proportion of
mapping situations: maps as primarily a 'vehicle' for transfer of information." He
presents an alternative concept, that he terms a representational perspective, which is
more in line with the cognitive / constructivist concept of information as presented
below. Robinson and Petchenik (1976, p. 88 ff.) report the implications of Jean Piaget's
work for understanding maps of the work of Piaget and his colleagues who are identified
with a constructivist approach to cognition. "Our review in Chapter 2 of the map as
medium of communication noted that recent methodologic writings in cartography have
emphasized that the percipient is an integral functioning component" (p. 108).
For purposes of the discussion that follows, generally, the Shannon theory can be
conceived as being more concerned with preserving the integrity of signals passed

through channels, against the forces of disorder collectively known as noise. As such,
there is a close affinity between this concept and the "conduit metaphor" that is explored
in detail below. The critical analysis that Reddy provides regarding the conduit metaphor
rests upon his observation of the insufficiency of approaches based in the Shannon
tradition, and will be fiuther discussed there.
Campbell, summarizing Shannon's approach, says that the intent is to "insure that
the reliability of the message system as a whole is high, even though the reliability of
transmission of individual symbols may be poor. Thus information theory has to do with
a system in its totality. It takes into account possibilities, and a choice from among
possibilities, and the freer the choice, the larger the amount of information will be. . . .
The theory is not interested in what must happen, because information is the resolving of
uncertainty, and unless uncertainty exists first, there can be no information. It is a theory
of the nonsimple and the noncertainY'(p.254).

Information 2: Information as Obiect or Natural Resource
The second concept of information to be presented here is much more familiar in
everyday terms than the more technical signal 1 channel concept outlined above. It can be
considered to be today's standard approach to understanding what information is. As is
the case in all three of the concepts presented here, the information as object or resource
concept is useful in summarizing a set of processes and relationships that people
encounter in their ongoing activities.
This approach conceives information to be a kind of material object. This allows a
versatile number of operations, activities and relationships to be included in one overall
concept. When viewed in this way, information is considered to be a thing that can be
obtained, stored, moved around, possessed like private property, and managed like
public, common or natural resources. With the potential for becoming property, this view

of information supports efforts to control information through various forms of
"intellectual property." As a resource, information is thought to be amenable to
management in ways that are similar to the management of natural resources such as air,
water and open space.
In this aspect, information is thought to have independent existence, outside of
the people who create and use it. It is thought to be capable of being "accessed" in a
forms that embody universal meanings, useful for many people in many settings. This
perspective is data- and document-centered. In it, there is no distinction maintained
between the contents of databases and documents and information itself. Expressions
about the value of information in this tangible form are often encountered, such as:
"Information is a valuable commodity, and the seeking and retrieval of information have
thus become critical activities in the Information Society. In a data-rich environment,
access becomes the bottleneck in information processing" (Fabrikant & Buttenfield,
200 1, p. 264).
This common understanding of information conceives it as being something to be
found in reference books such as dictionaries and encyclopedias, and maps, or in places
like libraries, doctors' offices, newspapers and the World Wide Web. Dervin (1977, p.
18) whose perspective fits within the person-centered, or cognitive / constructivist
concept of information elaborated below, says that the "collateral" that is "being
exchanged in library service" is thought to be "information" and these premises "pervade
Western civilization." She says that there are assumptions that "there is some universal
truth value about the user's situation" and that "given enough information and given
perfect retrieval of that information, every situation would have a perfect informational
match" (p. 19). In this way our attention becomes preoccupied with "bigger and bigger
storage and retrieval systems."

As conceived in this way, information is thought to be closely involved with the
process of transforming data, a low-value object, into knowledge, through a sort of
refinement or value-adding process, always involving information objects of some sort.
This process is described, for instance, by Cleveland (1985, p. 21) under the rubric "the
knowledge dynamic," where he asserts a progression involving "data, information,
knowledge and wisdom." Cleveland also cites what might be considered the "devolution"
of information, as found in poet T.S. Eliot's "Where is the wisdom we have lost in
knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?"
This data-knowledge spectrum, and problems with it, is also presented in
Oettinger's discussion of information as a resource base for "power in the 21" century."
"The term 'information' appears to cover too much that seems distinctive: knowledge,
data, information in a narrow sense that some treat as synonymous with data, news,
intelligence, and numerous other colloquial and specialized denotations and connotations.
However, the distinctions implied by oppositions such as observations I theories, data I
knowledge, raw intelligence I finished intelligence, accounting details I management
information are secondary, not fundamental in characterizing information resources.
They reflect only relative judgments. For instance, one person's knowledge is often
another's raw data" (Oettinger, 1980, p. 193).
Cleveland explored the idea of treating information as resource, and identified
some of the problems in this approach. In identifying the convergence of computers and
telecommunications as defining aspects of an emerging information society, he claims
that the "'information society' does not replace, it overlaps, the growing and extracting
and processing and manufacturing and recycling and distribution and consumption of
tangible things" (Cleveland, 1985b, p. 2). He reviews technical innovations of the 20th
century, and claims that most innovations were "due to new knowledge or information.
That makes clear the extent to which knowledge is an output or resource." His core

question is presented, "If information (organized data, refined into knowledge and
combined into wisdom) is now our 'crucial resource,' as Peter Drucker describes it, what
does that portend for the future?" (p. 3). He recognizes that "this newly dominant
resource is quite unlike the tangible things we have heretofore thought of as valuable
resources. The differences help explain why we get into so much trouble trying to use for
the management of information concepts that worked all right in understanding the
management of things" (p. 2).
The difficulty of thinking about information in terms of being a public resource as
a good comparable to other material commodities is detailed by Meyer. She discusses
"the economics of information goods" in the following terms. "Pure public goods are
both nonrival and nonexclusive, and thus information is an impure public good. While
information is completely nonrival (to share information with an additional consumer
imposes no cost on those already consuming it), the high costs of transmitting
information mean that exclusion of persons from its benefits is possible. Information can
be sold as a private good -- yet its benefits are not entirely appropriable either." She
continues by quoting Kenneth Arrow: "Information is inappropriable because an
individual who has some can never lose it by transmitting it. . . . But then according to
well-known principles of welfare economics, the inappropriability of a commodity means
that its production will be far from optimal. It may be below optimal; it may also induce
costly protective measures outside the usual property system" (Arrow, Collected Papers,
Vol. 4, 1984, p. 142, as cited by Meyer, 1997, at p. 1129-1130).
These observations on information conceived as a commodity remind us of the
"fictitious commodities" named by Karl Polanyi as being "land, labor and money" (K.
Polanyi, 194411957, Ch. 6) as being integral to the "great transformation" brought about
with the enclosure movement that marked the transition from rural agrarian society to
urban industrialism. These fictitious commodities were the product of the ownership

classes that engineered this social transformation. The establishment of information as a
resource commodity, as embedded in the present concept, may be the product of a similar
concerted, though only partly conscious, effort.
The enclosure movement, and the loss of common property in land, has been
noted in analogy to processes of exclusion related to information as object or resource,
particularly through the rights assumed under intellectual property laws. Reconceiving
information in terms of its being a common property resource has led to the metaphor of
"information commons," a concept that has been advanced by several authors; see (Agre,
1994; Felsenstein, 1993; Mosco, 1989; Onsrud, 1998; Schiller, 1996).
Much of the discussion by these authors is rooted in the information as object /
information as natural resource concept, with reference to the difficulties of sustaining
common property resources as identified by Hardin (1968). Problems and solutions are
presented in terms of opening and assuring access to information resources by wider
publics. They note stresses on our information environment that are parallel to stresses on
the natural environment, and often identifir public policies as being the essential factor in
these processes. Mosco, in calling attention to the dangers of a "pay-per society" in
which all information is clothed in microtransactional protocols, notes a persistent
"growth of a movement to deregulate and privatize -- i.e., turn into market systems -social institutions, including those chiefly responsible for communication and
information. This contrasts sharply with an alternative policy principle: public policy
made by representative bodies, not markets, should meet, not market needs, but the
information needs of citizens who value information, and control over the instruments
that produce and distribute it" (Mosco, 1989, p. 35). His recommendation is that we
should begin with communication and information needs, not markets, and begin with an
expanded notion of literacy.

Potential dangers that accompany the resource management concept of
information are concisely summed up by Boyle (1996, p. E l 5), "We need to figure out
how the world changes when information becomes one of the most important forms of
wealth and power: When everything from the pattern of purchases revealed by credit card
receipts to the pattern of your D.N.A. can become a byte of information, to be bought and
sold in the marketplace. . . . We are in the middle of an information land grab and no one
seems to have noticed." Gary Marx's suggestion (1 997, p. 48) that the class of
"information technologists and marketeers" who "all too often offer solutions in search
of problems and substitute answers for questions" points toward the consequences of the
dominant view of the object 1 resource concept. Information management, in this sense,
can be seen as the base of a valuable center of profit, value and professional self-esteem.
An alternative framing of the commons of information scenario is suggested by
Felsenstein (1993). His notion of "information commons" has less to do with common
property and resource management, and is more in keeping with the idea of information
as being involved in open public discourse. He asserts that all traditional societies,
villages, are "centered around some space of assembly, which usually functions as a
marketplace." He calls the fimction of the village square the fimction of the "agora," and
suggests that the commons of information is "a way of interacting. It is not property" (p.
18). Connecting information with participatory process and public dialogue may help us
to give attention to information in aspects that are distinct from the kinds of activity we
expect when dealing with objects and material natural resources.
Felsenstein's concepts help us bridge from the material to the cognitive view of
information as outlined in the section below. If information here is considered as a
natural resource object, in what follows (maintaining the resource perspective) it can be
considered in human resource terms, in a human-centered rather than object-centered
view.

Information 3: A Person-Centered or Social-Cognitive Approach

The third concept of information that is presented here can be thought of as a
human-centered versus data-centered view outlined above. From this perspective,
situated meanings are given equal importance to universals that are often required in the
agreements and universal ontologies that characterize data-centered and information-asobject approaches. This view recognizes the importance of context as an essential
element in determining information content, and sees the importance of connotative
language as above denotative language, even when factual information is involved. It is
in the tension between particulars and universals, globals and locals, that we find a basic
polarity which affords choices for particular purposes.
In the present view, not only is the cognizing human being the user of
information, but from this perspective information does not even exist until it is
recognized and put to use by people. Information is intimately involved with living
persons, their consciousness, purposes and actions. Whereas such notions as the transfer
of knowledge, information flows, data warehouses, intellectual property, information
economy and so forth fit well with the transmission and resource object views of
infomration, they don't afford much room for creativity, the participation of the knower
in what is known, the negotiation of meanings, or the importance of context in all
communication and knowledge. Because this third concept is less familiar than the first
two described above, and because it is the perspective that this thesis intends to
strengthen, it will be elaborated in somewhat more detail here.
In this person-centered concept, each person is taken to be at the center of his or
her own coordinate system. The phenomenological sociologist Alfred Schutz states the
importance for each person of the "world within my reach," a person-centered
coordinate system, the "center '0' of a system of coordinates which determines certain
dimensions of orientation in the surrounding field and the distances and perspectives of

the objects therein . . ." (Schutz, 1967, p. 307). Liebman, an originator of the "social
cartography" concept expresses it in this way: "Although each mapped community is
self-central while spatially distanced and ideologically detached from other communities,
the mappers' world visions include specific core locations. . . . Simply stated, try as we
may to expand our views of the universe, we still, as relativity theory argues, see all of
space from where we stand -- the point in the whole of space that is the self' (Liebman,
1996, pp. 196-197).
This concept also adopts an action orientation to knowledge. In this view, people
are essential participants in a creative process, they are sense-makers, information
designers, negentropists, and these actions are necessary to their ongoing human
existence. Information is less something to be collected, stored, managed, and bartered,
but rather emerges, is relational, and comes into being and disappears depending on who
is creating it, using it, and forgetting about it at any particular moment.
Integral to this action orientation are recognition of the motivations of individuals
who are participating in information processes. Such concepts as attention, intention and
commitment should have a place in our concept of information. The motivations and
commitments of people, often neglected in information system design because of the
difficulties in identifying, categorizing and measuring the wide ranges of factors that are
involved, have the possibility of being recognized and included in systems that are
designed around the requirements of individuals, who ideally are given full responsibility
for the structure and contents of information environments related to their needs. This is
the intent, in any case, of the design innovations that are offered later in this work.
In library and information science literature, the person who seems most closely
allied with the third notion of information given here is the communications scholar
Brenda Dervin, much of whose work centers on library settings. She calls her approach
"sense-making," which could easily characterize the concept discussed here as well as

person-centered or the more technically phrased cognitive / constructivist approach.
Dervin asserts that because of pervasive "ontological chaos" there will always be an
inability to "attain complete information," leading her to speculate that it "may be more
useful to conceptualize human beings as information designers rather than information
seekers and finders" (Dervin, 1999, p. 41).
She also addresses the "transmission" image of information process directly, and
contrasts it with "construction." "Information is not seen as something that describes a
given reality in an absolute and potentially accurate way, which can be transmitted from
source to receiver through channels, which can be counted by external standards and
pigeon-holed for all time. Rather, information is constructed. The act of constructing and
the act of using that which is constructed is a qualitative act. It varies in kind" (Dervin,
1992, p. 8 1).
Winograd and Flores also question the transmission idea, linking it to rationalistic
and representational traditions of thought. Their theory is based on the notion that
"communication is not a process of transmitting information or symbols, but one of
commitment and interpretation. A human society operates through the expression of
requests and promises among its members. There is a systematic domain relevant to the
structure of this network of commitments, a domain of 'conversation for action' that can
be represented and manipulated in the computer" (Winograd & Flores, 1986, p. 176).
They are deeply concerned "with the discourse and actions that are generated by a
rationalistic interpretation of human action", and know that "computer systems can easily
reinforce this interpretation, and working with them can reinforce patterns of acting that
are consistent with them" (p. 178).
Participation of individual human beings is intrinsic to Anthony Wilden's
definition of information. "Information may be symbolic, imaginary, or real and does
depend for its existence on being perceived by living creatures or human minds or

senses" (Wilden, 1987, p. 76). He urges us to recognize "that matter-energy exists
independently of its being perceived, but information does not" (p. 305 This "application
of energy" is the core of the information act, and it is what distinguishes information
processes from the causal processes of the (Newtonian) physical world. It fits with
Newby's "strong cognitive stance." From this perspective, "information exists only if a
change in knowledge state is brought about" (Newby, 1998, p. 8).
For Dervin, "information is conceptualized as that sense created at a specific
moment in time-space by one or more humans. Information is not seen as something that
exists apart from human behavioral activity. Because there is no direct observation of
reality, all observations result from an application of energy by humans in one or more
forms" (Dervin, 1992, p. 63).
There are frequent calls toward placing actual people at the center of information
processes. Nardi and O'Day (1999) characterize particular people and particular roles as
being "keystone species," integral to their ecological view of information processes.
They "are troubled when people ignore the human intentionality and accountability
behind the use of technological tools" (p. 15). Grosser (1991, pp. 387-388) stresses the
importance of human interaction in networks of information. He notes that information
systems literature often focuses on "the physical nature of the information resource and
its enabling technology" rather than on human dimensions. His review identifies "an
overwhelming preference for human as opposed to document- or computer-based
information sources" due to needs for social interaction, speed of interactions, ease,
expertise, timeliness and the value that people add to information, "interpreting its
meaning and significance in a particular context; this cannot be derived from documents
or computer-based information sources."
An example comes to mind from a group that seeks to improve regional
information and data sharing. The originating meeting that launched the Gulf of Maine

Environmental Information Exchange was initiated with the phrase "people, people,
people" as being what the systems being designed should be about (Farrey, MooneySeus, & Tausig, 1999). This perspective, or requirement, was maintained throughout the
conversations that followed (Schroeder et al., 2001).
To say that "people" are the central organizing concept in the design and
evaluation of information systems is not intended to imply that only people as individuals
are involved in the concept. The present view of information, that also could be termed
the cognitive 1 constructivist view, assumes no clear distinction between the individual
person, that person's motivations and perceptions, and the social and cultural context
within which individual people are embedded. To say "people" are at the center could
easily mean "people in communities," another notion that is underrepresented in the
realm of information systems design and evaluation (see Schroeder, 1999). To the extent
this is a cognitive view, it should also be conceived as a social-cognitive view. This is the
basic perspective of cognition given by Hutchins (1995) and Hall (1 976). Hall's focus is
on cultural factors, and he criticizes current science that has a theory of mind separate
from a theory of culture. "What has been thought of as mind is actually internalized
culture" (p. 168). Sternberg, in presenting a "sociological metaphor" as a core metaphor
of mind, describes the perspective of Lev Vygotsky, whose theory of "internalization"
stresses the basic notion that "we observe those in the social environment around us
acting in certain ways and we internalize their actions so that they become a part of
ourselves" (Sternberg, 1990, p. 242).
The situatedness of information in cultural context also recalls the close
relationship of space and time. This is recognized as a characteristic of the informal
spatial reasoning explored by Egenhofer and Mark in their concept of naive geography
(1995). They assert that "space and time are tightly coupled" and that many units in
geographic space are linked to effort over time, including the acre, "based on the amount

of land that a person with a yoke of oxen or a horse can plow in one day or one
morning," as well as "similar measures for distance, such as how far a person can walk in
an hour" (p. 8). The close relationship between space and time will be discussed further
below in Chapter 3.
The perspective adopted here is represented in geographic information science by
Couclelis' definition of information: "Contrary to some common misconceptions,
information is not a thing - i.e. a bunch of bits - but a relation between a sign and an
intentionality: the sign(s) being, in this case, the various graphic and other forms of GIs
output, and the intentionality, the purposeful human intelligence giving meaning to these
signs" (Couclelis, 1999, p. 34-35). In another source she states that a "useful operational
distinction between data and information is that data can be automatically manipulated
and processed by a machine, whereas information presupposes the involvement of a
cognitive agent . . . information (as opposed to data) is neither contained in, nor provided
by, an information system independently of a cognitive agent who is both capable and
willing to make sense of it. In semiotic terms, the diverse graphical, textual, numerical,
etc. outputs of an information device form a system of signs that need to be purposefully
deciphered for meaning" (Couclelis, 1998, p. 21 1). "Most importantly, information arises
through someone recognizing it as such. . . . Information may not constitute knowledge,
but it is closely related to it. Knowledge presupposes a knowing subject."
A person-centered approach to information should acknowledge the importance
of personal motivations such as the "commitment" recognized by Michael Polanyi in his
theory of personal knowledge. He uses the expression "making sense" in the section on
commitment (M. Polanyi, 1962). A commitment is "the general principle by which our
beliefs are anchored in ourselves" (p. 59). Any method of knowledge, including
scientific, includes informal suppositions, which come with "learning to speak of things
in a certain language, in which there are names for various kinds of objects, names by

which objects can be classified, making such distinctions as between past and present,
living and dead, healthy and sick, and thousands of others. Our language includes the
numerals and the elements of geometry, and it refers in these terms to laws of nature
whence we can pass on to the roots of these laws in scientific observations and
experiments. . . . It is by his assimilation of the framework of science that the questions
and commitments of scientists makes sense of experience. This making sense of
experience is a skilful act which impresses the personal participation of the scientist on
the resultant knowledge. It includes the skill of carrying out correctly the measurements
which verify scientific predictions or the observations by which scientific classifications
are applied. . . . The tracing of personal knowledge to its roots in the subsidiary
awareness of our body as merged in our focal awareness of external objects, reveals not
only the logical structure of personal knowledge but also its dynamic sources" (p. 60).
In a perspective from cartographic theory that is compatible with the approach in
this section, MacEachren states, "The communication paradigm . . . floundered due to a
fundamental assumption that matched only a small proportion of mapping situations:
maps as primarily a 'vehicle' for transfer of information. A representational perspective,
in contrast, begins with an assumption that the process of representation results in
knowledge that did not exist prior to that representation; thus mapping and map use are
processes of knowledge construction rather than transfer. To more fully understand how
maps work, then, we must consider the ways in which mapmakers structure knowledge
and the ways in which cognitive and social processes applied to the resulting
cartographic representations restructure that knowledge and yield multiple alternative
representations" (MacEachren, 1995,459).
MacEachren's recognizes the creative act of map making: "Maps are powerful
tools, and have been for centuries, because they allow us to see a world that is too large
and too complex to be seen directly. The representational nature of maps, however, is

often ignored - what we see when looking at a map is not the world, but an abstract
representation that we find convenient to use in place of the world. When we build these
abstract representations (either concrete ones in map form or cognitive ones prompted by
maps) we are not revealing knowledge as much as we are creating it" (MacEachren,
1995, p. v). This perspective is directly connected to the approach to knowledge
described in the section that follows.

A Note on Constructivist vs. Positivist Epistemolow

The third approach to information, a person-centered or social/cognitive
approach, can best be understood within an existing tradition of thought and work termed
"constructivist epistemology." Epistemology in general refers to formal theories about
our ways of knowing, and constructivism places primary responsibility for knowing with
the actively involved knower.
Constructivism, of which there are many varieties, can most easily be understood
as being distinguished from the positivist and empiricist traditions. Positivism is defined
as follows: ". . . systems of philosophy holding that theology and metaphysics belong to
earlier or imperfect modes of knowledge whereas positive knowledge is based on natural
phenomena and their spatio-temporal properties and invariant relations or upon facts as
elaborated and verified by the methods of the empirical sciences" (Webster's Third
International, p. 1770). Empiricism asserts that ". . . knowledge depends ultimately on
the use of the senses and on what is discovered through them" (Hamlyn, 1967, p. 499).
Feigl describes the program of logical empiricism, which aims at universal formalization
of language toward the orderly arrangement of the data of experience, a language "that
would provide for the 'unity of science"' He suggests that "the unity of the language of
science simply amounted to asserting common, communicable perceptual experience to

be the ultimate testing ground for all sorts of factual knowledge claims" (Feigl, 1973, p.

548).
Entrikin notes that "scientific geography" always has a positivist orientation, even
when subjective space is the object of study. This positivist approach is based on
"empirical observation, public verifiability of conclusions, and the importance of
isolating fact from value" (Entrikin, 1977, p. 2 10). Even behavioral geographers maintain
"the existence of a 'real,' objective world and have considered man's images of the world
as deformations of reality" (p. 2 12). For instance, cognitive mapping as presented by
Downs and Stea (1973, 10) is the process of "acquisition, amalgamation, and storage" of
"information fiom a complex, uncertain, changing, and unpredictable source via a series
of imperfect sensory modalities." They ask, "How is information, derived from the
absolute space of the environment in which we live, transformed into the relative spaces
that determine our behavior?" (p. 12). They affiliate theirs with a program of developing
"cumulative scientific knowledge" (p. 13).
In presenting a traditional model for perception and knowledge in terms of a
spatial metaphor (and introducing two alternatives, one based in the work of Maturana
and Varela, who are in the constructivist tradition) Fleischaker says the traditional model
is grounded in Descartes, Locke, Kant and Helmholz. "The traditional model is a causal
one in which the properties of the external physical object affect the retina to generate an
internal mental image of that object." There is a distinction between sensation of the
external world and perception in the internal world. Though the internal representation
may be considered as does "Kant, that the internal representation has been actively
assembled or, with Von Helmholtz, that it has been passively mirrored they all maintain
that "the external object and the internal representation are numerically and temporally
distinct and that the internal representation is the end product of a causal and

unidirectional chain which starts with the external object" (Fleischaker, 1984, p. 41). The
external world is thus the real world, and the internal world is its representation.
Roediger's suggestion of "alternatives to the spatial metaphor" for memory
(which is a composite of the characteristics of the object orientation to information and
the conduit and pathway metaphors detailed below) relies on the "constructivist"
approach of Neisser (Roediger, 1980, p. 239 ff.). He states that a "cognitive approach to
memory and thought" implies that "our original perception of the world is a construction
and that what we remember is the constructive act of the initial perception and
comprehension." On this point he quotes Neisser (1967, p. 285-286), "The present
proposal is, therefore, that we store traces of earlier cognitive acts, not the products of
those acts. The traces are not simply 'revived' or 'reactivated' in recall; instead, the
stored fragments are used as information to support a new construction" (Roediger,
1980).
Von Glasersfeld observes that cognitive scientists generally distinguish
themselves from behaviorists and other traditional approaches in terms of constructing
versus receiving knowledge. "A genuinely constructivist theory of knowledge must deal
not only with the process of cognitive construction but also with the relationship which
the results of any such construction might have to the reality of the traditionally
presumed ontological world" (von Glasersfeld, 1985, p. 92). He asserts a constructivist
account of objectivity that is also "free from the traditional epistemological paradox" in
these terms: "From that perspective, objectivity arises when concepts, relations and
operations that I have found to be viable in the management of my own experience, turn
out to be viable also when I attribute them to the models of Others which I construct to
manage my interactions with them" (p. 99).
This circular process of interacting social relationships is part of what preserves
the constructivist approach from being an expression of pure subjectivity. However,

moving away from a model of knowledge that depends on the existence of independent
entities in the world, of which we have knowledge that is presumed to be verifiable, can
involve disorientation. "Maybe one of the reasons why we avoid tapping the roots of our
knowledge is that it gives us a slightly dizzy sensation due to the circularity entailed in
using the instrument of analysis to analyze the instrument of analysis" (Maturana &
Varela, 1987, p. 24). As Lehar puts it, "there is something deeply mysterious about
consciousness, which is forever beyond our capacity to fully comprehend. As Searle
(1 992) explained, when we attempt to observe consciousness, we see nothing but

whatever it is we are conscious of; there is no distinction between the observation and the
thing observed" (Lehar, 2003, p. 3).
The paragraphs above represent an outline of the idea of constructivist
epistemology in the present context. The works of a number of writers relied upon here
indicate that their fundamental stance is in accord with a constructivist approach to
knowledge, sometimes presented in somewhat different terms, such as Dervin's "sensemaking," Reddy's "radical subjectivity," Newby's "strong cognition," and Maturana's
(6

autopoiesis." Couclelis' definition of information also fits: "Information is the relation

that connects a sign with an intentionality. . . . Most importantly, information arises
through someone recognizing it as s u c h (Couclelis, 1998, p. 21 1).
One additional concept should be introduced as being integral to the constructivist
approach connected to the person-centered concept of information. This is
"discontinuity." Dervin provides the "core assumption on which sense-making rests -the assumption of discontinuity. . . . This assumption proposes that discontinuity is a
fundamental aspect of reality. It is assumed that there are discontinuities in all existence -

- between entities (living and otherwise), between times, and between spaces. It is
assumed that this discontinuity condition exists between reality and human sensors,
between human sensors and the mind, between mind and tongue, between tongue and

message created, between message created and channel, between human at time one and
human at time two, between human one at time one and human two at time one, between
human and culture, between human and institution, between institution and institution,
between nation and nation, and so on. Discontinuity is an assumed constant of nature
generally and the human condition specifically" (Dervin, 1992, p. 62). She distinguishes
her approach from the "radical constructivist" which she takes to be "no order out there
or that there are no tools humans can use to arrive at more comprehensive and more
stable pictures of that reality." Rather, whatever order there is, is discontinuous; it is "not
directly accessible by human observers," and there is not assumed "an external standard
to which they can turn for an assessment of their truth, either in an absolute or even a
relative sense."
A simple example of this situation of discontinuity, which I often characterize as

there being "no inputs," can be seen in the process of engaging in face-to-face discourse.
Each person may have a large repertoire of sounds and gestures that are used to express
meaning in direct conversation. Yet, in a very physical sense, there are "no inputs," there
is nothing but vibrations variously generated, sound and light wave forms, that then
disturb or perturb the sensory apparatus of viewers and listeners - but there are no
"gestures," no "words" that actually pass from one person to the other. Jackendoff
describes this in terms of the processes of vision. The brain does not interpret images
because it does not see images. "When light strikes the eyes, the lenses focus it to
produce images on the retinas. But nobody looks at those images either. Rather, the
retinas convert the light into patterns of neural impulses, and it's nothing but neural
impulses from there on out" (Jackendoff, 1994, p. 172).
Seen from this standpoint, interpersonal communication has the character of
performance, rather than as involving the transmission of objects, as we would expect
from information theories based in the concepts of signals, channels, and information

objects. An understanding of the reality of discontinuity forms the basis for
understanding the notion of person-centered information, and how it differs from
traditional views that place information into an abstract interpersonal space rather than
into the creative, constructive domain of human actions.

Surnmarv of Three Concepts of Information
Three concepts of information have been reviewed here. The first appeared with
the emergence of telecommunications technologies, and is part of the theoretical basis of
the information sciences. The second reflects most people's everyday notion of
information as something represented as an object (physical document or conceptual
object) that exists as common property in the world, something that can be located,
owned, and shared or not. The third is grounded in the actions of people, who create
information through the choices they make, in an action orientation to information
involving intentionality and other motivating forces, an ongoing "sense-making" that
cannot itself make sense without the involvement of people as individuals or through
their collective social institutions.
Brenda Dervin's work advocates for the grounding of library services in the
sense-making approach speaks for an understanding of the third approach in library
settings. She has described the standard questions about how to provide library services
in the following terms. Librarians typically ask, "what information resources do citizens
want?" and what are their "information needs?" However, these avoid more fundamental
questions about what information is with customary answers: "Information describes
reality. It reduces uncertainty and allows people to cope better. Information behaviors
can be predicted on the basis of demographic attributes of people. Libraries can help by
providing the 'right' information at the 'right' time. . . . The current view of
information . . . is one that theoretically implies a view of the world as a place in which

there is complete order. Information is but a description of the order. To the extent that
an order is not described, information is somehow missing and must be found." She
claims that this is a view of man as adapting to nature; but "man creates as well as
adapts" (Dervin, 1977, p. 20-21).
The present work is intended to be situated in the tradition of Dervin's view of
information as expressed with co-author Patricia Dewdney in a later work (Dervin &
Dewdney, 1986). "The picture of information that emerges . . . is fundamentally different
from the more prevalent concept of it as a commodity: this postulates that information is
an autonomous object that can be stored, accessed, and transferred. From the alternative
perspective proposed here, information does not have an independent existence but is
rather a construct of the user" (p. 507).
There is a fundamental tension among the concepts of information presented here.
An adequate resolution is sought that will appropriately integrate the potentials of all
three. The tension may be understood in terms of a two-sidedness in all objects and
expressions, as expressed by the interpreter of indigenous architectures Suzanne Blier.
For her these are expressed in "ontological" and "metaphorical" dimensions: ". . . the
issues of ontological and metaphorical expression are central. Ontology, rooted in the
reality of human existence, is contextualized in concrete experiences. . . . Metaphor also
has basis in experience. . . . Ontology and metaphor thus are complementary aspects of
an object's (or idea's or structure's) significance. One conveys the reality defined in
actual experience; the other extracts from this reality, transferring its meaning to other
forms and ideas. Each complements the other in conveying meaning and symbolic intent"
@p. 1-2).
In a similar way, the various concepts of information may be read as
manifestations of the ontological and the metaphorical aspects present in all expressions
with significance. It seems that information must always involve two contradictory or

paradoxical aspects: the material, medium, object, documentary aspect; and the
cognitive, interpretive aspect. Our task seems to be to recognize these as expressions of a
unified whole in being and in process.
Keeping the whole in view is complicated by the difficulties in keeping the
various senses of the word information straight, even among those who understand the
distinctions at hand and want to preserve them. Couclelis, for instance, states that
"information arises through someone recognizing it as such" and that "an information
system thus neither contains nor provides information" (1998, p. 21 1). Yet her
information spaces are populated with "information objects" and a transportation of
objects model is inferred in sections devoted to information landscapes and information
retrieval. In a similar way, Newby is sympathetic with what he terms the strong cognitive
stance, creates a distinction between "cognitive space" and "information space," but blurs
the concept of information through discussion of "information objects" that "produce
information" in users - providing us with two senses for information, one external in the
object and one internal in the action of the user (Newby, 2001, p. 1021).
These are only mentioned in order to emphasize some of the difficulties of the
task, which involves maintaining clear distinctions while using terms in which these
distinctions are already blurred, sometimes intentionally serving particular interests and
agendas (Poerksen, 198811995). Our formal definitions and customary word uses
influence our conceptual structures, all of which help to determine the range of our
customary or possible actions. Habitual speech obstructs alternative ways of thinking. By
placing a focus on the sense-making approach to information, without excluding the
possible benefits of employing the more familiar and accepted concepts, our intent is to
increase available choices and range of actions.

Metaphors for Information Processes

This section presents three metaphors for information. The first, the "conduit"
metaphor, was elaborated by Michael Reddy in a landmark study (Reddy, 197911993) in
which the conduit image was linked to prevailing ideas of what happens in
"communication." The concern about communication, which was prominent in the
decades before the 1970s when his essay appeared, has since then been replaced by a
dominant discourse over the meanings of "information." Reddy's "conduit metaphor" is
closely tied to a critique of the model for communication advanced by Shannon and
Weaver, discussed above also in terms of the signallchannel concept of information.
The second metaphor for information presented here is termed the "pathways to
knowledge" metaphor. This metaphor colors much of what is thought to be related to
knowledge acquisition and problem solving. It has not been elaborated in any single
source such as Reddy's treatment of the conduit metaphor. In the information sciences,
this metaphor is closely related to information "search and retrieval." Here, discussion of
this metaphor relies on the work of Lakoff and Johnson, particularly their identification
of the source-path-goal schema as a fundamental construct of spatial relations in our
thinking, emerging in various forms such as "achieving purposes" is "commonly
conceptualized as reaching a destination" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 5 17). They present
this metaphor as being involved in all of our concepts of "means-end rationality . . . the
choice of means for maximizing the achievement of purposes and minimizing unwanted
outcomes." For purposes of this paper, this process is considered to be closely related to
question asking and answering, and problem solving in general, which are assumed to be
centrally involved in information processes. As with Reddy's conduit metaphor, the
pathways-to-knowledge metaphor is closely tied to the two most commonly held
concepts of information, the signallchannel and resource object views.

The third metaphor for information that is suggested here is termed the
"resonance metaphor." While expressions of resonance, reverberation, and similar terms
appear occasionally in literature about cognition, learning, and communication generally,
this aspect or quality of information processes has received little systematic treatment. As
presented here, the resonance metaphor is proposed as a complement to the conduit and
pathways images. In a sense, it is meant to add to our available repertoire of leading
images about what information is, in order to overcome some of the conceptual
limitations that are embedded in the other two. The resonance metaphor is intended to
express the person-centered concept of information presented throughout this work.
The sections will outline these metaphors as they relate to information, and will
explain how they may together afford a more comprehensive basis on which to base
activities such as the design of information systems than is otherwise available to us.

Generative Metaphors
The importance of metaphors for our understanding of our world, and
communication of that understanding, has been made clear through the work of George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson and in works such as are collected in Andrew Ortony's

Metaphor and Thought (1979/1993). In their book Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and
Johnson (1980) present an example that might serve well in setting a conceptual frame
for the ideas presented in this chapter.
In their example, Lakoff and Johnson outline for readers an "argument is war"
metaphor, in which the language of war is shown to be present in most discussion about
arguments between people generally. Included are such concepts as defeating, taking and
defending of positions, winning and losing. Many of our responses to the activity of
engaging in argument can be assigned to implications of the argument is war metaphor.
This seems perfectly natural, given our cultural frame. Then they suggest the question,

how would arguments be different if another leading metaphor were involved? It is
certainly hard for the reader to imagine an alternative, so they propose one: argument as
dance, or performance. They provide a contrast to the argument as war metaphor through
an hypothetical culture where "arguments are not viewed in terms of war, where no one
wins or loses, where there is no sense of attacking or defending, gaining or losing ground.
Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as a dance, the participants are seen as
performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way" (p.
5).
In a similar way, it is suggested here that our prevailing understanding of
"information" is colored by leading metaphors that may limit choices available to us as
we engage in activities such as asking questions, solving problems, and learning
generally. Metaphors that in effect take over our conceptual choices, setting frames for
our actions in ways that we are not fully aware, have been termed "generative
metaphors" by Donald Schon. His essay on this subject immediately precedes Reddy's
on the conduit metaphor, in Metaphor and Thought, and Reddy refers directly to this
concept as an indicator of the importance of that and similar studies.
Schon begins by stating that some authors seek to discount the importance of
metaphor, considering it to be an "anomaly of language" and as something that is
disruptive to the search for any"genera1 theory of reference or meaning" (Schon, 1979, p.
254). He rather asks readers to consider metaphors as being central to all of our
perspectives and frames, our "way of looking at things," the "process by which new
perspectives on the world come into existence." He focuses particularly on the distinction
between problem-setting and problem-solving approaches to policy making. In his terms,
the making of social policy is usually considered as a problem-solving enterprise; he
would rather give primary attention to the processes of "problem setting," raising
awareness of "the ways in which we frame the purposes to be achieved than with the

selection of optimal means for achieving them" (p. 255). This will bring our attention to
the fact that we think in terms of generative metaphors and the analogies and
"disanalogies" between familiar descriptions and the "actual problematic situations that
confront us" (p. 255).
The outcome of this attention, he claims, is the possibility of what he calls "frame
restructuring." "There is a kind of cognitive work common to the integration of
conflicting frames and to the making of generative metaphor, and to this shared process I
have given the name 'frame restructuring and frame coordination'" (p. 279). "In all of
this, we need to ask what is involved in learning to do this kind of cognitive work? What
is its relation, on the one hand, to domain-specific knowledge and, on the other hand, to
very general sorts of competence in the use of language?" He also asks about "the
conditions favorable to the practice of frame restructuring" (p. 280).
Much of the discussion below is intended to point toward a particular kind of
frame restructuring that may be needed related to our ideas of information. The concept
of "frames" is intrinsically spatial, and exploration of the meaning of spatial frames of
reference in the work of Stephen Levinson (1996) and other authors will suggest the basis
for the kind of shift in generative metaphor that Schon, Reddy and others have called for.
The discussion below will examine spatial concepts that are intrinsic to these metaphors,
toward frame restructuring for our overall understanding of information processes.

The Conduit Meta~hor
Whereas Schon's primary concerns were with the definition of social policy
problems, and the ways in which generative metaphors might aid or stand in the way of
policy problem solving, Michael Reddy took the perspective offered by Schon and turned
it directly toward defining problems in language. He suggests that these problems of
language are similar to the problems that Schon identifies, but replayed at a more

fundamental level, "several octaves lower" (Reddy, l979/1993). We should note here
that although Reddy in several places uses figurative language that intimates the
"resonance metaphor" offered below (e.g. "several octaves lower"), he does not comment
directly on these forms or their potential usefulness in solving the problems he surveys in
his essay. Such terms and phrases as "right set of notes," "long awaited music," (p. 164)
and "logical reverberations" (p. 170) appear in his discussion.
The importance of Reddy's contribution was expressed by Lakoff in his essay on
"contemporary theory of metaphor" that was in the second edition of the collection in
which Reddy's essay also appears. In a section titled "Homage to Reddy" Lakoff called
Reddy's a "now classic essay" that in a "single, thoroughly analyzed example . . .
allowed us to see, albeit in a restricted domain, that ordinary everyday English is largely
metaphorical, dispelling once and for all the traditional view that metaphor is primarily in
the realm of poetic or 'figurative' language" (Lakoff, 1979/1993, pp. 203-204).
In Reddy's view, "The problems of society, government, and culture depend
ultimately on something like the daily box score of such successes or failures to
communicate" (pp. 165-166) as were presented in Norbert Wiener's concern about the
"basic processes of human communication" in his book The Human Uses of Human

Beings. Reddy identified Wiener as "one of the originators of information theory" (p.
164) and refers throughout to the theory of information and communication in terms of
the conduit metaphor. Reddy's analysis is made with a sense of urgency and commitment
to change that makes it clear he does not look at our views of language, information and
communication as of simply academic interest. To his readers he states an intent "to
convince you of what may be a disturbing premise: that merely by opening our mouths
and speaking English we can be drawn into a very real and serious frame conflict. My
own belief is that this frame conflict has considerable impact on our social and cultural
problems. If we are largely unable, despite the vast array of communications

technologies available to us today, to bring about substantive improvements in human
communication, it may well be because this frame conflict has led us to attempt faulty
solutions to the problem" @. 165).
He continues by offering a personal account of how he came to a shift in his own
frame restructuring, over several years "collecting some new facts and talking about
them with many different people. Very slowly, during this period of time, these new facts
initiated a frame change in my own thinking about language" @. 166). Given an entirely
new frame, he knows that describing it and getting acceptance from others will be
difficult, since he found himself "speaking across the chasm of frame conflict." In this
way, Reddy lets his readers know that the attainment of a new frame is the result of a
realization, a commitment and an effort, and invites them to begin to see the benefits that
a similar reframing may have for them. We might note that the usage "chasm" as applied
to human communication and understanding is spatial. This is similar to Brenda Dervin's
"gaps" that will be discussed in later sections (Dervin, 1992), and serves to alert us to the
many ways in which spatial concepts are part of the frames and metaphors used when we
are discussing aspects of communication and our information environment.
Given his commitment to the importance of his message, what are the
characteristics of the "conduit metaphor" of communication? There are four categories
that make up the "major framework of this metaphor: "(I) language functions like a
conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person to another; (2) in writing and
speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words; @. 3) words accomplish
the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others; and (4)
in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the
words" (p. 170). Thus, words are containers that somehow are shipped among
participants in communication, transferred via channels he calls conduits. This process
also implies that thoughts and ideas somehow attain independent existence in an "idea

space" that lies external to people and that is without "any need for living human beings
to think or feel them" (p. 170). Reddy makes it clear that a concept of communication
that departs from human beings, via "reified thoughts and feelings" (p. 170) is not a
suitable model. The resonance metaphor presented below intends to establish a base for
understanding information from the perspective of the cognizing human subject, without
which our concept of the information process is not complete.
Given the inadequacy of the conduit metaphor, Reddy suggests that "some
alternate way of conceiving of human communication" is needed (p. 171) and presents an
extended scenario that he calls the "toolmaker's paradigm" as the expression of a
possible alternative. The set of activities and relationships he proposes is complex, based
on people who are thought to occupy nearby environments, similar to each other's but
not the same, and with no direct access across the boundaries that separate them. "Let us
suppose that the people in these environments have learned how to . . . exchange crude
sets of instructions with one another - instructions for making things helpful in surviving,
such as tools, perhaps, or shelter, or foods, and the like. But there is, in this story,
absolutely no way for the people to visit each other's environments, or even to exchange
samples of things they construct. This is crucial" (p. 172).
Again, this "absolutely no way . . . to visit . . . or even to exchange" is a theme
that will be seen again in what is presented below in this work as a whole. Generally it
will be identified with the word "discontinuity" or "discontinuities," and the desirability
of discontinuity rather than conceiving it as a problem to be solved. It is another facet of
the information process that is embraced by Dervin in her "sense-making" view of
information, a solution particularly designed for library environments that is firmly
situated within the human-centered approach that is advocated here.
What is implied by this structure of discrete environments that Reddy asks us to
imagine? It is that "people only know of one another's existence indirectly, by a

cumulative series of inferences." He calls this situation "the postulate of 'radical
subjectivity"' (p. l72), and it is clear that this intuition is an important element of the
frame restructuring that Reddy himself underwent. Reddy then presents an analysis of the
mathematical theory of communication and its base in the second law of
thermodynamics, the natural increase of entropy, that "all forms of organization always
decrease in time" (p. 175). In fact, "successful human communication involves an
increase in organization, which cannot happen spontaneously or of its own accord." In
this way, human communication acts against the forces presumed by the second law. The
force of human communication is that we always are applying energy to overcome the
tendency to entropy. "Human communication will almost always go astray unless real
energy is expended" (p. 174). It is this fact that points toward the central misconception
perpetuated by the conduit metaphor, implicit in much of our ways of speaking about
communication, in which processes of transmission seem to take care of outcomes that
only the direct application of human energy can bring about. In Dervin's terms, we are all
and always "information designers" and it is from fundamental acknowledgement of that
position that we should be interpreting the information process (Dervin, 1999).
The point of all this for Reddy was that if the "conduit metaphor is a real and
powerful semantic structure in English, which can influence our thinking - then it
follows that 'common sense' about language may be confused. I confess that it took
nearly five years for me to come around to radical subjectivism as 'common sense"' (pp.
175-176). It is an intention to support a general shift in "common sense" that Reddy
achieved that motivates much of the presentation below, including the proposal of the
resonance metaphor. He says that "no speaker of English, not even your author, has
discarded the conduit metaphor" and that this will not happen "until we succeed in
bringing about an entire series of linked changes in the English language" (p. 176). In
this way, he is making an open appeal for change, not just in the way that we understand

our communication processes, but in the way that we actually act upon our
understandings. He calls the hold of the conduit metaphor a "semantic pathology" that
began with the serious problems that the originators of information theory, Shannon and
Weaver brought about with how they "chose to name the parts of the paradigm." The
extension of information theory, in Shannon and Weaver's terms, met with frequent
failure. "I think that the reason for these failures was the interaction of the conduit
metaphor with the conceptual foundations of information theory. As soon as people
ventured away from the original, well-defined area of the mathematics, and were forced
to rely more on ordinary language, the essential insight of information theory was
muddled beyond repair" (p. 182).
As example, Reddy looks at the term "message" as used in Shannon and Weaver,
and as understood in everyday speech. A message can be both a set of signals, as in "I got
your message, but had no time to read it," and as the alternative states represented by the
signals among which choices must be made in interpretation, as "I get the message, let's
leave him alone" (p. 183). For Reddy, since the theory is based on the notion that the
second kind of message is never sent anywhere, whereas the first is, "this choice of
words leads to the collapse of the paradigm." If the originators had taken more care, they
would have more clearly distinguished between the different messages, with different
terms. However, in Reddy's view, they could not have taken this care, since "their
thought processes were responding to the biasing effect of the conduit metaphor." He
quotes Weaver directly: "How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey the desired
meaning?" (italics Reddy's) and discussion of two "messages, one of which is heavily

loaded with meaning and the other of which is pure nonsense" (emphasis Weaver's, p.
184). Further confusions about the function of the signals in the theory, that they "do
something" (afford the "power to reproduce an organization by means of nonrandom
selections") while also speaking as if they "contain" something (p. 184).

At the end of his extended analysis, Reddy claims that these fundamental
confusions about what is happening in the communication process causes us to neglect
the responsibility of participants in the communications process, and to avoid the real
work that must be done (p. 185). The conduit metaphor, pervasive in our ways of
speaking, helps us to believe that communication is a "success without effort" system
when in fact "energy must be expended." When we begin to believe that information has
to do with the creation of, transfer and storage or more and more signals, we "neglect the
crucial human ability to reconstruct thought patterns on the basis of signals and this
ability founders" (p. 188).
The final extended example that Reddy offers is to apply these considerations to
the common understanding of what a library is. He dismantles the assumption that ideas
are in libraries by analyzing a "chain of metonymies" that involves our thinking that
ideas are in words, and words are on pages, and pages are in books, and books are in
libraries, thus ideas may be found in libraries. Refiamed, however, "there are of course
no ideas in the words, and therefore none in any books, nor on any tapes or records.
There are no ideas whatsoever in any libraries. All that is stored in any of these places are
odd little patterns of marks or bumps or magnetized particles capable of creating odd
patterns of noise. Now, if a human being comes along who is capable of using these
marks or sounds as instructions, then this human being may assemble within his head
some patterns of thought or feeling or perception which resemble those of intelligent
humans no longer living. But hits is a difficult task . . ." (p. 187). In fact ideas and culture
are not in documents and libraries, and there "is no culture at all unless it is reconstructed
carefully and painstakingly in living brains of each new generation. All that is preserved
in libraries is the mere opportunity to perform this reconstruction."
Another observer (Von Foerster, 1980) called attention to the distinction between
the documents and their arrangement in a library and the "information" they are thought

to contain in terms similar to Reddy's. He wrote, "Nevertheless, since we think we know
what information is, we believe we can compress it, process it, chop it up. We believe
information can even be stored and the, later on, retrieved: witness the library, which is
commonly regarded as an information storage and retrieval system. In this, however, we
are mistaken. A library may store books, microfiches, documents, films, slides, and
catalogues, but it cannot store information. One can turn a library upside down: no
information will come out. The only way one can obtain information from a library is to

look at those books, microfiches, documents, slides, etc. One might as well speak of a
garage as a storage and retrieval system for transportation. In both instances a potential
vehicle (for transportation or for information) is confused with the thing it does only
when someone makes it do it. Someone has to do it. It does not do anything" (p. 19).
Von Foerster also provides the humorous and memorable image of the
"Nuremberg Funnel," a caricature of the conduit metaphor. "I always believed that
thinking of knowledge as packagable, transmittable, marketable commodity was arecent
perversion until I ran into a broadsheet printed in the late 161hcentury that dramatically
depicts an elementary educational situation. A young lad, apparently a student, is seated
on a chair and has a funnel inserted through a hole into his head. Next to him stands a
teacher with a bucket full of knowledge which he is in the process of pouring through the
funnel into the student's head. A few letters, numerals and a simple equation are seen just
falling from the bucket." Von Foerster suggests that this pedagogical method is still with
us, "funnel-aided instruction" (Von Foerster, 1982, p. 279). After discussion of the many
implications of this prevailing view, he continues "I hope it is sufficiently clear that
teaching via the Nuremberg Funnel would not work, not because of the funnel, but
because of the bucket - it won't hold knowledge" (p. 28 1). A contemporary illustration

by Peter Bennett that is reminiscent of the Funnel is reproduced here (Figure 2). It
originally appeared as an untitled illustration for an article by Lawrence Lessig on
regulating the Internet (Lessig, 2000, p. 27).
Reddy's concerns about the dominance of the conduit metaphor in our thinking
about communication and information processes generally are reflected in the
motivations for the present work. The search for an alternative metaphor begins with the
understanding that information does not exist apart from the cognizing human subject.
Also, that there are inevitable discontinuities that are not flaws in our systems of
information relations, but that must be recognized and built into the systems we design
for managing our interactions including communication. Finally, the notion that
"conduits" actually connect, that messages actually travel, that ideas can pass from one
place and person to another work against recognition of actual discontinuities in
information processes. The section that follows, discussion of the "pathways" metaphor,
will address this point in more detail.

The Pathways Metaphor
This section outlines a second metaphor for information processes, most
commonly conceived as the process by which we go about "acquiring" knowledge. There
is a sense in which the pathways metaphor can be seen as a reversal of the conduit
metaphor. Instead of considering information, or knowledge in its material aspect, to be
embedded in objects that somehow move, are transferred or transmitted to the person
who needs them in some form, this metaphor implies that it is the seeker who moves
from one place to another, from a place characterized by uncertainty, to a place where
knowledge in some form is found.

Figure 2. Illustration by Peter Bennett. This can be viewed as a
contemporary rendering of the Nuremberg Funnel.
(Reproduced by permission, see Appendix B)

That the "pathways to knowledge" formula is well established is shown in the
over 1,500 results returned from a Web search for the phrase (though reduced to under 50
when limited by including the word "metaphor" in the query). An example of the
metaphor's use, with a positive connotation, is found in an online document devoted to
adult learning: "The 'Web' as metaphor is meant to conjure a positive image: multiple
strands of interlocking information that users can traverse as easily and as delicately as a
spider negotiates a web's dewy filaments. For the adult learner, however, the World
Wide Web can seem more like an impenetrable maze than a set of linked pathways to
knowledge" (Literacy Assistance Center, 2000).

I have not found a thorough study of the pathways metaphor comparable with
Reddy's treatment of the conduit metaphor. Reddy worked from a deep personal
conviction that the conduit metaphor holds a power over our thinking about knowledge,
memory and cognitive process generally that needed to be questioned and ultimately
undone. The conduit metaphor does seem to be more pervasive, and less benign, than the
pathways-to-knowledge metaphor.
Discussion of the pathway metaphor will be briefer, and sources more various,
than the discussion based on Reddy's work presented above. The intention here is not to
dismantle the pathways metaphor, as to understand its workings in a way that may show
the potentials and problems of adopting a pathway view in any particular informational
situation.
There is a pattern of everyday activities that gives credence to this metaphor. For
instance, when we are looking for something that is lost, we will often move from place
to place in search for it. We know that we have left these things "somewhere," and the
task is to imagine and then traverse paths from where we are (and they are not) to the
places where they are. The process is both a cognitive process, involving memory and

speculative thought, and a physical process, movement across distances from points of
origins to destinations that are our goals.
This may suggests criteria for design of information spaces, based on factors of
manipulability as discussed later in this paper. The actuality of paths from the unknown
to the certain, as expressed in our everyday actions, suggest that problems with this
metaphor are not as significant as those identified by Reddy in the case of the conduit.
Nevertheless, the use of this metaphor in some sense disables our understanding
of what is involved when we are engaged in other common information-related activities
such as searching the World Wide Web. It is customary to use phrases such as "go to"
and "I went" when describing the action of traversing such a space. "I went to their site
and got. . ." a web document. Yet, of course, I did not go anywhere. I tapped some keys,
moved a mouse, clicked on some "buttons"

- and

sent a signal to a machine in another

place, that was able to recognize it as such and decode it, and to then undertake internal
operations that resulted in the sending of a string of digits streaming in return, decoded
locally and displayed on my own local machine.
What do we mean when we say that we have "gone somewhere" in this way? In
this case, our going and coming back represents a change of state in the machine that is
in front of us. Changes of state seem to be a common condition covered by the pathway
metaphor. There seems to be some limitation in our ability to speak directly about state
changes that leads to the adoption of a metaphor such as this.
This aspect is made explicit in the work of Canter, Rivers and Storrs on
characterizing "user navigation through complex data structures" (1 985). After stating
that their work involves an "attempt to capture some of the psychologically significant
aspects of the movement of users within interactive data-bases" (p. 93) - taken literally
this would make for an interesting trip -and claiming to study "the actual route taken
through the data" (p. 94), they state their central claim: "Moving from one place to

another is akin to interacting with a computer system in order to change its state. The
state changes possible within the systems are analogous to the places accessible from
each other" (p. 94). It is only along the way that we learn in passing that these constructs
are "analogies" (p. 94), but soon again the authors begin to speak of as "journeys"
through data structures.
The essential point here is not that these aren't "really" journeys, or that we as
database users do not actually travel through structures of data. Rather, something about
behavior in this situation is like taking a journey. What is actually happening is that the
machine and the user go through a series of state changes, that in some sense are
analogous to making a journey. Canter and colleagues then present a plausible typology
of state changes in terms of the order in which various states are achieved. They rely on
Alty's "path algebras" in which "finite state systems are characterized as a connected
graph whose arcs are the transitions between states" (p. 94). These are then classed as
various forms of loops, rings and spikes, in the form of the resulting graphs, and
correlated with searching behavior that they call searching, scanning, browsing,
exploring, and wandering - each appropriate for particular people, in particular settings,
toward particular goals, and serving different cognitive styles. "It is easy to imagine two
expert users with different characteristics, one methodical in his approach to work, the
other more erratic and inspirational. While both might be successful in achieving their
aims within a data-base 1 expert system, it is likely that they would be more effective if
operating in a software environment that was more sympathetic to their individual styles"
(p. 101). These point toward a need to design robust interfaces that might allow people
choices among these strategies, and that help people understand their "routes" to desired
data results, while helping them not to get lost in the process.
Their results are closely reflected in Newby's presentation of "navigation" as a
search model, before this took hold as a standard metaphor for interaction with the World

Wide Web. "Instead of considering the organization of the database and the design of the
interface separately, they are considered together: functionality of the system and the
access mechanisms to that functionality are inseparable. . . . As one can navigate more
easily through a familiar physical space, a closer match between user and system
information space will allow for easier and surer wayfinding. . . . The notion of a
document having some relevance value independent of a user is not accepted. System
information spaces might have different meanings for different users" (Newby, 1991, p.
112).
Lakoff and Johnson's discussion about "mathematizing means-end rationality
through metaphor" helps us to generalize the navigation approach of Canter and
colleagues, and Newby to other patterns of action. Their basic idea is simple. Given
desires and purposes, as well as results we may find undesirable, by means of the
application of reason, the problem is set as to how to "choose to act most efficiently and
effectively to maximize achieving your desires and purposes while minimizing unwanted
outcomes?" (p. 5 17). They find that "achieving purposes is most commonly
conceptualized as reaching a destination, via the Event-Structure metaphor. . . . In that
metaphor, actors are conceptualized as travelers and courses of action as paths that lead
to destinations. An action is motion along a path. The state resulting from an action is a
location. The choice among actions is the choice among paths. The Event-Structure
metaphor has the effect of spatializing action to achieve a purpose as motion to reach a
destination. This is the first metaphorical step in the mathematization of achieving
purposes" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 5 18).
They then relate this spatialization of purposeful action to the image of branching
trees, often used to visualize decision points. "The next step is to take our spatialization
in terms of locations and paths to other locations and visualize it metaphorically as a
'tree,' with the initial location as the 'root,' the trunk and branches as the paths, and the

branching points as intersections of paths -- places where one must make a decision as to
which way to go." These are visualized as points and directed lines, the form of "decision
trees" @. 518).
Note that they, like Canter and colleagues, refer to the concept of changes in
"state" as part of this metaphor: "The state resulting from an action is a location." We are
reminded that as we traverse a physical path, such as in hiking a mountain path, we will
mark our progress (and attain our purposes) by pauses at vistas sequentially attained.
Traversing a path is to have accomplished an ordered visibility; as we move we attain
ordered views. This may be the way that the pathway metaphor, though literally not true,
may be put to best use in interface design. Pathways in digital environments have more
the character of sequential viewing than movement as such.
This orderliness is a form of constraint, and thinking of pathways in terms of
established constraints may help in seeing their value. Providing paths constrains
movement, to the benefit of the person in traverse (protecting from dangers off the path,
for one) and in protecting the environment traversed. Constrained pathways may help the
person in creating order, focusing attention, achieving goals by means that would be
unmanageable or unthinkable without established paths.
Given this overview, the task for the system designer seems to be similar to the
process followed by Canter and colleagues. That is, to spatialize a process that is
intrinsically not spatial, by metaphoric means that bring parts of the metaphoric source to
bear aspects of the problem at hand. Requirements for paths in digital environments may
include characteristics from physical paths across terrain: they should be well marked, be
continuous integral and whole, and be traversible in reverse.
It should be remembered that the path itself, in many cases, is of importance
equal to the destination when learning processes are underway. Knowing "how we got
here" and not just where we are is an important aspect of Web browsing that is not well

supported, but that is wanted in many cases. The notion of paths as "trails" that have
intrinsic value and that should be preserved within the record of any search was intrinsic
to the design concept put forward by Vannevar Bush in his "memex." The searcher
"builds a trail of his interest through the maze of materials available to him. And his trails
do not fade." In his conceptual scheme, it is the availability of a set of trails that have
been established that allows the inquirer / researcher to find resources, and then to make
them available to others (Bush, 1945, p. 107). A contemporary statement, related to
geographic approaches to information access, observes: "Similar to footprints in the sand,
information seekers may leave search trails behind when browsing an information space.
These search trajectories relate to query histories in traditional information retrieval.
Information items might be repositioned on or off the 'beaten track' for faster discovery
or later retrieval" (Fabrikant & Buttenfield, 2001, p. 269).
The paragraphs above have shown how the pathways metaphor is grounded in
actual human activities such as searching for lost objects (often involving kinesthetic
knowledge, as described in more detail in Chapter 4 below) and translating the traversal
of a path involving sequential attainment of vistas or views, into creating order in
viewing successive states of a machine or of a person's interaction with a machine. These
are useful in conceiving of effective organization of machine interfaces for human
"navigation."
There are, however, activities that are part of general information processes that
may not be well served by the pathways-to-knowledge metaphor. These may include the
questioning and answering process. No doubt, often this process is embedded in an
environment that requires actions that are like traversing paths. The answering of a
question at a library reference desk often results in the patron (and sometimes the
librarian) traversing a path from the place where the question is asked and negotiated, to
the place where an answer is found. Of course, this takes the motivational background of

the patron as given (often unexplored in customary practice of reference service; see
(Dewdney & Michell, 1997)), and is fully grounded in the concepts of information that
situate it among shared universals, and as seen as object and resource. As was argued in
the section on person-centered or cognitive I constructivist concepts of information,
practices that serve one set of concepts, images or metaphors may not be effective when
other aspects might better be emphasized.
The transmission and object concepts of information, and the conduit and
pathways metaphors, all involve movement in some form, the movement of information
as object or the movement of person as involved in search and retrieval activities.
Lakoff examines metaphors for time in detail, and his conclusions point toward
why we can easily see information in terms of objects. "It has often been noted that time
in English is conceptualized in terms of space. . . . Time is understood in terms of things
(that is, entities and locations) and motion" (Lakoff, 1979ll993, p. 2 16). Lakoff states
that the "present time is at the same location as a canonical observer" and then outlines
in detail the mapping of the metaphor "Time Passing is Motion" (p. 2 17). There is an
"object/location duality" (p. 225). In terms of time, it can be "understood in terms of
relative motion between an observer and a time. In the object-dual, the observer is fixed
and times are moving objects. In the location-dual, the opposite is true. The observer
moves and times are fixed locations in a landscape. . . . In addition, the object in motion
is conceptualized as a possession and the thing-changing as a possessor. Change is thus
seen as the acquisition or loss of an object. Causation is seen as giving or taking" (p.
225). Thus, if we conceive of information as involving change, by Lakoff s metaphoric
analysis, there can easily be expressions that implicate information processes in the
giving or loss of objects, even though no object is actually involved in the process.
Are the established concepts and metaphors adequate to a situation in which it
might be established that nothing moves? We have shown an example earlier, in that the

online searcher does not really "go anywhere" when browsing the Web. The notion of
movement would be minimal if we were to take seriously the central notion of
"discontinuity" that is part of Dervin's "sense-making"

- there

may be no way to get

from here to there, and there may be no way to bring it to us, whatever "it" is, and
whatever is presumed to be "there."
Another problem in the question asking and answering process that may not be
fully served by the pathway metaphor is the actuality of multiple strategies of approach
to a question, multiple satisficing answers, and fundamental changes in the question
being asked due to the iterative nature of the process. Within the pathways metaphor, we
might say there are "multiple paths to multiple destinations," not all of which are
recognized as candidate destinations before the search is underway. This fundamental
uncertainty could be represented by multiple branching trees. This is the extension of the
pathways metaphor suggested by Lakoff and Johnson and mentioned above (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999, p. 5 18). This is also recognized by Canter, Rivers and Storrs in one of
their classes of search, "wandering."
This wandering among uncertainties leads to the notion of browsing, and even the
"serendipity" of finding, discussed within New Directions Downeast as an important
outcome of effective digital library design (New Directions Downeast, 2002). Chang and
Rice (1993) in their discussion of browsing posit two "basic wayfinding learning
processes [which] operate simultaneously: non-dimensional and dimensional learning,"
the first of which generates "sequential or route maps and suggests a linear design style
for a wayfinding system" while the second generates "a spatial or cognitive map and
encourages a spatial design style" (p. 248).
Although Chang and Rice do not elaborate on the distinctions between what they
term sequential and spatial design styles, it is suggested here that a spatial approach
involving discrete (discontinuous) structures may serve as an alternative to the concepts

and metaphors for information that involve movement and transportation, such as we find
in the pathways to knowledge metaphor. Their distinction of sequential vs. spatial
approaches recalls an early work in the field of search and retrieval that outlines many
aspects of the approach that is elaborated here. Doyle's "semantic road maps for
literature searchers" (1 961), after detailing several then-current competing approaches to
document classification in terms of new machine capabilities, asserts the importance of
giving structure, the constraints provided to assist searchers. He says it "is probably
psychologically sound to give a literature searcher some kind of a structure, whether
hierarchical or otherwise, rather than to give him an infinitely flexible and therefore
totally disorganized array of terms" (p. 570). "Two kinds of structures can be envisioned
at this point, hierarchical and associative" (p. 571). He suggests that "association maps"
actually could be drawn by the searcher. "A psychological association map would result
if some eager human decided to organize in detail all knowledge. Such a psychological
association map would also result if all literature searchers were asked to draw a small
map of the associations which lead to their search request statements (in using a system
such as coordination indexing) and all these small maps integrated to form a big one" (p.
571).
His "two kinds of structures" seem essentially to be Chang and Rice's "linear and
spatial design styles." Considering how alternatives may be imagined to the prevailing
metaphors and design approaches will be explored in the concluding section of this
chapter.

Imaginin~and A d o ~ t i nAlternative
~
Meta~hors
Benking and Judge (1994) call for the development of repertoires of spatial
metaphors that may be suitable for interface design. They suggest the "interesting
possibility, that some complex systems may only be adequately comprehended through

three or more complementary metaphors" (at p. 2 of 5). This call for an expanded
repertoire of metaphors reflects Schon's attention to the importance of "generative
metaphors" in framing policy problems (Schon, 1979). Kuhn suggests that appropriate
metaphors can be selected and designed the meet the needs of users in particular task
environments, including in the operation of computer interfaces (Kuhn, 1993).
In the course of his analysis of the conduit metaphor, Reddy began to imagine an
alternative in the form of a "toolmaker's paradigm," but the scenario he suggested seems
to be much too complex and detailed to become the basis for a commonly held metaphor
for information and communication processes.
Increasing our repertoire of metaphors suggests that we allow an opportunity for
new structures to be created and brought into relationship with those that already exist.
The basic insight of Carroll and Thomas (1982) is that cognitive learning involves
adoption of new "structures," and that this learning comes about through metaphor:
"People develop new cognitive structures by using metaphors to cognitive structures they
have already learned" (p. 109).
The range of available alternative metaphors for memory in natural language is
presented by Roediger. He states that metaphors are often used "when confronted with a
phenomenon that we do not understand, to try to relate it to things that we do understand
or at least are more familiar with" (Roediger, 1980, p. 23 1). In his survey of metaphors
for memory he begins with a review of Julian Jaynes' observation that consciousness and
mind are generally conceived in terms of "metaphor of an actual physical space, with
memories and ideas as objects in the space" (Jaynes, Origin of Consciousness, (1976),
48-66; cited by Roediger at p. 232). He continues by noting that we speak of our ideas in
terms that would be appropriate for objects in space, "allow room for new ideas" or see
them as being "bright, dim, haz-y or fuzzy" (p. 232). Of 36 examples given in his Table 1
(p. 233), 27 are designated as being either "spatial analogies with search" or "other

spatial theories." Nine are put in a third catch-all category, "other analogies." He states
that there now is "no other general conception of the mind or memory" that rivals "the
conception of the mind as a mental space in which memories are stored and then
retrieved" (p. 238).
Even though the storage metaphor has become pervasive, it shouldn't be taken to
imply that our brains manage memory in that way. Roediger reviews a number of results
that potentially "embarrass the spatial storage and search assumptions" (p. 238). Even
though alternative conceptualizations might be available, "the spatial storage and search
assumptions are so ingrained in our language that [establishing alternatives] may be
difficult" (p. 239). Among alternative candidates, he refers to the ideas of Bartlett (1932)
and Neisser (1 967) who propose the notion that "remembering involves a construction of
memories from available information, rather than a verbatim reproduction of the contents
of memory" (p. 239).
To accompany the concept of constructing memory Roediger presents three
analogies "based one way or another on auditory imagery" (p. 240). Though one of these,
the signal detection analogy, is often integrated into the concept of spatial search
processes, there is a distinct alternative: the "resonance or broadcast metaphor" (p. 241).
Citing Edwin Boring, he recounts a tradition going back to David Hartley's (17thc.)
concept of "vibratiuncles," the "physiological counterpart of ideas" (History of
Experimental Psychology, 1950, p. 196, cited at 241). A more contemporary expression
is also cited, D.B. Wechsler's, "Memories, like perceptions and eventually sensations,
have no separate existences. . . . Memories are not like filed letters stored in cabinets or
unhung paintings in the basement of a museum. Rather, they are like melodies realized
by striking the keys on a piano. Ideas are no more stored in the brain than melodies in the
keys of a piano" ("Engrams, Memory Storage and Mnemonic Coding," Am. Psychologist
18, 1963, pp. 150-151, cited by Roediger at p. 241).

Roediger states that the "same basic idea of retrieval as a matching or resonance
process has been used by a number of other psychologists." For some, retrieval is
compared to "the operation of a tuning fork. When a tone of a particular frequency is
sounded in the presence of a bank of different-sized tuning forks, the appropriate one will
vibrate sympathetically" (p. 241). In everyday speech, we might say that an expression
we have heard, sometimes in reply to a query, "rings a bell." Roediger observes that
resonance models may be "formally identical to spatial storage and search theories if one
assumes an unlimited capacity, parallel search process" (p. 241). The final alternative to
spatial metaphors outlined by Roediger is Pribram's holographic, or optical filter,
analogy.
Roediger's presentation of several metaphors for memory that are based in
auditory or resonance images points toward the "resonance metaphor," discussed in
detail below in Chapter 7. Also, his use of words such as bright, dim, hazy and fuzzy
point toward the "pools of light" metaphor suggested by a pattern in Alexander and
colleagues' approach to architectural design (Alexander et al., 1977, p. 1 160). In his
summary, Roediger observes that the preponderance of spatial search metaphors may be
limiting to the development of "psychological theories and models of memory," and that
"the construction, levels-of-processing, and resonance metaphors" may be helpful (p.
244). Since many of the spatial search metaphors derive from "the technology of keeping

records," he sees an opening through new technologies for the development of alternative
metaphors of memory and mind. Certainly the alternatives that are suggested below
depend on new technologies, both to represent structures and to link them.
In attempting to conceive of alternatives to the pathways-to-knowledge metaphor,
we may begin with the concept of fields. An association between pathways and fields is
suggested by Murray, who describes Koffka's "valence field theory of navigation,"
which follows discussion of more customary idea of navigation as being decision

making, the "form of discrete decisions" being likened to choice of paths. Such choices
are exclusive or "bistable" such as found in Necker cubes, since once choice excludes
others. However, "the perceived paths themselves, and the perceived promise and risk of
each path" are expressed as "fieldlike entities in the brain" (Murray, 1995, p. 227).
Murray also recounts Gibson and Crooks' (1 938) proposal of a "field theory
model of driving," that also might apply to perceptual behavior while walking (p. 228).
He says that the abstract thinking required for long distance navigation also involves
fields, that an abstract "thought cloud" (p. 230) may be available mentally, able to rotate,
be scaled, reoriented, etc, similar to the reading of a map.
The pathways-to-knowledge metaphor probably understates the complexity and
variety of paths followed in any instance. In practice, most pathways are found to be very
indirect and crooked; there is no assurance that the most direct path imagined at the
outset of any undertaking will be the most effective route to the goal. Social barriers are
inevitable, and since knowledge is socially and culturally based, these blockages must be
part of any model of knowledge relationships and production. This is where an
alternative structure, still pathlike in some respects, becomes available, the domain of
"small world" effects. The small world model is a dual structure: ties that are locally
strong and globally weak, relating dense clusters of strong relationships through
important but rare and somewhat random distant ties (Buchanan, 2002, p. 207). A small
world model seems to fit the concept of federated workspaces that is described below as
an alternative to the pathway paradigm.
The small worlds concept also affords a means of overcoming or circumventing
the pervasive in-group / out-group distinction in social realms. Often the most basic
decision that is made in the evaluation of information is to determine whether the source
belongs to an accepted, or an outsider, social realm. This pattern of human behavior
won't be overcome through the design of information systems, but appropriate design

may help to mitigate its effects. Systems need to allow connections that are not straightline, strong-link. If crooked loops are found to connect people, a system's design should
afford something of the same indirect character, which would represent another departure
from the pathways metaphor.
The alternative metaphor that is suggested in this work, the resonance metaphor
for information, will be described in detail in Chapter 7. One other metaphor that is
briefly mentioned in several places here is "pools of light." As was the case with the
resonance metaphor, pools of light was first suggested in discussions centering on the
graphic This Corner of the World (Figure 1) especially in terms of the end-nodes of the
three branching trees that are included in that visualization, but that have not yet been
incorporated into the heuristic workspace. "Pools of light" is Pattern 252 in A Pattern
Language (Alexander et al., 1977, p. 1160) and Hunting makes reference to this in his
New Directions white paper (Hunting, 2002). Alexander and colleagues state that "it is a
fact of human nature that the space we use as social space is in part defined by light" (p.
1161). Within New Directions, discussion of the "pools of light" metaphor centered on
how someone, traversing a discontinuous treelike network, might be made aware of
resources at a distance, but not accessible by direct path from that network explorer's
standpoint.
Boas, in his essay "Idea," notes that etymologically the word idea "is related to
the verbs 'to see' and 'to know"' and that the "notion that ideas can be apprehended by a
kind of vision or intuition, by looking and seeing them, has never been lost in Occidental
philosophy, for knowing as a kind of insight, illumination, revelation has almost always
been retained" (Boas, 1973, p. 542). Lakoff and Johnson affirm this, observing that
"understanding is seeing; ideas are light-sources; discourse is a light-medium" (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980, p. 48) and note in a later work that "illuminate, an extended instance of
the general Knowing Is Seeing metaphor, is learned well after the conceptual primary

metaphor Knowing is Seeing is learned (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 490). Further
exploration of how variants of the "pools of light" metaphor might be useful in
constructing alternatives in information system design remains a task for future work.
That the resonance metaphor has been adopted here should not imply that the
pathway and conduit metaphors are intended to be totally overturned or rejected. They
clearly speak for many of the elements experienced in information processes. For
instance, the idea of movement, intrinsic to both standard metaphors, has a place in
several of the theories that seem quite appropriate in terms of information processes.
Dervin, who works from within the constructivist frame, include the notion of movement
in their metaphoric notions of "gaps," "steps" and "situation stops" (Dervin, 1992, p. 75).
Krippendorff (2002) suggests that the "ability to move" is intrinsic to the concept of
space, including social spaces such as the conversation spaces he explores. To choose
among metaphors, and the adoption of nonconventional metaphors toward expanding
choices, is ultimately a pragmatic decision that can only be evaluated through the
consequences of the choice in practice.
While there are many similarities across the concepts and metaphors for
information that have been presented in this chapter, there is no direct mapping between
the three concepts and the three metaphors. Rather, the concepts are directed toward
understanding how information is thought tho work from several perspectives, and the
metaphors are vehicles for generalizing the concepts according to patterns of
understanding that are applied in many domains.
The constructivist or "strong cognitive" approach advanced here reflects that of
Von Foerster: "For if indeed we have to abandon the notion of a commodity called
'information' which changes hands in a process called 'communication,' then we must
also abandon a strategy that keeps us searching among things outside of us and adopt one
that allows us to look for processes within ourselves" (Von Foerster, 1980, p. 21).

It is in these terms that new models and metaphors are being explored here. For
instance, rather than assume that searchers travel toward answers or that answers can be
packaged for delivery upon request (a model that works for many purposes), a set of
mutually related question spaces is proposed in which questions (and questioners) are
brought into closer proximity, and through these mutual proximities answers may
gravitate toward questioners. The end product does not aim to attach an existing answer
to an emerging question, but aims rather to create a new entity, the answer to the new
question, as something new that can serve both as question and answer in the next
iteration.
These are some of the considerations that motivate our attention to alternative
metaphors such as resonance and pools of light, and the ideas that are intended to be
realized in the heuristic workspace presented below.

Chapter 3
CONCEPTS OF SPACE: SPATIAL VOCABULARIES
AND FRAMES OF REFERENCE

Introduction to Concepts of Space
An inquiry into spatial aspects of information sharing processes, where this study
began, requires a general reflection on the question, "What is space?" This chapter
reviews some of the answers to this question that have been given by geographers and
others involved in the tradition of inquiry now adopted by the spatial information
sciences. Whereas the present inquiry began in an attempt to inventory spatial concepts
as expressed in specific words, phrases, and terminology in general, toward creating
order among spatial concepts, the availability of fiames of reference and coordinate
systems turned out to be more useful than was a catalog of the range of available spatial
terms. This chapter reviews approaches to defining "space" generally, outlines the
collection of spatial terms that were gathered as candidate codes for qualitative text
analysis, and gives an overview of spatial fiames of reference in everyday language.
Because all of language is culturally rooted, including concepts related to frames of
reference, this section at times refers to cultural aspects that are further discussed in the
next chapter.
Because space is a general quality that pervades all of human experience, not just
in its physical aspects, and not just as metaphoric extensions fiom a physical ground,
defining space in concise or universal terms is particularly difficult. Couclelis and Gale
outline the range of domains in which concepts of space are situated: "subjective or
objective, psychological or mathematical, relative or absolute, empirical or formal,
Euclidean or non-Euclidean, metric or non-metric . . ." (1986, 1). Miller and JohnsonLaird emphasize the pervasiveness of space through a quotation from Wilbur Urban's

Language and Reality (1939, p. 186) that "our intellect is primarily fitted to deal with
space and moves most easily in this medium. Thus language itself becomes spatialized,
and in so far as reality is represented by language, reality tends to be spatialized (Miller
& Johnson-Laird, 1976, p. 375). Given this range, there should be no surprise that

definition is difficult.
Couclelis and Gale (1986) begin to resolve this diversity and the ambiguities it
involves through defining space with the "most general mathematical definition of space
available," from Alexandroff: "The concept of topological space is only one link in the
chain of abstract space constructions which forms an indispensible part of all modern
geometric thought. All these constructions are based on a common conception of space
which amounts to considering one or more systems of objects -- points, lines, etc. -together with systems of axioms describing the relations between these objects.
Moreover, this idea of a space depends only on these relations and not on the nature of
the respective objects" (pp. 4-5).
The definition of space given by Golledge and Hubert is similar (1982). Space is
"an abstract set possessing a topology. Given such a definition, one can expect that the
space is a set over which concepts of continuity and proximity may be given meaning"
(p. 108). Both of these general definitions emphasize relationships and rules.
Alexandroff s explicitly, in "systems of axioms describing the relations between . . .
objects" and Gollege and Hubert's in terms of relationships that can be established,
specifically the relations of "continuity and proximity."
That space involves relations rather than objects, and that there are sets of rules
that apply for any given space, seem to provide a workable base from which to think
about "spatiality" in general. The notion of "spaces" occurs in many contexts in everyday
English: decision spaces, information spaces, conversation spaces; geographic space, the
space of geospatial data, cyberspace, question space, and so forth. It seems essential to

ask, when considering any space, what rules hold for it (or "in" it) and what relationships
are established by means of those rules.
Turnbull quotes Piaget in emphasizing the pervasiveness of space in our
experience, that "spatiality is fundamental to our consciousness and our understanding of
experience." It is fundamental in "ordering our knowledge of the world." He also cites
Malcolm Lewis' point that spatial concepts help to "provide the structural as well as the
functional foundations of language" (Turnbull, 1993, pp. 1,2). These remarks emphasize
the bridge from our assumptions about space as conceived in the character of our
physical surroundings, toward acknowledging the integral relationship between human
agency and perception and our concepts of space.
Further clouding the boundaries of the concept of space is its close relationship
with time. Space and time, which are often taken as being two distinct dimensions of
existence or of the order of the world, seem to be more intimately connected than is
generally sensed in their everyday expression. The Oxford English Dictionary is
organized around historical usage, with historic first occurrences taken from written
documentary sources. In the OED, five double-column pages are devoted to the word
(6

space." It first appeared in English at about 1300 A.D. In the definition for its first

historical usgae, space denoted "time or duration"; when used without an article, space
meant "lapse or extent of time between two definite points, events, etc., chiefly with
adjectives such as little, long, short, small" (p. 87). Two columns of text are devoted to
variants of the word space as meaning what we would generally call time, until the fifth
definition is reached: linear distance; interval between two or more points or objects.
This, our everyday notion of "space" first appeared about 1390; the example provided is
"Astronomie . . . makth a man have knowechinge Of Sterres. . . . And what betwen hem
is of space." The OED's Definition 6 provides, "Superficial extent or area; also, extent in
three dimensions" which only is documented beginning at 1387; example given for this is

"Also Affrica in his kynde hath lasse space." Thus, definitions of space in the sense of
distances, areas and dimensions in the physical world are documented nearly a century
after uses relating mainly to time (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989, p. 87).
Of course, in everyday speech as opposed to printed sources our sense of space
may have been prevalent, or may have come first but not be documented. What this
history suggests, however, is that "space" and "time" are intimately involved with each
other; that we separate them at some risk; and that the concept of spacehime as a unified
whole is quite intelligible in everyday usage. Some contemporary writers have taken the
opportunity to express this relationship concretely, as in Bakhtin's "chronotope" said by
Entrikin to capture "the sense of space-time wholes that have fascinated both
geographers and historians" (Entrikin, 1991, note 23, p. 139).
Space has been defined by geographers generally in terms of the character, extent
or scale of our physical surroundings. A recurring distinction is asserted between large
and small scale space, sometimes called table-top space vs. geographic space, or
perceptual space vs. transperceptual space. Freundschuh and Egenhofer (1997) attempt to
characterize such spaces in a unified continuity with portions distinguished in terms of
"manipulability, locomotion, and size of space." They suggest "six types of spaces"
termed manipulable object space, non-manipulable object space, environmental space,
geographic space, panoramic space, and map space. They suggest that these categories
will be of help in developing a coherent concept of a naive geography, "a set of theories
of how people intuitively or spontaneously conceptualize geographic space and time" (p.
1). The notion of manipulability is discussed below in Chapter 4, as an important factor
in peoples' knowledge generally and in terms of the design of informational, conceptual
or knowledge spaces.
Robinson and Petchenik's review of the concept of space asserts that "the map is
space" (emphasis in original) (1976, p. 86). Map viewers will have reactions to "map

space," and this will be a "function of fundamental concepts of space." They discuss the
work of Piaget (as do Mark and Frank, below) in terms of such fundamental concepts as
proximity, separation, enclosure, spatial order and symmetry. These are linked to
"representational space" (p. 88), of which map space is one version.
Mark and Frank (1996, p. 10 of 23) refer to Piaget and Inhelder's concept of
perceptual and transperceptual space; these concepts are also cited by Downs and Stea
(1977, p. 197). Mark and Frank emphasize how our bodies influence spatial perception,
beginning with one of the most salient factors, gravity, the upldown axis. They discuss
Kuipers' views on how we negotiate large scale space, via landmarks, views, etc. They
provide extensive discussion of what may be required to coordinate these spaces, toward
finding geometrical ways of representing natural language spatial understandings.
Entrikin, in reviewing the distinction between empirical and phenomenological
geography, presents Kant's notion of space. "Kant viewed space and time as types of
intuition which provide form to the manifold of sensation. Through the spatial intuition
of the perceiver, experience of the external world gains its form. Space is thus imposed
by the perceiver on perception rather than being derived from perception by the
perceiver" (Entrikin, 1977, p. 215). Translating from Kant, Entrikin states that space is
the "form of possible objects."
Entrikin notes that Cassirer extends Kant's notion of spatial intuition, toward its
being a "feature of all human experience" including myth, religion and science (p. 2 16).
Cassirer claimed that there are three modes of human knowing, the affectivelemotive, the
intuitive and the conceptual. The first manifests in art, religion and myth; the second in
language and the "natural world of common sense," and the third in mathematics and
science (p. 2 17). "Each spatial mode is part of a symbolic system, and no modality of
space represents a mere replication of some outer reality. Rather, each modality serves a
formative function in organizing man's experience. Space, like time, is an a priori set of

relations imposed by consciousness on experience and is necessarily found in the variety
of symbolic systems" (p. 217). Entrikin states that the "objective world becomes
intelligible to language to the degree in which language was able, as it were, to
retranslate it back into terms of space" (p. 2 18). Thus, space becomes an organizing
principle within which all of human experience becomes intelligible, and that "the
various systems of knowledge created by man have distinct spatial perspectives, and that
it is important to understand each spatial perspective in terms of the symbolic system of
which it is a part" (p. 219). It should be noted that Entrikin's narrative seems compatible
with the overall view of coexistence of simultaneous frames, within one existential field,
a perspective that is compatible with the approach that is adopted in the present work.
Entrikin's reference to Kant's view of space as the "shape of possible objects"
may have a bearing on the notion of forces, structures and forms as presented in Chapter

5 below. The notion of possible objects also suggests a nondeterministic world, such as
one in which space is related to our ability to make choices. The concepts of space and
information both seem to share in being about our abilities to make choices and have
some relationship to environments for the emergence of the new. This is seen, for
instance, in the "room to move" that is central to Krippendorff s "conversation space"
(2002). This suggests that a fundamental positive human activity is in helping to make
space for others, suggesting an approach to the ethics of social space. Further discussion
of space in human dimension will be presented in the next chapter.
A final concept should be added to these overall considerations about space.
Space does not simply exist, in fixed quantity and form, to be populated or filled but
otherwise unavailable to human agency. Rather space is created, not simply there to be
occupied. We accept the view of Lefebvre, who states that "social relations of production
have a social existence to the extent that they have a spatial existence; they project
themselves into a space, becoming inscribed there, and in the process producing that

space itself' (Lefebvre, 19741199 1, p. 129). In this way we may begin to see ourselves as
being capable of generating totally new spaces that are not competitive with existing
space, allowing people to engage in the process of creating and negotiating new worlds.

Spatial Terminolow
A collection of spatial terms was created as part of codebook development for
purposes of analyzing interview data texts. The goal was, and still is, to consider how
information sharing processes are expressed in spatial terms. In exploring code
candidates, no inventory or thesaurus devoted to "spatial concepts" was found. Rather,
suggestions for core spatial terminology were found embedded in many sources where
many discrete sets of terms and concepts were found. See Appendix A: Spatial Terms
from Codebook 3 for a list of terms that were candidates for data text coding.
Resources that were consulted in establishing a core spatial vocabulary included
controlled vocabularies such as the Library of Congress Subject Headings and the
thesaurus of the Geographical Index, collections such as Buck's synonyms in the IndoEuropean languages (Buck, 1949), as well as a range of writers in geography, spatial
information sciences and related disciplines: (Bloom, Peterson, Nadel, & Garrett, 1996;
Buttimer & Seamon, 1980; Couclelis, 1992, 1998; Freundschuh & Egenhofer, 1997;
Golledge, 1995; Levinson, 1996; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Talmy, 2000a; Tversky,
1996; Vatsyayan, 1991).
This collection of over a hundred terms as candidates for a "spatial" vocabulary
made it apparent that spatial terminology is pervasive in our language. Hall came to a
similar conclusion through an informal investigation of his own. He examined the pocket
Oxford dictionary, looking for "all tei-ms referring to space, or having spatial
connotations, such as: together, distant. over, under, away from, linked, enclosed, room,
wander, fell, level, upright, adjacent, congruent, and so on. A preliminary listing
uncovered close to five thousand terms that could be classified as referring to space. This

is 20per cent of the words listed in the pocket Oxford dictionary. Even deep familiarity
with my own culture had not prepared me for this discovery" (Hall, 196611969, p. 93).
Golledge (2002) notes that lack of a "widely accepted vocabulary" for spatial
concepts inhibits the discipline of geography. He raises the question of how "we build
primitives and low order concepts into more highly ordered (complex) terms." The
spatial primitives he suggests include "place-specific identity, location, magnitude, time,
boundary, and distance" (p. 7). From these may be derived distribution or arrangement of
objects, regions, frames of reference, orientation and directions, spatial hierarchies; and
at higher orders, patterns, clustering and dispersion, etc. In an earlier article, Golledge
suggested that the primitives of spatial knowledge are "identity, location, magnitude, and
time" (Golledge, 1995, p. 29). Identity means to establish identity of place or phenomena
in space, often through labeling and naming. Local conditions make universal
identification difficult. Magnitude means "how m u c h in all dimensions. After defining
the "primitives," he suggests derived concepts such as distance, angle and direction,
sequence and order, connection and linkage (pp. 33-35). Then he gives examples of
spatial distributions and 2-D phenomena such as boundary, density, dispersion, pattern
and shape (pp. 35-37) followed by the "higher order" derived concepts of correlation,
overlay, network, and hierarchy (pp. 38-41). Concluding his review, he raises many
questions about how the various understandings of these concepts cause difficulties for
users of GIs and other systems designed and intended for use by "experts" (p. 43) and
with the "type of error that is carried along as baggage with every spatial concept that we
use." Following Golledge, Fabrikant and Buttenfield (2001) list "key spatial concepts" as
being identity, location, direction, distance, magnitude, scale, and time or change. In
terms of information visualization, "Each has a parallel in the spatialized transformation
of semantic content" (p. 268).

The very partial attempt to inventory spatial terms, toward coding text segments
for expressions of space while discussing information processes, confirmed a growing
sense of the all-pervasive nature of space in all of human experience. Because the same
terms might be used when discussing the physical geographic world, and the humancentered social-cognitive world, some strategy for distinguishing uses of spatial terms in
very different contexts seemed necessary before any identification of spatial concepts
through spatial words, or vocabulary, would be feasible. The survey of concepts of space
provided a means of distinguishing spatial concepts in terms of their settings, suggesting
connotative and contextual approaches to spatial concepts rather than denotative, literalist
approaches. A resolution was found in the form of spatial "frames of reference,"
explored by many researchers into the relationship between language and space.

S ~ a t i aFrames
l
of Reference
The idea of spatial frames of reference can easily be approached through a story
told by William James. For him, the following story was meant to illustrate the meaning
of pragmatism. He recounts returning to camp after a day of hiking, and finding a raging
controversy among his fellow campers. The debate centered on a squirrel on a tree trunk,
and on a person who tried without success to see the squirrel, who kept moving around
the tree. The question at issue was: "Does the man go round the squirrel or not? He does
go round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round the
squirrel?" (James, 1987, p. 505). James' solution followed "the scholastic adage that
whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction. . . . 'Which party is
right,' I said, 'depends on what you practically mean by "going round" the squirrel.' If
one means passing through the cardinal directions about the squirrel, then 'obviously the
man does go round him,' for he occupies these successive positions. But if on the
contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him,

then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go
round him. . . . Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther dispute."
Establishing frames of reference as a way of orienting our speaking about spatial
relations is a prerequisite for understanding the relations we are indicating. This section
will present a few examples from authors who have attempted to define what frames of
reference are required for reducing ambiguity in expressing spatial relations. The choice
and use of linguistic frames of reference also is similar to the kinds of decisions that are
made in establishing figure and ground as are presented by Gestalt psychologists in
illustrating the processes of human perception. The discussion of frames of reference will
conclude with a description of the three-frame scheme provided by Levinson and his
colleagues: intrinsic, relative, and absolute. These provide a sufficient and useful means
of distinguishing among possible approaches to defining frames of reference.
One of the problems in learning about frames of reference is that most of the
discussion has been in technical terms that are not part of everyday speech, thus
undermining the usefulness of analyses that are meant to describe what are for us very
common everyday practices. The approaches of three authors to the linguistic expression
of spatial frames of reference are given in essays collected in a single volume edited by
Bloom and colleagues, Language and Space (1996).
Framing expressions about spatial relationships in everyday speech begins with
the act of perspective taking. Levelt (1996) says that perspective taking is part of the
"microplanning" of conversation, and is "a process of abstracting spatial relations for
expression in language" (pp. 77-78). He proposes three frames, or choices for perspective
taking: deictic (a speaker-centered relative system), intrinsic (expressing the position of a
referent in terms that are intrinsic to a reference object) and absolute (such as cardinal
directions). The term "deictic" often also appears in related literature as "deixis," or
sometimes as the more familiar-sounding "indexicality." The word "deictic" refers to a

showing or pointing out directly; for instance, "the words this, that, and those have a
deictic function" (Merriam-Webster Inc., 2003). The word "index" also refers to
pointing. Indexical expressions are relative, not absolute, in that they depend on
distinctions drawn among referents in the immediate, shared environment of those in
discourse. Levelt concludes that there are no "fixed laws," no "hard-wired" mappings
that guide the choices of perspective as expressed in language. "There are preferences,
for sure, following Gestalt properties of the scene, human interest, and so on, but they are
no more than preferences." Choices depend on culture, "communicative intention and
situation" (pp. 102- 103). He also states that the frames given by Levinson and colleagues
would also be sufficient for his own purposes.
A different set of frames is suggested by Tversky (1996), who reviews such areas
as object recognition, which can be viewer-centered or object-centered (p. 464);
environmental perception, where the pertinent concepts are egocentric and allocentric, "a
reference system external to the environment, usually the canonical axes, north-south,
east-west" (p. 465); or perception organized according to landmarks. She notes that
neurophysiologists suggest "three bases for spatial reference systems: the viewer,
landmarks, and an external reference frame" (p. 465). She emphasizes peoples' ability to
"take perspectives not currently their own" and that there are "three bases for spatial
reference: the viewer, other objects, and external sources. . . . These three bases at first
seem to correspond to deictic, intrinsic, and extrinsic uses of language, though it will turn
out not to be that simple" (p. 465). She distinguishes intrinsic and extrinsic within the
deictic approach, intrinsic using properties or sides of the reference object, while
extrinsic requires reference to the speaker's frame (p. 466). She then relates these
approaches to Levinson's scheme of relative, intrinsic and absolute (p. 467). The absolute
is a form of extrinsic, and Tversky notes that Levinson says that two of the frames,

intrinsic and absolute, are "binary, that is, they require two terms to specify the location
of the target object: the target object and the referent object."
Levinson, who is involved in an ongoing cross-cultural study of expressions of
spatial relationships in language, has identified three frames of reference that are
available in our culture. At least two of the three appear to be available in all cultures
(though not always the same two). The author claims that "there is a cross-modal
tendency for the same frame of reference to be employed in language tasks, recall and
recognition memory tasks, inference tasks, imagistic reasoning tasks, and even
unconscious gesture. This suggests that the underlying representation systems that drive
all these capacities and modalities have adopted the same frame of reference" (Levinson,
1996, p. 109). In a later paper, Levinson and colleagues state that "different languages
induce distinct conceptual codings" in the spatial domain, and that "language and
conceptual coding in the spatial domain covary" (Levinson, Kita, Haun, & Rasch, 2002,
p. 155). In spite of the finding that there is "in fact a great deal of cross-cultural variation
in the semantic relations and categories of spatial language" (p. 156) and that though "not
all languages make use of all frames of reference" (p. 183) the basic three frames of
absolute, intrinsic and relative account for the available frames in all cultures. This
conclusion is limited to manipulation of objects and their relationships in tabletop spaces,
the experimental setting devised for these investigations.
Pederson and colleagues, including Levinson (Pederson et al., 1998) have
undertaken an extensive "crosslinguistic and crosscultural study of spatial reference" (p.
556). Whereas they found that the three basic frames of reference can account for all
spatial framing in language, all three frames may not be actually used by some cultures,
and cultures may have very different means of expressing these frames. They found that
"what one language does with a dedicated morpheme, another language might express
with a construction andlor pragmatic rules. Accordingly, in order to allow for broad scale

comparison of languages, our level of comparison can be neither morphemes nor lexical
items. Rather, our level of crosslinguistic comparison must be contextually interpreted
utterances" (p. 565). They did find that half the languages in their study used both
relative and absolute frames; but in some these just provide information about the
participant and not the geography, or in others they provide information that is "geocardinal and never about a speech participant" (p. 572). "Communities differ in dramatic
ways with respect to spatial reference in language. Importantly, we find that the human
body is by no means a universal template for creating projective coordinate systems for
spatial reference in tabletop space" (p. 584). They found "linguistic relativity effects" and
assume that such mechanisms "would potentially operate across many areas of human
cognition." They surmise that these language structures are not just available, but that the
linguistic system "actually forces the speaker to make computations he or she might
otherwise not make. . . . That is, the linguistic system is far more than just an available
pattern for creating internal representations: to learn to speak a language successfully

requires speakers to develop an appropriate mental representation which is then available
for nonlinguistic purposes" (p. 586).
Talmy (2000b, p. 230 ff.) also addresses the individual / cultural components of
frames available in speech. He presents schemas and schematizations of space somewhat like frames - and asserts that the speaker chooses among those available.
Reviewing these choices, "it is the speaker that selects one schema over another from
those available and applicable, and it is thus the speaker that determines the highlighting
of one group of factors or of another." and that culture and language "preselect" among
alternatives.
Just as people must choose among terms when speaking, they also must choose
among frames in pre-organization of expressions. Fabrikant and Buttenfield (2001)
review how small and large scale environments are understood by means of gaze views,

routes or tours, putting relative, intrinsic and extrinsic frames of reference to use, which
"can be switched frequently, and the choice is thought to be dependent on the type of
environment and how the environment has been experienced -- for example, by
navigation or by map reading" (pp. 269-270).
The complexities of reference frames are again apparent in Klatzky's discussion
of allocentric locational, egocentric locational and allocentric heading representations in
context of "whole-body navigation" as contrasted with settings involving manipulation of
objects (1998, p. 3). Another set of considerations involved in choice of a frame of
reference, or the "transformation from a visual perception to the relative expression of
reference frames" is said by Frank to involve an origin (speaker, object, another person),
an orientation ("e.g. the axial frame of the speakers, of the addressee, or another object"
and "handedness of the coordinate system (same as a person's or inverse)" (1998, p.
293).
Reviewing the literature of spatial frames of reference, Levinson (1996) notes
major categorical distinctions involving relative vs. absolute, egocentric vs. allocentric,
viewer-centered vs. object-centered, orientation-bound vs. orientation-free, deictic vs.
intrinsic, and viewer-centered vs. object-centered vs. environment-centered. He then
provides a basic definition of Gestalt as "a unit or organization of units that collectively
serve to identify a coordinate system with respect to which certain properties of objects,
including the phenomenal self, are gauged" (p. 126). His discussion concludes with
"three linguistic frames of reference," (p. 138) intrinsic, relative, absolute.
In his Fig. 4.9 (p. 139) Levinson provides a helpful graphic description of what
these frames mean by means of "canonical examples of the three linguistic frames of
reference." For intrinsic: "He's in front of the house;" the reference point of origin is a
house, with its parts labeled. For relative: "He's to the left of the house;" the reference
point of origin defines left in terms of the location of the observer. For absolute: "He's

north of the house;" the origin is at the house, with reference frame composed of the
cardinal directions.
After discussion of this model, he notes another problem: the "three distinct
frames of reference are 'untranslatable7 from one to the other, throwing further doubt on
the idea of correlations and correspondences across sensory and conceptual
representational levels" (p. 152). At this point he introduces Molyneux7sQuestion: "If a
blind man, who knew by touch the difference between a cube and a sphere, had his sight
restored, would he recognize the selfsame objects under his new perceptual modality or
not?" His conclusion: "In short, either the frame of reference must be the same across all
sensory modalities to allow the cross-modal sharing of information or each modality
must allow more than one frame of reference" (p. 156). Since frames are not translatable,
individuals are required to "stabilize their representational systems within a limited set of
frames of reference."
Levinson also notes the importance of perspective taking, of expressing spatial
frames of reference, as part of the work needed in overcoming the underdetermined
nature of all symbolic expressions, both visual and verbal. Levelt draws our attention to
"ellipses in spatial expressions" (1996, p. 9 9 , the parts of scenes or spatial relations that
are left out of descriptions. The importance of underdetermination in symbolic
expression is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
An overall conclusion that may be drawn from the discussion above is that before
any vocabulary or terms can be defined within a particular instance or use of spatial
terminology, the range of available frames of reference that is appropriate for that
particular context or communicative intent (such as our interest in expressing perceptions
about information sharing) needs to be seen in terms of choices among available options.
While there is a large vocabulary available for speaking about spatial relations, frames of
reference provide a syntax for this, and suggest the contextual cues for interpretation and

interrelation of terms, providing a ground for these terms' meanings in particular
relationships.

Summary: Concepts
of Space

The concept "space" seems at first to be unproblematic. Space has the character
of openness, a expansive uniformity throughout. Space seems able of being displaced by
objects that occupy it without diminishment of its essential character or quantity. Space
in this sense mainly characterizes the physical world external to human beings. We have
become accustomed to the idea of an infinite physical universe, or one whose boundaries
are at best indefinite, a Newtonian concept of absolute space (Curry, 1996, p. 92). Space
is conceived as a sort of container without walls - within which everything, somehow,
finds a place to be, either through the order of nature, an Aristotelian view, or through
some set of social decisions or agreements.
This unproblematic space works well enough in default applications for everyday
life, but its pervasive acceptance may obscure the availability of alternative concepts. We
have seen that space is found to afford several different conceptualizations, leading to the
conclusion that more than one space may be found to simultaneously coexist on mutual
terms. Our common notions of space may not yet be inclusive enough to allow the
variations that in fact already exist to be put to their full potentials in use.
Attempting to create a collection of concepts related to space began with a
question that has been part of the basis of this work throughout, the intuition that there
may be spatial aspects to the activity we call information sharing. Is there a spatiality to
our information processes? Before interview data could be coded to signal the occurrence
of spatial concepts as expressed in language, toward substantiating a spatial component
for general understanding of the information sharing process, some sense of the range of
what spatiality might mean was found to be needed. Many terms indicating spatial

relations were collected, but the words themselves are of limited value in text analysis
without a better understanding of the frames of reference that help give meaning to their
use in particular contexts. The coding of text would need to take account of these
linguistic frames in addition to the use of particular spatial terms.
While trying to sort out the framework for the use of a spatial vocabulary, it also
became clear that some other distinctions may be as problematic as the concept of space
itself. It was the task of sorting out spatial terminology - actually, the discovery of its
pervasiveness through all of human experience as made clear through examining spatial
vocabulary - that certain other distinctions became less clear than they might seem in
unexamined everyday speech. First, the distinction between individual cognition and
social process is difficult to maintain, as many authors emphasize in their assertions that
individual cognition is embedded in social process. Thus the term social-cognitive
seemed to be an appropriate reframing of cognitive processes. In a similar way, literature
about aspects of individual cognition that depend on physical embodiment, the direct
physical interaction of the individual with a physical world, along with the notion that
even our physical spaces are largely the expression of human activity, suggest a blurring
of the distinction between the physical 1 geographic and the social-cognitive dimensions.
All of these dimensions are simultaneously implicated with each other, and are
not as distinct as we often would think. The distinctions we draw out of convenience may
mask the usefulness of thinking about all of these aspects as being parts of a unified
whole. These realizations led to a sense that a most fruitful approach might be to assume
that our lived space is one field that includes the geophysical and sociocognitive at once,
and to assume that spatiality pervades this field in all aspects. From this perspective, the
various dimensions of lived space might have the possibility of being represented within
a single coordinate system (probably involving multiple origins in individuals and
communities), within which multiple frames of reference may be simultaneously

available. In this view, one domain such as the social-cognitive would not occupy a space
assumed to be based metaphorically upon a more real geophysical space. Rather, space
would be seen to involve all of human experience, each dimension of which may be
represented through simultaneous coordination rather than by means of literal or
metaphoric translations from one domain to another. Finding a way to coordinate such
multiple co-existing spatial frames thus became part of the problem that is set for this
work.
These multiple frames may be seen as the dimensions within a single coordinate
system, each dimension expressing the particular rules and relationships that apply in
each dimension. We are accustomed to thinking that we live in a three dimensional
world. If this is so, what are these dimensions? Most familiar, and most tied to the
geophysical world at all scales from tabletop to geographic, are the three dimensions of
physical space: height, depth and breadth, with a "fourth dimension" of time added in. As
we have already seen, the time dimension can as little be unraveled from space as can our
bodies be separated from the physical world, or our individual selves from the social
contexts within which we exist.
The anthropologist Edward T. Hall posited that there is a "hidden dimension"
within which we live, the dimension of culture. He called the science of relationship
between space and culture "proxemics," and thought that raising awareness of the
cultural basis of spatial relations was essential, for "no matter how hard man tried it is
impossible for him to divest himself of his own culture, for it has penetrated to the roots
of his nervous system and determines how he perceives the world." This is "a new
dimension - the cultural dimension - most of which is hidden from view" (Hall,
196611969, p. 189).

The concepts of space and infomation in their human dimensions, including
space and culture, human problem solving, geometries of mind and the spatial
organization of knowledge, will be discussed in the chapter that follows.

Chapter 4
INFORMATION AND SPACE IN HUMAN DIMENSION

A Three-Dimensional World: S ~ a c eTime
,
and Culture

This chapter seeks to present some of the ways the human dimension is expressed
in terms of our understanding of space and information processes. The intent of this work
overall is to strengthen a human-centered concept of information processes. Open
questions about spatial aspects of information sharing run throughout this work, and
sharing must be considered to be a social, or human-centered process. The previous
chapter on concepts of space concluded with reference to Hall's "hidden dimension," the
cultural aspect of spatial relations. This chapter will provide an overview of some of the
human-centered processes that are generally related to information, again with focus on
the spatial aspects of those processes.
Topics that will be discussed here include cognitive maps and mental models,
human strategies for understanding and action that often evoke analogies to geography
and cartography. Discussion of these outward-looking concepts will be followed by
examples of constructs for the geometries and maps of the mind, applying spatial
concepts to help us understand our own thinking and related processes. In addition, such
topics as sorting, physical manipulation as part of kinesthetic knowledge, and action
orientation will be touched upon, to give a sense of the participatory approach to
knowledge that needs to be part of a human-centered concept of information processes.
In the sections below, an attempt will be made to keep acting human beings at the center
of discussion. Space thus becomes a way of organizing or framing human actions in
various ways. The human dimension always has personal as well as social aspects.
Sometimes these may be expressed as a cultural dimension, or may be thought of as
social-cognitive. The position taken here is that individual humans are embedded equally

in their social and physical worlds, in worlds of language and meaning as well as in a
world of material constraints and the possibilities afforded by our physical bodies. Some
of the complexities involved in adopting a human-centered approach are described in the
sections that follow.
Overall, this chapter intends to support the view of Hall and others that
consideration of culture is intrinsic to discussion of spatial and temporal dimensions. Hall
has written, "What has been thought of as mind is actually internalized culture" (1 976, p.
168). Hutchins, another author who stresses the importance of culture in cognition, aims
to relax or dissolve boundaries that "have been erected, primarily for analytic
convenience, in social space, in physical space, and in time" (1995, p. xiii).
In his introductory discussion of "mind at different levels," Hampden-Turner calls
culture "mind writ large." "Culture consists of the sharing of mythic patterns, for
meaning requires that we complete a picture whether we are certain of its final form or
not. Culture is then mind writ large which shapes us unawares unless we develop the
understanding to shape culture" (1981, p. 11).
Harley (1992) makes it clear that cartography is cultural expression. He contends
that "the scientific rules of mapping are, in any case, influenced by a quite different set of
rules, those governing the cultural production of the map." He stresses that there is need
to recognize rules "related to values, such as those of ethnicity, politics, religion or social
class, and they are also embedded in the map-producing society at large. . . . In the map
itself, social structures are often disguised beneath an abstract, instrumental space, or
incarcerated in the co-ordinates of computer mapping" (p. 236).
Entrikin (1977) reviews two distinct approaches to spatial perspective that are
represented in the work of empirical and.phenomenologica1 geographers. In
distinguishing the existential space of the phenomenologists and the metric distances of
the empirical geographers, "the question arises as to whether these two distinct spatial

perspectives can be reconciled within one philosophical framework or represent two
divergent paths of geographic thought" (p. 209). This question persists in discussions of
geographic theory today. Doreen Massey proposes that a thorough reconsideration by
geographers of the concepts of space and time may help to build a bridge between the
natural and social sciences, including their expressions in geography (Massey, 1999). The
present work is intended to be a contribution toward this possible reconciliation.

Comitive Ssace, Copitive Maps, Mental Models, Geometries of Mind
Although the topics of cognitive spaces, maps and models generally are
conceived to refer to the capacities of individual human beings, the preceding section
should help us to remember that these also must be discussed in terms of their
interpersonal human social context. This said, there is a sense in which cognition can be
seen as being embodied in individual human actors, and most of the topics in this section
are presented in a way that reflects this view. The sections below involve what might be
thought of as spatialization of mental process, which is generally conceived in individual
human terms.

Comitive
Space and Cognitive Maps
What is "cognitive space"? Couclelis and Gale (1986) state that cognitive space
"includes the larger-scale space beyond the sensory horizon about which information
must be mentally organized, stored, and recalled" (p. 2). For Newby, "Cognitive space is
not just what is known (e.g. facts about the world) but also the dynamics by which
knowledge is acted on, used, changed, etc. Processes in cognitive space are those
required to store and retrieve knowledge, and also processes for integrating perceptions
with experience, desires, the physical self, and so on" (Newby, 1998, p. 1).

This organization of information "beyond the sensory horizon" is thought to be
performed through a mental strategy involving the construction of a cognitive map. The
Dictionary of Psvcholog~cites Tolman, whose observation of the behavior of rats in
mazes initiated the cognitive map concept, in defining cognitive map: "A learned pattern
of connected behavioral actions to achieve a particular end, be it a rat in a maze who
wants to go to a food box, a child who wants to get dressed, or a student who wants to get
a college degree" (Corsini, 1999, p. 181). Klatzky's more restrictive definition applies
only to physical space: "Cognitive maps are internal representations of spatial
environments that permit the planning and execution of movement within them" (2000,
p. 147).
The work of Downs and Stea is associated with increasing general awareness of
cognitive mapping. They claim that cognitive maps are taken for granted as part of
everyday activities. They assert that "human spatial behavior is dependent on the
individual's cognitive map of the spatial environment" (1973, p. 9). Cognitive mapping is
the process of "acquisition, amalgamation, and storage" of "information from a complex,
uncertain, changing, and unpredictable source via a series of imperfect sensory
modalities" (p. 10). They ask, "How is information, derived from the absolute space of
the environment in which we live, transformed into the relative spaces that determine our
behavior?" (p. 12).
Geographers have an interest in cognitive maps in terms of hypotheses about how
people manage their relations with their physical environment. The use of a "map"
metaphor also makes this a comfortable concept for geographers. Downs and Stea state
that "cognitive structures, or maps, serve as a frame of reference, a basis for
interpretation, a source of behavioral predictions, and as a means of shorthand expression
and communication." The processes involved include our ability to "rotate
environmental information in space, as in planning routes to andfiom a place." We are

able to translate these structures through time. We are able to view the information
included in cognitive maps from different perspectives. We can add or subtract elements
at will. People demonstrate flexibility in their ability to change scales. Downs and Stea
say that "Cognitive mapping is a process of both analysis and synthesis" (1977, p. 96).
Their notion of cognitive mapping is grounded in a representation-of-reality model, and
aims at understanding the basis for skills at spatial problem solving.
Tversky (1993, p. 14) explores the many nuances of conceiving of cognitive maps
as "mental representations for environments." These are known to differ fiom "true"
maps (her quotations) but she claims that they are presumed to be like maps in being
"coherent wholes that reflect spatial relations among elements." They are "available to
mental inspection" as maps are available to physical inspection. They are like images in
being "internalized perceptions." She calls her approach a "constructionist" view, by
which people "acquire disparate pieces of knowledge about environments" of which "not
all the relevant stored information will be retrieved when needed" (p. 15). Her
"constructionist" approach should be distinguished fiom the constructivist approach
described in Chapter 2.
To her description of cognitive maps, Tversky adds two other constructs:
cognitive collages, and spatial mental models. In the case of cognitive collages, often
operating "for environments not known in detail" the information will be systematically
distorted, lacking "coherence of maps" but nevertheless good candidates as metaphors
for environmental knowledge. The second operates where people have more detailed
knowledge, and allow various operations to be performed, such as "perspective-taking,
reorientation, and spatial inferences." These may not "preserve metric information" but
do well in preserving "coarse spatial relations" (Tversky, 1993, p. 15).
A recurring theme in the cognitive mapping literature is awareness of the

discrepancy between the cognitive map and the environment that is being understood or

negotiated with the help of such a map. Tversky outlines many of the "systematic errors
in memory" that are involved with these metaphoric operational structures (pp. 15-18). In
discussion of the production of spatial descriptions (pp. 18-22) she concludes that though
most languages provide people with the "technical systems to convey metric information
about location, orientation, and distance, this terminology is not widely used in everyday
speech," (p. 22) but that people rather create descriptions using "categorical spatial
relations" that are sufficient for everyday purposes.
Klatzky, in reviewing research into the "spatial accuracy of cognitive maps"
(2000) notes that they "have nonspatial as well as spatial components and that they are
influenced by processes of perception, learning, and meaningful interpretation. Research
has been directed toward the underlying causes of systematic errors in cognitive
mapping." She claims that cognitive maps usually are formed by people through
"perceiving and interacting with their environment. They use manipulation and
locomotion as well as vision, thereby involving haptic modality (purposive touch) and
proprioception (sensing via the muscles, tendons, joints, and vestibular system" (p. 147).
Gollege in turn discusses the source of "biases" in geographic knowledge as being
based in "cognitive filtering" (2002, pp. 7-9). These filters include the tendency to make
irregular shapes regular, adjustments to fit reference frames, imposition of hierarchical
ordering, and the addition of "biased personal knowledge." He discusses the many ways
in which people with only informal knowledge and without theoretical base can go
wrong.
Hirtle and Heidorn stress the importance of structure when considering cognitive
maps. They proceed from the assumption that there are "representations" of "actual
three-dimensional space" that are the basis for spatial cognition, and put focus on the
operations of that representation rather than on the "actual space" (Hirtle & Heidorn,
1993, pp. 170- 171). They begin with an overview of the tradition of inquiry begun by

Lynch in Image of the City (1960), and describe the landmark, route and survey
knowledge that are built up in the city image. Research into structured and unstructured
representations of geographic spaces is reviewed, with the conclusion that where
structures were not explicit, people would create hierarchical structures to assist in
ordering space. These results are in line with perception studies of Gestalt psychologists,
as are the perceptual adjustments noted by Golledge, above. They review research into
the translation of cognitive maps into language when giving directions. Choosing
reference objects and narrating spatial relationships among these objects is central to the
process of giving directions. Choice and relations among reference objects may not
reflect a "'realistic' picture of spatial relations" (p. l83), and for this reason spatial
language reflects an "idealization" of actual relations. Finally, spatial language
expressing cognitive maps depends on choice of points of view, described in terms of
frames of reference as described in the previous chapter.
Although Hirtle and Heidorn's view that cognitive maps can reflect actual spaces
is called into question by the overall approach adopted in the present work, their
conclusions about the importance of structure in spatial cognition seem correct. "We
think that it is clear that space is not perceived, stored, or processed in a homogeneous
manner. Structure and orientation within the space are used to organize the space, and in
cases where no structure is available, one will be created. Therefore, in presenting
information to people, it is important to present redundant, structured information. It is
also critical to allow subjects to converse in a language of topology that allows for
relations such as containment or adjacency, rather than strict Euclidean terms" (p. 186).
Most discussion about cognitive mapping seems to relate to human abilities as
demonstrated in everyday activities, such as wayfinding and making judgments about
spatial relations that are remembered or inferred. There are few hypotheses about what
these maps actually are, in terms of human physiology and the neural processes by which

these abilities are exercised. O'Keefe (1996) discusses the presumed workings of the
brain as it creates and uses cognitive maps. He states that these have three elements:
places, directions and distances; and that the relations among them are maintained by
vectors, in part due to physical positions, for instance the "head directions cells in the
postsubiculum" an area adjacent to hippocampal region (p. 280). The forces whose
vectors may influence the organism's interpretation of direction may be present "as the
local gradient of a universal signal such as gravity, geomagnetism, or olfactory currents,
as the vector originating at a place or object and passing through another place or
object . . . or as having a specified angle to a previously identified direction" (pp. 279280). Most researchers would probably agree with Newby that "we must admit that our
ability to describe and discuss cognitive space has outpaced our ability to provide a
complete picture of how cognitive space actually works!" (1 998, p. 8).
Kuipers discusses the distinction between the graphical map and the cognitive
map. For many purposes (he gives examples from wayfinding) there is an indefiniteness,
underdetermination of information available to the map user from the graphical map, and
the cognitive map may be composed of logical frames in the user that are only loosely
related to the graphical map. Map users are quite able to generalize from incomplete
knowledge, both in their own cognitive maps and in available graphical maps. He
concludes that graphical maps provide context for other information available to the user
- a conclusion that may fit with the "heuristic" intent of the workspace developed here

(Kuipers, 1978).
When space is defined from the viewpoint of geographers and geographic
information systems, it often takes on a positivist coloration. Golledge, for instance,
details the many "biases" in geographic knowledge due to "cognitive filtering" including
the tendency to make irregular shapes regular, adjustments to fit reference frames,
imposition of hierarchical ordering, and the addition of "biased personal knowledge"

(Golledge, 2002, p. 9). Identifying and exploring such biases is similar to the research
gathered in Kahneman and colleagues in Judgment Under Uncertainty (1982). All of the
"human conceptions of space" offered by Freundschuh and Egenhofer (1997) are tied to
spatial relations in physical environments external to human observers, at various scales
from "manipulable object space" and "map space" to "panoramic space." All their spaces
have some physical referent to serve as frame of reference for conceptualizing the space:
"Transperceptual spaces . . . are learned via wayfinding experience over time" while
"figural spaces are smaller than the body and are perceived form one vantage point."
They do not attempt, as Couclelis and Gale did in coordinating several orders of spatial
relation toward extending these geographic spatial concepts to nonphysical, cognitive
domains (1 986). Harley provides a dissent from this overall positivist stance, which he
considers to be a problem in contemporary cartographic practice: "One effect of
accelerated technological change -- as manifest in digital cartography and geographical
information systems -- has been to strengthen its positivist assumptions and it has bred a
new arrogance in geography about its supposed value as a mode of access to reality"
(1992, p. 23 1).
The entire cognitive mapping project among geographers seems to be oriented
toward bringing the cognitive map into closer correspondence with the environment
which it maps. Downs and Stea assert that cognitive maps "portray," are the "likeness
of," are "simplified models" of the environment (1 977, p. 6). They write of the
"accuracy" of cognitive maps -- by which they mean the physical products of
representation of the cognitive mapping process. "A cognitive map is aproduct - a
person's organized representation of some part of the spatial environment" (p. 99 ff.).
The theme of underdetermination, the generalization from incomplete knowledge
as described by Kuipers above, is an important one. There seem to be two threads of
approach to cognitive maps, one in terms of emphasis on problems related to their non-

correspondence with reality, and the other which focuses on people's ability to work with
incomplete information and to make sense of it. These two tendencies, each with merit,
also mark two approaches to information in general as well as characterizing two distinct
approaches to understanding our relations with the world.

Mental Models
Mental models are similar to cognitive maps in several respects. Tversky defines
a mental model as "a knowledge structure, like a schema, but more complex, as it not
only represents information but also suggests how to process it" (2000, p. 191). She
reports that the mental model construct appeared simultaneously in two forms, both
sharing in the definition above but differing in the following way. On the one hand, she
notes that Johnson-Laird (1983)used it as "a description of the mental structures used to
solve verbal syllogisms, rather than the rules of logic, which are often violated" (p. 191).
The essays in Gentner and Stevens (1983) used it "to characterize conceptual
representations of knowledge of primarily physical systems, door bells, calculators,
steam plants, electricity, mechanics, navigation. Mental models were seen as
configurations of parts or processes causally influencing each other in specified ways.
Like a schema, a mental model represents domain-specific knowledge; in contrast to a
schema, a mental model incorporates processes that are temporal or causal in nature.
Rather than being inspected, such a model is 'run' to draw inferences" (p. 191).
Tversky notes that the term model is used in two senses, "a model as a miniature
of a real-world object or system and a model as a theory that generates predictions." All
of these distinctions lead to ambiguities surrounding our understanding of mental models,
ambiguities which she claims are "not necessarily bad; it can be argued that many useful
terms in psychology (and life) are ambiguous" (p. 191).

Since both cognitive maps and mental models are descriptions of processes that
can be inferred from human speech and behavior, without their being available to direct
observation, they can be conceived as explanatory constructs that make complex
processes seem more manageable by means of abstractions available in metaphor.
Don Norman (1983) notes that "people's views of the world, of themselves, of
their own capabilities, and of the tasks that they are asked to perform, or topics they are
asked to learn, depend heavily on the conceptualizations that they bring to the task" (p. 7)
and that mental models serve these needs. "Mental models are what people really have in
their heads and what guides their use of things" (p. 12). His overview of characteristics of
mental models notes that they are incomplete, that they are unstable, that people don't
use them well, they don't have "firm boundaries," they may be unscientific, and they are
parsimonious: "Often people do extra physical operations rather than the mental planning
that would allow them to avoid those actions; they are willing to trade-off extra physical
action for reduced mental complexity" (p. 8).
Norman, much of whose work has centered on exploring the interface between
people and machines, says that system designers should work toward a "system image"
that is "consistent, cohesive, and intelligible" (p. 13). Ideally, user interactions with the
system will produce a mental model that is compatible with this system image. He
presents distinctions between the conceptual model of the system (more or less the
designer's model), the system image, and the mental model. To have this repertoire of
distinctions among models that are active in the design, learning and use of systems is
meant to enrich the design process generally. In any case, the systems must work amidst
the "messy, sloppy, incomplete, and indistinct structures that people actually have" (p.
14).
Murray notes that the Gestalt psychology was "ahead of its time in its emphasis
on mental representations" as part of problem-solving processes, in that "it postulated

that subjects build up what we now call 'mental models' of the elements of a problem"
(Murray, 1995, p. 165).
A classic article about mental models is Gentner and Gentner "Flowing Waters or
Teeming Crowds: Mental Models of Electricity" (1983). Their goal was to understand
how people construct and manage analogies related to complex systems. They describe
the powerful role of "generative analogies," which are mental models, in problem solving
and theory building. In their narrative, common analogical constructs for understanding
electricity involve water flows or moving crowds. To say that electricity flows like water,
that an electric cord is a "narrow, controlled entity like a river" (p. 99) does not imply
that people think that electricity is wet like water, but that there is a system of
relationships that are thought to be shared across these domains. The moving crowd
model has "objects racing through passageways" and voltages are interpreted as how
hard this crowd pushes, a resistor as a gate controlling the crowd, and so forth. In their
conclusions they cite many reports which show that people hold inaccurate and
inconsistent models based on mental representations of physical phenomena that "contain
profound errors" (p. 126). Their overall conclusion is that "Generative analogies can
indeed serve as inferential frameworks" (p. 127).
In a more recent study, Levin, Stuve and Jacobson (1996) studied "mental models
of networks." Their study was done in 1996, when the emerging World Wide Web had
not yet solidified into common models for the general public. They surveyed teachers
and teachers in training for their images of e-mail, the Internet and the World Wide Web.
Their work was aimed at better understanding of teachers' concepts of technologies and
their uses. Some of the "models" they elicited were web, highway, solar system,
encyclopedia, fishnet, fungus with tentacles, nervous system, tree, interactive wave, and
visual model of culture (novices), and community, foggy world, funnel, library, neural
network, octopus, water molecule, ant trails, global village, and window on the world

(users with some experience) (pp. 4-5 of 14). Of particular interest to the work underway
here is the vast range of images offered by these users, stretching the imagination but
encouraging in the search for structures that afford many interpretations applied to
interactions to a very diverse, distributed system.
Mental models have certainly played a part in the construction of the "heuristic
workspace" that is one of the outcomes offered here, described in detail in Chapter 8
below. At this point, because the characteristics of the workspace are not fully defined
nor described, its existence is as much in the form of a mental model as it is an actual
space realized in a digital environment. Building physical models, which accompanied
the creation of the digital space, affords a stability that is absent from the character of
mental models as presented by Norman, who states "mental models are unstable" (1983,
p. 8). Nevertheless, even the construction of physical models requires the coordination of
a set of mental models. Likewise, without the physical and virtual models held directly
before the eye or in the hand, the ability to mentally "hold" such a complex as three
nested polyhedral nets would not be possible. Mental and physical models are each
helpful in carrying out the required work of design. Having a physical model in hand has
one advantage not available in the form of a mental model, which is the ability through
demonstration to give others a sense of the model's structure and functions.

M a- ~ of
s Mind
This section presents "maps of the mind" which in a sense are complements to the
mental models described above. Whereas cognitive maps and mental models are
outward-looking, from the person toward the environment as a space to be navigated or a
set of processes to be learned, maps of the mind are attempts to graphically illustrate
mental and linguistic processes and other factors that make up the mind. Whereas
cognitive maps aim to coordinate representations with a shared public and physical world

so as to better negotiate that world, "maps of the mind" are graphical interpretations
based on measurement or on descriptive concepts of the workings of the mind of the
cognizing subject.
Three of the examples presented here, Kelly, Osgood and Newby, derive their
spaces from measurements of various factors that compose psychological, semantic and
cognitive spaces. Hampden-Turner presents dozens of sketch drawings as "maps" that
illustrate his review of theories of mind.
The psychologist George Kelly is known for his "personal construct theory" and
for a metric called the role repertory grid, or Kelly Grid. This is a "matrix of concepts,
individuals and constraints." Leonard states that the "Kelly Grid is built on the premise
that people construe their worlds by evaluating people, events, ideas, and objects (called
elements) according to distinctions between their polar opposite characteristics. Each
pole of each construct has meaning only when contrasted with its opposite" (Beer, 1994,
p. 122). Shaw and Gaines (1992) claim that "Kelly was a keen geometer with experience
in navigation and an interest in multi-dimensional geometry" (p. 2 of 15). Their Figure
11, "The RepGrid Screen showing a principal components analysis" is an array of
vectors, similar to Osgood's vector-based semantic spaces that are described below.
Shaw and Gaines continue, "It may seem strange to base cognitive science on
geometry rather than logic until one remembers that the reasoning structure of the

Elements (Euclid) was the basis for both Greek and modern logic, and that geometry and
logic in a category-theoretic framework are equivalent" (p. 2 of 15). They cite Kelly
(1 955) for what they call his "fundamental postulate," that a "person's processes are
psychologically channelized by the way in which he anticipates events" (p. 3 of 15).
Personal constructs are "templets for construing events." Kelly's psychological space
comes "into being through a process of construction by which we create a space in which
to place elements as we come to construe them" (p. 3 of 15). This becomes a "coordinate

system for our experience" and the "topology of the space comes into existence as it is
divided."
Kelly calls his approach "constructive alternativism" (1969, p. 96) meaning that
"reality is subject to many alternative constructions, some of which may prove to be
more fruitful than others." The personal construct is "essentially a dichotomous
differentiating and integrating unit" (p. 104) that people deal with both categories and
continua, and these qualities allow us to treat the personal construct as a mathematical
function. "Each of our dichotomies has both a differentiating and an integrating function"
(p. 105). For Kelly, choices are not made between doing something and doing nothing,
but in choosing between two somethings. Since incidents (apparently, of anything) are
"infinitely homogeneous," differences must be interposed. This interposition defines the
construct, which is an "intervening act" (p. 105).
The character of Kelly's proposed geometry and arithmetic are given in two
paragraphs at (1969, pp. 96, 105). There are no distances; each axis represents a single
distinction, not a continuum; angles describe the relationships between contingencies or
frequencies of incidents; these "change with the context of incidents to which the
constructs are applied." Kelly's method of exploring personal constructs is to engage in a
process of articulating similarities and differences beginning with the ways people put
others into particular categories, establishing similarities and differences among them. By
noting the constructs on a tabular matrix, the "construction matrix," eventually "complete
operational definitions" of a person's constructs can be established (p. 109). The idea that
each person constructs a multidimensional set of categories that can be expressed in a
unique spatial construct is similar to ideas that motivated the design of the workspace
offered below.
The methods of Charles Osgood, a pioneer of psycholinguistics, were very similar
to those used by Kelly in deriving personal constructs. Osgood engaged in cross-cultural

studies of meaning, toward developing an "Atlas of Affective Meanings," and devised a
new "semantic space vehicle" (1971, p. 39). He explicitly postulated a spatial model for
semantic space: "Let me ask you now to do the impossible -- to imagine a hypothetical
semantic space of some unknown number of dimensions, but certainly larger than the
three to which our human estate gives immediate entree." He offers colors as analogy,
and uses as a base "a locus of complete meaninglessness analogous to the neutral grey of
the color space." A concept at that position would "have no distinguishing semantic
characteristics. The meaning (M) of any concept located elsewhere in the space could be
represented by a vector extending from the origin." He then goes on to provide analogies
to color's saturation, brightness and hue, and relates these to the direction and length of
the vectors in semantic space. Direction, however, requires "the existence of some
reference coordinates or dimensions." As a way to conceive "psychological opposites in
language" he provides another color analogy, of complementary colors, cancelling each
other as represented in equal and opposite directions from center (Osgood, 1971, pp. 7-8)
The heart of his method is a coordinate system of multiple bi-polar relationships,
and Osgood likens his method to the game of Twenty Questions (p. 9). His scales
represent a "distance from meaninglessness" measure (p. 42) exploring 620 concepts
organized into 12 "super-categories" (p. 46). He carried out an extensive cross-cultural
program of research, while acknowledging shortcomings "due mainly to the intricacies of
culture and the questionable validities of the intuitions of native informants, even very
highly motivated ones like our colleagues" (p. 57). He clearly states that at the time of his
work neither he or anyone else had a "rationale for sampling the conceptual domains of
human cultures" (p. 40). The cross-cultural work of Levinson and colleagues, described
above in the discussion of frames of reference in Chapter 3, could legitimately be situated
in the research tradition initiated by Osgood.

Newby, whose work is within the information sciences with particular interest in
the processes of search and retrieval, uses a version of multidimensional scaling based on
the "Galileo theory" of Woelfel and Fink to delineate cognitive space (Newby, 1998).
"Galileo theory posits laws of cognitive processes similar to the laws of physics. In a
Galileo cognitive space, survey items (referred to as 'concepts') have not only location,
but also cognitive equivalents to mass and velocity. 'Mass' is associated with how much
knowledge and certainty exists about a concept. 'Velocity' is simply the tendency of a
concept to move (or sometimes oscillate) relative to other concepts over time. The
Galileo cognitive space is not an empty space with occasional concepts in it, such as
graphical depictions of the solar system. Rather, it is akin to an Einsteinian space-time, in
which forces exist between items in the space, such that there is no truly empty space,
only areas of more greatly concentrated 'mass' and their associated forces" (p. 5). This
introduction of the concepts of "forces" will be expanded in Chapter 5.
Though Hampden-Turner's "maps of the mind" are not based on quantitative
measurements, they have the advantage of providing evocative illustrations of the wide
range of established theories of mind (1981) . He recognizes that his is an unorthodox
approach to the visual display of relationships expressed by our ideas about the human
psyche, but the graphics he presents are effective icons for the narrative provided in the
text Many of the names that appear elsewhere in the present study appear among the
"maps" he presents: Varela, Bateson, Osgood, Fuller, Korzybski, Piaget, and the "force
fields of Kurt Lewin".
His maps are as diverse as the theories they illustrate, showing objects in space,
fields of force, complex networks, multi-headed and multi-species trees, machines and
paradoxical figures. Common to most is some portrayal of the human head. There also is
an overall sense of the forces at work in the mind. The images are evocative invitations to
the reader to reflect and interpret the details given in the narrative text. The variety and

depth of the "maps" give the reader a sense of the chaotic nature of the mind, no doubt an
important factor in our inability to derive a single or consistent view of its workings.
Harnpden-Turner is explicit about his goals and alternative intellectual commitments.
"This entire book is a plea for the revision of social science, religion and philosophy to
stress connectedness, coherence, relationship, organicism and wholeness, as against the
fragmenting, reductive and compartmentalizing forces of the prevailing orthodoxies" (p.
8).
Given that people construct and use cognitive maps and mental models, what are
the materials from which these are composed? Like all cognitive processes, these seem to
be composed from at least three major streams that are involved in encoding, and
decoding, our perceptual experiences. Two of these are words and images, the factors
involved in Paivio's "dual coding" hypothesis for memory (Paivio, 1979, pp. 177- 243).
He presents three "different theoretical levels of meaning - representational, referential,
and associative" (p. 177) giving special attention to the place of imagery in symbolic
processes. Paivio also points toward a third factor that can be generally identified as
kinesthetic. "In agreement with theorists such as Osgood (1953), Werner and Kaplan
(1963), and others, I assume that the aroused meaning process evoked by a word or other
symbol is an organismic reaction with affective, or motor (including verbal), or imaginal
components, or all of these at once" (Paivio, 1991, pp. 109- 110).
Other authors also embrace the kinesthetic factor. Levelt presents three "multiple
representation systems" of the mind: "spatial representation system, propositional
representational system, kinaesthetic and other representational systems" (1996, p. 78).
We also recall Klatzky's haptic and proprioceptive factors in the construction of
cognitive maps (2000, p. 147). All of these authors point toward understanding cognitive
processes in terms of multidimensional participation in our experience and in our ability
to mentally manage it.

In the present work, the kinesthetic factor is expressed within the heuristic
workspace model presented below in terms of real spatiality, the ability to move and
rearrange symbolic tokens, and inclusion of "forces" among the defining elements of the
structure. Manipulability, the involvement of the hands as well as the eyes and ears,
seems to be an essential component of learning and memory. This comes up here in
several contexts, such as the importance of sorting as an basic information activity
(described below); the movement and rearrangement of symbolic tokens within the
workspace, importance for retrieval of having put something physically in a place.

Sorting, Cate~orization,Manipulation
This section introduces sorting as an important and fundamental information
process. People are constantly engaged in sorting through fitting objects and concepts
into categories and groups, often without much reflection about the basis on which this
sorting goes forward. The concept of sorting is easily associated with physical activities
related to moving objects from one place to another, into and out of groupings that
change depending on situation and time. Most sorting seems to go forward on informal,
ad hoc basis, and is pragmatically related to immediate goals.
The formal approach to sorting is classification, closely linked to giving stable
names to things and concepts. The dynamic and situational character of most sorting
works against the stability needed in formal systems of classification. There is a
movement away from an approach to categories based on a classical theory, toward a
view of categories based on examplars and prototypes, an approach identified with
Eleanor Rosch. The sections that follow will expand on these themes.

Everydav sort in^ and Theories of Cate~orization

Sorting is an everyday activity, one of the basic activities associated with
information processes, as are losing and finding things and the questioning / answering
process. Sorting involves making order, essential to the "sense-making" said by Dervin
to be the core of information. Making order and the origin of forms begins with drawing
distinctions. "We take as given the idea of distinction and the idea of indication, and that
we cannot make an indication without drawing a distinction. We take, therefore, the form
of distinction for the form" (Spencer-Brown, 1969, p. 1).
Sorting closely relates space and information, since the most familiar kind of
sorting involves moving things, rearranging them physically, creating sets of objects in
physical space. There seems to be little doubt that something similar happens when
sorting involves nontangibles, such as happens with the rearrangement of ideas toward
creating order in thought. Ideas, or concepts, are often spoken of as if they were physical
objects, the "folk solids" that are said to be the materials of cognitive processes (Clark,
1993, p. 4).
Sorting "creates space" in a practical sense. If a random array of objects is
scattered in a physical setting, such as tools on a workbench or working papers in a study,
sorting them actually creates space, working room in which new activities can take place
that were not available amidst the confusion and random clutter - itself the result of
tendencies toward disorder, entropy. This disorder began with yesterday's order and
resulted from the accomplishmen: of yesterday's tasks. Everyday sorting is "negentropic"
action, a mark of the ongoing creativity that is one way of distinguishing living from
nonliving processes.
While it is usually conceived as a mechanical process, more like housekeeping
than as one of the creative arts, sorting can also be a learning strategy. The first kind of
learning that sorting allows is an understanding of the relationships among the things

sorted, and awareness of the particular criteria that are applied when any sorting occurs.
Sorting rules can be inferred from the arrangement of the sort while it is ongoing and
when complete. Sorting also allows recombination in unique situated orderings that can
be seen as the results of a creative process. In these ways, mere sorting can be the source
of new insights about the ordering of relations in our world. The space that is created
through sorting has the potential for making room for new choices that might otherwise
not be available; the increase of choices being one of the main goals of informational
activities generally.
Categorization is part of sorting. Sorting can't be done unless there is a prior
sense of how distinctions are to be drawn in the process. Drawing distinctions is a rulebased activity, though in the case of most everyday sorting the rules can be very general
and informal. The categories that are involved often are loosely defined or even totally
tacit, inexplicit, or part of background assumptions that operate but are seldom
recognized, often part of the "cognitive unconscious" hypothesized by Lakoff and
Johnson (1999). Which might be fine, if being unconscious of the criteria for any
particular sort does not stand in the way of the purposes for which the sort is undertaken.
Drawing distinctions on habitual or unconscious basis, or accepting socially-determined
distinctions uncritically, may result in decreased availability of choices, excluded choices
of which the person doing the sorting will probably be unaware.
Our approach to sorting is generally judged on pragmatic bases. The
appropriateness of any category, concept or rule according to which formal or informal
sorting takes place can be judged only in its consequences, both for the person engaged in
sorting, and in the consequences of the sort in its implications for others.
Names and the naming of things is also intrinsic to sorting, though sorting can
happen without names for the categories or objects being made explicit. Names that are
assigned to objects, or to sorting rules, may have serious unintended consequences.

Examples are given by the linguist Whorf in his classic article on the "relation of habitual
thought and behavior to language" (194lIl956). His examples were taken from his years
working as a fire insurance inspector, where he found exhaust fans that were thought to
be "blowers" and thus blowing the fire across the factory; a flammable substance called
"rock wool" that was thought to be noncombustible due to being "rock and then
suddenly exploding; and other equally compelling examples.
Considering classification processes as a spectrum, sorting occupies the informal
pole, while classification occupies a more formal region. Much of the effort in
constructing information storage, search and retrieval systems has gone toward managing
categories, toward goals of consistent arrangement within the system and toward issues
of coordination between categorical assumptions of system users and the arrangements of
the system. Certainly part of the mental model of users of information retrieval systems
has to include something about how categories are managed by the system, but the
congruence between user and system-based categorical structures cannot be as close as
most machines require.
Svenonius discusses the rules for formation of the vocabulary of "classification
languages" (2000, p. 56), stating that these rules can be simple or complex, derived from
the works being classified or from controlled vocabularies. She finds that "little progress
has been made in automatically classing terms into semantic categories" in part because
"the information needed to do it is not sufficiently formalized or consolidated" (p. 145).
Some new tools are becoming available, "that consolidate and normalize lexical
information. . . . These tools can be found in the form of lexical databases that combine
dictionary and thesaural information, databases mapping natural to normalized
languages, metathesauri, semantic networks, term banks, and various sorts of knowledge
representations. Such tools hold promise for advancing the automation of semantic
classification. Nevertheless, semantic classification will always be difficult. . . . Where a

human intelligence cannot unequivocally class a term, a machine intelligence can hardly
succeed" (p. 146).
Part of the problem in constructing consistent vocabularies for classification
languages, and the difficulties nonspecialists have in using them, is that they are based
within the traditional, or classical, approach to categories. Controlled vocabularies such
as the Library of Congress Subject Headings and the thesauri used in indexing specific
subject domains usually involves a classical approach to categorization. The hold of this
theory has diminished recently, largely due to work within a tradition initiated by Eleanor
Rosch.
The classical theory of categories, and the importance of Rosch's recognition of
the importance of prototypes for categorization, is detailed by Lakoff (1987). "From the
time of Aristotle to the later work of Wittgenstein, categories were thought [to] be well
understood and unproblematic. They were assumed to be abstract containers, with things
either inside or outside the category. Things were assumed to be in the same category if
and only if they had certain properties in common. And the properties they had in
common were taken as defining the category." He continues that this was "arrived at on
the basis of a priori speculation . . . not even thought of as a theory . . . but as an
unquestionable, definitional truth" (p. 6 ) .
Based on Rosch's work, Lakoff outlines the questions have been raised regarding
consequences of the classical theory. First, "if categories are defined only by properties
that all members share, then no members should be better examples of the category than
any other members;" also, if properties are inherent in the members, then "categories
should be independent of the peculiarities of any beings doing the categorizing; that is,
they should not involve such matters as human neurophysiology, human body movement,
and specific human capacities to perceive, to form mental images, to learn and
remember, to organize the things learned, and to communicate efficiently" (p. 7).

Lakoff s colleague Mark Johnson ties the classical theory of categories to an
"Objectivist" theory of understanding, of which he is critical. "A theory of categorization
is basic to any theory of cognitive structure, for it explores the way we organize our
experience into kinds. Objectivist semantics has tended to factor the set-theoretical view
of a category as specifymg necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in a given
kind" (Johnson, 1987, p. 191). Now Rosch's alternative is available, supporting the vies
of "categories as consisting of networks with prototypical members clustered in the
center of the category with less prototypical members at various distances from the
central members. A category thus forms a complex radial structure, and we would need
an account of the nature of these structures, to the extent that they vary in kind" (p. 192).
Paivio, whose particular interest is in the role of imagery in memory, finds that
Rosch's exemplars often are remembered and used in the form of images. "Some recent
evidence strongly suggests that we use specific pictureable exemplars as the prototypical
representations of general categories. Rosch showed experimentally that not all category
instances are equally good members of the category. . . . Rosch has demonstrated that
people who are required to deal mentally with general concepts in an experimental task
tend to think in terms of the prototypical best examples rather than vague abstractions or
even verbal labels. . . . Moreover, Rosch was able to show that people somehow evaluate
the category membership of other exemplars by comparing them with these prototypical
examples. That is, good prototypes serve as reference points or standards against which
other examples are compared. Finally, some of these good prototypes have considerable
generality or universality [cross-culturally]" (Paivio, 1991, p. 263).
A good summary of Rosch's prototype theory of categorization is found in Mark
and Frank, who align themselves with Lakoff and Johnson's "experiential realism"

(1 996). They describe how experiential realism approaches the problems with a classical
set theory approach to categories, in which "there are necessary and sufficient observable

properties of any entity, from which its membership or non-membership in some set can
be deduced without ambiguity" (p. 4).
Understanding the nature of the everyday activity of sorting, how we make sense,
order and space in our lives through the use of categorical judgments such as are
advanced by Rosch, should be useful in bringing the categorical structures of human
participants into accord with the definitional frameworks built into information systems,
or interactive learning environments. Svenonius, in the passage cited above, indicates
some of the ongoing work toward alternative approaches. These ideally would maximize
the use of such features of categorization as individual differences, graded membership in
classes (prototypes), and peoples' "basic level categories," which are "determined by the
way people interact with parts of their environment, and thus will depend upon their
gestalt perception, image formation, motor programs, functions and purposes" (Johnson,
1987, p. 192).
Generally, when sorting is done by machines, all the characteristics of the sort are
well defined, as in the set-theoretic approach to categories. Machine-based processes
often result in structures of meaning that are well defined, but that ultimately enforce the
establishment of universal meanings to which users are compelled to conform. New
approaches, based on a more open understanding of the process of categorization as
practiced, may lead toward a more contextual, relational, situational, and distributed
notion of the organization of meaning than is now the case. In part, the approach of
federated autonomous workspaces suggested in Chapter 8 is proposed as one design
strategy in this direction.

Action Orientation, Lived Space, Kinesthetic Knowledge
The fundamental unity of the physicallgeographic and the socia11cognitive worlds
is experienced in human lived space. The human dimensions of space and information

are expressed in this section through examples of what are meant by action orientation,
for instance situating responsibility for information in terms of human choices, and by
what might be called kinesthetic knowledge, also discussed by various authors in terms
of embodiment and manipulation, or the knowledge of the hands.
As suggested in the previous section, sorting is a fundamental informational
activity, and through our physical or "embodied" actions directly relates information with
space. As Bowker and Star observe, "To classify is human. Not all classifications take
formal shape or are standardized in commercial and bureaucratic products. We all spend
large parts of our days doing classification work, and we make up and use a range of ad
hoc classifications to do so. . . . We have certain knowledge of these intimate spaces,
classifications that appear to live partly in our hands -- definitely not just in the head or in
any formal algorithm" (Bowker & Star, 1999, pp. 2-3).
That our knowledge is embodied, that our concepts originate in our physical as
well as our linguistic and intellectual activities, and that our memories and other
cognitive processes are intimately tied to our bodies are themes that recur throughout the
present work. Our classifications, and many other aspects of our cognitive processes, do
"appear to live partly in our hands." Understanding this is one of the ways that we can
begin to make the person-centered approach to information real. This section will discuss
several aspects of this.
The "motor theory of perception" of Alain Berthoz is one point of beginning
toward seeing these concepts together as an integrated whole. "A major theme of this
book [The Brain's Sense of Movement] is that perception is more than just the
interpretation of sensory messages. Perception is constrained by action; it is an internal
simulation of action. It is judgment and decision making, and it is anticipation of the
consequences of action" (Berthoz, 1997/2000, p. 9). The book suggests that the sense of
movement may be considered a "sixth sense" (p. 25 ff.). There are senses of position and

velocity; sensation and control of these are in several physical organs, such as the
"neuromuscular spindles" that detect muscle stretch (p. 27) and the semicircular canals,
that he asserts gives the body a "basic Euclidean frame of reference" (p. 33) that we also
find in the Euclidean basis of Weber's cognitive geometry (2002).
Berthoz reviews Poincart's geometric, representative and retinal spaces.
Geometric space is "continuous, infinite, three-dimensional, homogeneous (all its points
are identical), isotropic (all the straight lines that pass through the same point are
identical). In contrast, representative space (which is primarily visual space) is twodimensional (retinal space); it becomes three-dimensional owing to convergence and
accommodation; it is not homogeneous, because the part of the retina that is most
sensitive to shape, the fovea, is nonhomogeneous with the periphery. It is thus not
isotropic." Berthoz suggests that a basic intuition of PoincarC is affirmed by "modem
psychophysics;" that is, "we do not represent to ourselves external bodies in geometrical
space, but we reason about these bodies as if they were situated in geometrical space. . . .
Poincart introduces a fundamental notion that is essential to my own theory: 'To localize
an object simply means to represent to oneself the movements that would be necessary to
reach it. I will explain myself. It is not a question of representing the movements
themselves in space, but solely of representing to oneself the muscular sensations which
accompany these movements and which do not presuppose the preexistence of the notion
of space"' (Berthoz, 199712000, p. 37).
In these ways, Berthoz helps us to understand the importance of the actions of our
bodies in relationship to our perceptions and our knowledge. The focus of this section,
lived space and the actions we perform in it, is linked to a phenomenological approach to
geography, space and design.
Kimberly Dovey seeks to integrate lived space, the actual requirements of
individual and institutional clients for architectural projects, with the geometric space

that is one of the tools for architectural and environmental design. She states that there is
a distinction between "lived and geometric modes of space," with focus on lived space
characterizing "the phenomenological approach to environmental studies" (Dovey, 1993,
p. 247). Citing Norberg-Schulz (1971) in an approach to categorizing lived space in a
similar fashion as Freundshuh and Egenhofer (1997), discussed above in the Chapter 3,
she distinguishes various scales of lived space ranging from the "level of small objects"
that is "centered around acts such as grasping and manipulating" through the "level of
furniture," the "scale of building" and "larger geographic scales" (Dovey, 1993, p. 249).
She introduces the concept of "zones of actual and potential reach," citing Schutz and
Luckrnan (1973) and recalling the work of phenomenological geographers Buttimer and
Seamon (1980).
Dovey reflects that "Plato declared in the Timaeus that geometry should be the
science of space. Subsequent developments through Euclid have built geometric space
into a powerful model for understanding the world. This model is so powerful that a
geometric representation of the world is widely perceived as the one true arrangement,
with people's various everyday experiences being more or less accurate in relation to it"
(p. 248). For phenomenologists, "the lived-space of the lifeworld is the primary spatial
mode from which geometric space is abstracted" (p. 249). She refers to Merleau-Ponty
who "asserts the priority of lived-space . . . firmly anchored in the nature and structure of
the human body and the potentialities for action" (p. 249). The potentials of space within
an action orientation are shown in her quotation from his Phenomenology of Perception,
"Space is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are arranged, but the means
whereby the positing of things become possible. . . . [Ilnstead of imagining [space] as a
sort of ether in which all things float . . . we must think of it as the universal power
enabling them to be connected" (p. 249).

Distinct from lived space, Dovey claims that geometric space "is purged of social
and cultural meaning; it is reduced to the coordinates of a map or the lines of a technical
drawing. It achieves accuracy and predictability at the expense of experiential depth" (p.
250). Nevertheless, the geometric space that is available to us is of great value. "The
irony of geometric space is it is the elimination of human values that makes it useful;"
while lived space "is the opportunity-laden setting for action in everyday life," @. 250)
geometric space "is a means to improved lived-space, a shared language that contributes
to a successful design process. This cycle from experience through geometric
representation and back to a transformed experience I call the cycle of lived-space" @.
251).
Dovey outlines many of the problems encountered in architectural design related
to an inability to express lived space through simple geometric portraits as in working
drawings. She advocates for revised design process, allowing "a critical analysis of the
design process to ensure that the primacy of experience is not lost to the complexities of
scale of the development" and asserts that "the lived-experience of place both initiates
and concludes the process of environmental change" (p. 267). Her perspective has a
bearing on the results that are suggested in the present work, in that she asserts the
positive value of geometric approaches (a large factor in the design of the workspace,
below), and in that she puts the "lived-experience of place" at the beginning and end of
the design process, as is intended here in putting the cognizing human subject at the
beginning and end of all information processes.
Edwin Hutchins, whose "cognition in the wild" seeks to establish the human actor
as a whole person, not only a brain, and social relationships as the locus of cognition, not
just the external "physical symbol-system architecture." Reflecting on traditional
cognitive science, he states that the "physical symbol-system architecture is not a model
of individual cognition. It is a model of the operation of a sociocultural system from

which the human actor has been removed" (Hutchins, 1995, p. 363). "When the symbols
were put inside (computer or brain), there was no need for eyes, ears, or hands. Those are
for manipulating objects, and the symbols have ceased to be material and have become
entirely abstract and ideational" (p. 365).
Hutchins describes the place of nautical charts aboard a naval vessels as
important shared, visible workspaces around which a social cognitive process can occur
(p. 27 1) and describes the origins of mathematics in physical manipulation of tools that
had physical as well as symbolic aspects (p. 361). He points in two directions
simultaneaously, outward from the head to inclusion of the body and the society, and
inward from abstract symbol management systems toward the embodied person. His
perspective forms part of the basis for the conceptual design of the results that are
presented here.
This standpoint may give us some insight as to why paper remains so important
for our own situated understandings for their interpersonal communication. Malcolm
Gladwell, reviewing Sellen and Harper's book The Myth of the Paperless Ofice,
describes the importance of small, physical slips of paper called "flight strips" to the
work of air traffic controllers. He recounts that "as a controller juggles all those planes
overhead, he scribbles notes on little pieces of paper, moving them around on his desk as
he does. Air-traffic control depends on computers and radar. It also depends, heavily, on
paper and ink" (Gladwell, 2002, p. 92). The use of these basic data sheets has defied
migration to computer. Sellen and Harper find that "paper has a unique set of
'affordances' -- that is, qualities that permit specific kinds of uses. Paper is tangible: we
can pick up a document, flip through i t . . . quickly get a sense of it. . . . Paper is spatially
flexible, meaning that we can spread it out and arrange it in the way that suits us best.
And it is tailorable: we can easily annotate it, and scribble on it as we read, without
altering the original text."

Gladwell proceeds to discussion of the organization of desks, and the "prevalence
of piles over systematic filing" (p. 93). This may be a "sign of complexity: those who
deal with many unresolved ideas simultaneously cannot sort and file the papers on their
desks, because they haven't yet sorted and filed the ideas in their head." The flight strips
are particularly important for the air-traffic controller because they help in creating
"situation awareness" through the construction of a "three-dimensional 'picture' of all the
planes in his sector" (p. 96). In other words, the manipulation of actual physical objects,
such as slips of paper and papers piled not filed, is an important strategy for constructing
a working model of knowledge required for everyday activities.
Similar results were reported by Malone in studies of how people organize their
desks (1983). One of his respondents stated, "Well, see the hardest problem for me
organizationally is deciding what the categories are and what category something is in"
(p. 107). This points toward an important factor in all cognitive processes, that not all
factors that are in fact accounted for have clear categorical definitions. Malone suggests
that office information systems should allow "two of the functions of conventional desks:
easy storage of loosely classified information and convenient use of visible reminders"
(p. 111).

David M. Levy (2001) advocates for an awareness of the continuing importance
of physical documents in a world that is increasingly motivated toward their digitization.
He contrasts paper with digital documents in terms of their "bounded" versus "divided"
existences. "A paper document is complete in itself, with the communicative marks
inscribed directly on the writing surface -- one or more sheets of paper. The ensemble is a
self-contained, bounded object. It weighs a certain amount, feels a certain way, and is
always located somewhere: on your desk, in a briefcase, on your refrigerator, or folded
and stuffed in a pocket. Its digital counterpart, however, has a divided existence; it lives a
double life. . . . Digital materials are made up of both the digital representation and the

perceptible forms produced from it" (p. 138). In his view, physical documents are
integral to the "world-making, or culture-making, business" and "help us exert power and
control, maintain relationships, acquire and preserve knowledge" (p. 159).
The observations about the continued usefulness of paper are not meant to detract
from the advantages of managing documentation and communication in digital
environments. Rather, they serve to emphasize the importance of such activities as
construction of information through actions such as sorting, the importance of kinesthetic
and postural memory, and the role of manipulation or the knowledge of the hand. This
should point us toward inclusion of related facilities in our computerized, or digital
exosomatic extensions.
The integrative design process advocated by Dovey earlier in this section is
similar to the approach of Bamberger and Schon (199 1) that they characterize as
"reflective conversation with materials." Their core concern was, "Can we, from a
careful and rigorous study of the process of making things, gain insights that will apply
to learning and invention in domains more usually considered 'cognitive' -- making
solutions to problems in math and science, solving puzzles within constrained task
situations, inventing new theories? In short, how can making a real object inform making
things in domains thought to be quite different from the arts and crafts? . . . At some
point . . . we set ourselves the task of trying to capture moments in which individuals
actually came to see in new ways" (pp. 186-187).
In one of their research settings, people without previous musical training were
observed in their making of tunes. They characterized the result as a "reflective
'conversation' between makers and their materials in the course of shaping meaning and
coherence" (p. 190). "Improvising, uses elided into one another, new relations, new
meanings emerged, and these, in turn, reshaped the makers' knowledge-in-action with
respect to this task. In this way the tune-builders' commonplaces of possible things to do

with the materials, together with their still unarticulated criteria for making musical
sense, gradually became things to think with in their work of making a tune that they
liked" (p. 208). There was mutual change of process, between finding and making, a
"transaction between finding and making -- finding in the materials what we know
already and simultaneously making something new of them . . ." (p. 208). This "finding
in the materials" recalls Gibson's recognition of the "affordances" directly perceived by
organisms in the objects and conditions of the physical environment (Gibson, 197911986,
p. 127 ff.) and Storm's "eolithic" rather than linear approach to the use of materials in the
conduct of design (Storm, 1953).
Interviewed about his approach, Schon observed, "As you work a problem, you
are continually in the process of developing a path into it, forming new appreciations and
understandings as you make new moves. The designer evaluates a move by asking a
variety of questions, such as 'Are the consequences desirable' 'Does the current state of
the design conform to implications set up by earlier moves?' 'What new problems or
potential have been created?"' (Schon & Bennett, 1996, p. 175).
Their recognition of the importance of interactions between people and their
working materials recalls the perspective of Csikszentmihalyi (1993) who shows acutely
awareness of the interpenetration of people with the objects in their lives. The
relationship between people and their things has both positive and negative aspects. On
the one hand, "Most people require an external order to keep randomness from invading
their mind" and objects thus help "stabilize and order the mind" (p. 22). On the other
hand, artifacts are both symbiotic and parasitic on their "human host." "When things are
necessary to prove dominance and superiority, human costs start to escalate very quickly.
It is striking to note in comparison how inexpensive things that stand for kinship and
relatedness tend to be. Tokens of remembrance, respect, and love typically have trivial
intrinsic value, and the labor invested in them is usually voluntary" (p. 28). His remedy:

"The addiction to objects is of course best cured by learning to discipline consciousness.
If one develops control over the processes of the mind, the need to keep thoughts and
feelings in shape by leaning on things decreases. This is the main advantage of a
genuinely rich symbolic culture: It gives people poetry, songs, crafts, prayers, and rituals
that keep psychic entropy at bay. . . . We very much need to learn more about how this
inner control can be achieved. Then objects can again be used primarily as instruments
rather than as projections of our selves, which, like the servants created by the sorcerer's
apprentice, threaten to drown their masters with relentless zeal" (p. 28).
The theme of the development of knowledge structures through physical
interaction with the environment runs throughout the present work. We recall Klatzky's
claim that cognitive maps are formed within people "by perceiving and interacting with
their environment. They use manipulation and locomotion as well as vision, thereby
involving haptic modality (purposive touch) and proprioception (sensing via the muscles,
tendons, joints, and vestibular system" (Klatzky, 2000, p. 147). Likewise, Gollege and
Hubert (1982, p. 108) observe: "Distance itself is conceived by a process of intellectual
synthesis that involves an equilibration both of motor experiences and of visual effects."
The examples given above are meant to illustrate the involvement of the total
person, especially in terms of physical involvement in learning and information
processes. These suggest that information involves participation. In addition to the
physical or kinesthetic aspects of participation, active participation is involved in
communication and in the interpretive aspects of language understanding.
Communication through language always involves active listening, which is a creative
process, while the conduit metaphor for communication tends to emphasize the role of
listener as passive receiver rather than as active creator as participant in information
processes.

In addition to active, creative listening, speakers must take responsibility for
appropriate framing of what they say, so that listeners will be more likely be successful
in their task. All expressions in language are underdetermined. Robyn Carston (2002),
who bases her work on Sperber and Wilson's "relevance-theoretic framework," suggests
a "linguistic undeterminacy thesis" which identifies this underdeterminacy in at least 3
forms: 1) "Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is meant." 2) "What is said
underdetermines what is meant." 3) "Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is s a i d
(p. 19). Similar to this linguistic underdeterminacy is what might be considered a "spatial
underdeterminacy" as suggested by Downs and Stea: "Obviously there are innumerable
ways of characterizing the whatness and whereness of a location. No single, limited set of
attributes can provide adequate knowledge for solving all spatial problems. The nature of
the problem itself determines which attributes are relevant or irrelevant, important or
unimportant. The problem also determines what is considered to be an object" (Downs &
Stea, 1977, pp. 54-55).
The concept of implicature often frames discussions of the underterminacy of
expressions. This concept derives from the work of philosopher H.P. Grice, and is
"frequently used in linguistics as part of the study of conversational structure.
Conversational implicatures refer to the implications which can be deduced from the
form of an utterance, on the basis of certain co-operative principles which govern the
efficiency and normal acceptability of conversations . . ." (Crystal, 1997, p. 191). The
linguist Stephen Levinson (2000), whose work was described earlier in relation to
linguistic frames of spatial reference, has also elaborated a "theory of generalized
conversational implicature." The three linguistic frames of reference identified elsewhere
by Levinson (1 996), by which spatial concepts can be distinguished, can now also be
seen in context of the notion of "implicature" or necessary ambiguity and uncertainty that
accompanies all speech acts, which are counted "among the devices . . . that languages

use to encode distinctions" (Harnish, 1992, p. 66, referring to work of Sadock and
Zwicky (1985) on universal fundamental speech acts). Setting up of such distinctions
seems to be an essential prerequisite for communication in general.
Implicature is discussed in other places in the present work, particularly in
exploration of the place of questions in information systems. The point here is not to
summarize theories about conversational practices that serve to reduce the necessary
underdeterminacy of expressions, but to simply emphasize that this condition exists.
Resolution of the intrinsic ambiguities in all expressions must involve some measure of
active participation in the communication and information process, either as the speaker
who frames utterances or as the active and creative listener. Appropriate framing of what
is said and participation through active listening are preliminary to the successful
negotiation of meaning. All of these conditions should be accounted for and included in
information systems design.
Strategies for resolving uncertainties and ambiguities in communication reminds
us of Bateson's concept of "metacommunication~'(197212000). His definition of
information is "the difference that makes a difference," and these differences have to do
with the choices available to participants in the informational processes underway.
Metacommunication is that part of communication aimed at helping us to make wellinformed choices about the meanings that are involved in any conversational setting.
Bateson presents this concept in a number of sources, including his writings on
schizophrenia. He suggests that this pathology is related in part to an inability to decode
messages, especially certain "more abstract labels which we are most of us able to use
conventionally but are most of us unable to identify in the sense that we don't know what
told us what sort of a message it was. It is as if we somehow make a correct guess. We
are actually quite unconscious of receiving these messages which tell us what sorts of
message we receive" (pp. 194-195). These messages about messages are what he calls

metacornmunication, an often implicit signalling that serves to orient participants toward
the relevant purposes and contexts of the conversation, which also are at the core of
problems associated with underdeterminacy in language.
Finally the action orientation to information suggested here is intrinsic to Michael
Polanyi's concept of personal knowledge. "I regard knowing as an active comprehension
of the things known, an action that requires skill. Skilful knowing and doing is performed
by subordinating a set of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skilful
achievement, whether practical or theoretical. We may then be said to become
'subsidiarily aware' of these particulars within our 'focal awareness' of the coherent
entity that we achieve" (M. Polanyi, 1962, p. viii).

Spatial Organization of Knowled~e
The concluding section of this chapter will review some traditional approaches
that have been taken toward organizing knowledge spatially. These include the "method
of loci," a mnemonic strategy used in classical rhetoric; the occurrence of
"commonplaces" as used in learned discourse; and the more recent concepts such as
"circle of knowledge" as expressed through such innovations as the "encyclopedia" and
the physical arrangement of books in the 19thcentury British Museum Library. Some
examples of spatial structures related to knowledge organization in computing
environments will supplement these traditional and historic approaches.
The most well known of the traditional mnemonic practices as taught in classical
rhetoric is known by several names, including the "method of loci" or the construction of
a "theater of memory." The standard history for this mnemonic approach is Frances
Yates' The Art of Memory (1966). Further discussion and many graphic illustrations of
classical and medieval "mnemotechnic devices" can also be found in Murdoch (1984, p.
72 ff.). Sandberg (1997) gives a cognitive basis for these approaches. "The first form of

cognitive amplification strategies developed was cognitive tools, internal software that
helps us organize thoughts and memories. . . . The method was based on the simple
observation that we are good a remembering things inside a context, so given a stable,
easy to remember context information could be linked to it and then easily retrieved" (p.
7 of 14).
Allan Paivio uses references to these traditional strategies of memory to illustrate
his own "dual coding" theory of memory, in which linguistic elements and visual
imagery are equal partners in our ability to learn and recall. Paivio's outline of traditional
memory systems (1979, pp. 153-175) guides the overview presented here. Knowledge of
these traditional systems comes to us fkom classical texts such as Cicero's description of
Simonides in Cicero's De oratore. Cicero summarizes the method: "persons desiring to
train this faculty (of memory) must select places and form mental images of the things
they wish to remember and store those images in the places, so that the order of the
places will preserve the order of the things, and the images of the things will denote the
things themselves, and we shall employ the places and images respectively as a wax
writing-tablet and the letters written on it" (quoted by Paivio at p. 154).
According to this method, a large selection of places is required, which are then
remembered in a certain order, and which also then can be used multiple times for
different purposes. The person who carried the method to the greatest extent was
Giordano Bruno. His aim was "to encompass and unify the world of appearance and the
supercelestial world of ideas using the memory tradition and astrological notions. The
intermediaries between the two levels were to be magical star-images organized
according to the associative structure of astrology. The grand aim was no less than that of
grouping, coordinating, and unifying all the multiplicity of earthly phenomena within
memory through the organization of significant images that derive magical power from

the stars. Through the celestial images, the conhsed plurality of things becomes unity"
(Paivio, 1979, p. 164).
Bruno's method adopted features of the system of Ramon Lull, involving
"concentric circles that could be revolved to produce different combinations of concepts"
(p. 165). Bruno's was a round celestial system coordinated with a square architectural
system, composed of 24 memory rooms, divided into 9 memory places, further divided
into fields and cubicles, where "everything in the physical world -- plants, stones,
animals -- and all the arts, sciences and human activities were to be represented in these
rooms by images. The round celestial system juxtaposed with the square plan (perhaps as
a round building encompassing a square one) contained the celestial figures and images
which were to animate, organize and unify the detailed places and images contained in
the memory room" (p. 165). This was "a dynamic system in which the static elements
can be combined and recombined by rotating the Lullian concentric wheels to yield
different combinations of 'subjects and predicates"' (p. 166).
Paivio states that these traditiona! systems embody the "implicit assumption,
among others, that concrete objects and events, or their verbal surrogates, are easier to
remember than more abstract stimuli" (Paivio, 1979, p. 177). In describing the origins of
his dual coding theory of memory, Paivio relates a "conceptual peg experience" that was
itself about "conceptual pegs" (Paivio, 1991, pp. 1- 18). As a beginning graduate student
in psychology at McGill in the early 1950s, Paivio was exposed to a mnemonist whose
method involved linked pairs of evocative nouns that rhymed with the cardinal numbers.
This opened for him the tradition of memory devices in classical rhetoric, often involving
the association of concepts with specific places, particularly architectural.
The elaborate celestial circle / architectural square approach adopted by Bruno, as
described by Paivio, recalls for us the form of traditional cosmological charts, another
genre of spatial knowledge organization.

The theater of memory and method of loci seem closely related to strategies of
spatial cognition such as the mental tours or "gaze tours" described by Tversky
(Tversky, 1996, p. 469). Downs and Stea (1977) describe the "mental walks" of the
memory prodigy "S." They quote from Luria's Mind of a Mnemonist (1968, pp. 3 1-33)
that S. "found some way of distributing these images in a mental row or sequence . . .
[he would] take a mental walk . . . 'distributing' his images at houses, gates, and store
windows." They claim that this sort of activity takes cognitive mapping "another step
further: to associate nonspatial information with a well-known cognitive map" (p. 97).
Also similar to the method of loci are the "commonplaces" in language that tie
places and concepts together. Walter Ong, writing about the cultural periods in which
oral traditions prevailed, claimed of commonplaces that "one could even argue that they
were in many ways the center of the culture" (Ong, 1967, p. 3 1). He viewed
commonplaces "as oral residue," the "information storage and conceptualization" of oral
culture (p. 79). In many ways we might think of commonplaces as "headings" but
traditionally they were thought of in terms of place, or topos (p. 80). This topos in Greek
became our topic, and topical commonplaces existed for such concepts as "causes,
effects, contraries, comparable things, related things, and so on" (p. 8 1). As with the
method of loci, commonplaces were used in rhetoric as "a set of headings enabling one to
analyze the subject or an accumulated store of readied material, or both, previously
composed or excerpted, to which one resorted for 'matter' for thinking and discoursing"
( P 83).
The spatial aspect of this concept survives in the form of "topic maps" that will be
called upon in later sections as a strategy for establishing connections across digital
workspaces.
Before moving from these concepts that prevailed in classical and medieval
times, an alternative approach stressing the importance of what might be thought of as

"no-place" for the world of thought. This is the topos noetos, or place of thought, as
recalled for us by Hannah Arendt. She asks, "Where is the topos noetos, the region of the
mind in which the philosopher dwells? . . . Framed in spatial terms, the question received
a negative answer. Though known to us only in inseparable union with a body that is at
home in the world of appearances by virtue of having arrived one day and knowing that
one day it will depart, the invisible thinking ego is, strictly speaking, Nowhere" (Arendt,
1978b, p. 11). "The thinking ego, moving among universals, among invisible essences,
is, strictly speaking, nowhere; it is homeless in an emphatic sense - which may explain
the early rise of a cosmopolitan spirit among the philosophers" (Arendt, 1978a, p. 199).
"Philosophers love this 'nowhere' as though it were a country (philochorein) and they
desire to let all other activities go. . . . The reason for this blessed independence is that
philosophy (the cognition kata logon) is not concerned with particulars, with things given
to the senses, but with universals (kath ' holou), things that cannot be localized. . . . In
other words, it may well be that we were posing a wrong, inappropriate question when
we asked for the location of the thinking ego. Looked at from the perspective of the
everyday world of appearances, the everywhere of the thinking ego - summoning into its
presence whatever it pleases from any distance in time or space, which thought traverses
with a velocity greater than light's

- is

a nowhere" (p. 200).

Approaching perspectives more familiar to our contemporaries, we should
remember that the encyclopedia is literally the "circle of knowledge" (Wells, 1968) and
that the circular form for the organization of knowledge was adopted in the design for the
reading room of the British Museum Library (Edwards, 1859).
The spatial organization of knowledge is also reflected in the comprehensive
subject classifications that have been established for libraries up to the present time. The
philosopher Patrick Wilson (1985) details the problematic relationship between
classification systems and the need to provide locations for books in libraries. He cites

Cutter's dictum that a library's "dictionary catalog" should "show what the library
has . . . on a given subject" while adding that it may not be "obvious what 'being on a
given subject' meant" (p. 3 19). Wilson claims that "place has no definite sense" in terms
of library classification: "No single feature, and no cluster of features, set off the writings
at one position from those at all other positions; the rules of assignment prescribe nothing
definite, and no confident predictions can be made about what will be found in the
writings at a given place."
Wilson stops just short of stating that books are where they are in a library
because that's where the librarians put them. Yet we may reflect that when managing
physical objects such a books, they must be put somewhere, and some sense of order is
preferred to no order at all. The constraints that hold for physical objects in physical
locations are relaxed in digital environments.
A thorough overview of current attempts to structure knowledge spatially in
digital environments, along the lines that have been attempted since classical times, is
given by Chen (2003, pp. 67-99) especially in the chapter "Mapping the Mind" which
includes the "memory palaces" tradition and suggests the potential usefulness of
traditional visual displays such as Asian mandala. The approaches to spatial organization
of knowledge in digital environments discussed there include cognitive maps, geographic
maps, visualizations of multidimensional scaling, networks, trees, concept mapping, and
clustering. The chapter concludes with a history of research into the small worlds
phenomenon, and its geometric representations.
The construction of information spaces, virtual spaces and cyberspaces, all of
which should be considered as being in the tradition of spatial organization of
knowledge, has been treated in various ways by some of the authors who are sources for
ideas expressed in the present work. Couclelis (1998) explores the possibilities and
difficulties involved in "the construction of information spaces." She describes data

visualization, multidimensional spaces "representing quantifiable variables," and phase
spaces from the physical sciences designed "to represent the state of arbitrarily complex
systems in n-dimensional variable space, to which conventional methods of analytic
geometry apply" (p. 21 1). She notes that an outstanding problem with such abstract
spaces is that they "are practically impossible for humans to conceptualize, visualize, or
explore in their full richness" (p. 21 1). Concepts that are familiar in Euclidean space such
as proximity and distance, angles, orientations and shapes "are much harder to interpret"
in these abstract spaces. She quotes Benedikt's "Cyberspace: Some Proposals" (1991, p.
123) and concurs with his thinking that spaces constructed for virtual worlds "must
resemble the space-time of human experience: 'Cyberspace has a geography, a physics, a
nature, and a rule of human law' not as an empirical fact, but by pragmatic necessity" (p.
2 12).
Benedikt is a "designer and theorist in architecture" (199 1, p. 120) who has
focused on design aspects of cyberspace. Benedikt suggests that constraints "may be
designed into it toward optimal use" (p. 123). In this space, physical objects are replaced
by objects "in form, character and action, made up of data, of pure information" (pp. 122123). The design of appropriate constraints, modeled on the constraints of physical space,
place and time, is one of Benedikt's preoccupations. He posits that everyday conceptions
cannot be arbitrarily overturned in cyberspace, and he advances a set of principles against
which cyberspace design may be judged. Of special interest is his "principle of transit"
which enforces discontinuities into cyberspace design, requiring stepwise traversal of this
space.
Benking and Judge (1994, at p. 5 of 5) suggest that adoption of the approach of
"memory palaces" might serve the "need for such visual metaphors to enable individuals
to handle information overload and retain some control over the information they
endeavour to possess. Spatial metaphors can be seen as vital to retaining possession of

information and avoiding 'memory leakage' or the effective 'dismemberment' of one's
information space."
The workspace that is presented in the Chapter 8 fits in many ways within the
traditions of spatial organization of knowledge outlined here. It has characteristics of the
method of loci, and emphasizes clustering of concepts around conceptual landmarks that
are similar to commonplaces. It is a generic space that can be made available for a variety
of purposes, organizing a variety of geometries in a way similar to the variety of
architectural forms that needed to be available to classical rhetoricians. It affords a
diverse variety of patterns, frames of reference and nested coordinates, available in a
synoptic view, all to be defined by the person organizing the space.
This chapter has provided a broad overview of information and space as they
interpenetrate all dimensions of human thought and action. Rather than being seen as
universal constants, space and information are recognized here as being qualities that
depend on human agency for their existence and meaning. This approach reflects Hall's
suggestion that a third, "hidden" dimension of culture should always be considered when
the more familiar dimensions of space and time are in mind. This chapter has attempted
to make many facets of this human dimension more visible, toward providing an
adequate and plausible ground for the adoption of a human-centered approach to
information.

Chapter 5
FORCES AND STRUCTURES

This chapter introduces a theme that may serve as a bridge from the mainly
theoretical considerations presented earlier, to the attempt to engage these mainly
abstract considerations in the service of a specific design task. One of the consequences
of the discussion of the dominant metaphors for communication and information is the
search for an approach that would minimize the object character of the information
concept. An intimation of this is presented here in an exploration of how structures and
stability can be thought to result from interacting forces as they do from the arrangement
and connections of physical materials.
The resonance metaphor for information, introduced in Chapter 2 and elaborated
in Chapter 7, suggests that interactive information processes can be conceived in some
measure as propagating waves, an alternative to the alternatives that emphasize
information as object. The object of the design task here is a multi-dimensional space that
is composed of a set of nested three-dimensional figures, that together afford a diverse set
of information processes and relationships to be visualized. This chapter provides
background in terms of the relationship between forces and structure as is embedded the
design concept.
Along with these two main points of focus, some discussion will be presented
related to the concepts of patterns, stability, and social structure, all of which are related
to forces and structures, and also which have a direct relationship to the overall design
process that is underway here. The discussion here, as in the rest of this work, seeks to
deemphasize the role of objects in our thinking about information. To speak of structures
in terms of forces leads also to the notion of stability without objects, stable structures
that result from stable patterns of interacting forces rather than from fixing relations

among tangible objects, such as is the case with most building architecture. Although the
organization of knowledge may have a spatial structure (as in examples given in the
section on spatial organization of knowledge in Chapter 4), that structure does not have
to be the result of the piling up and connecting of physical objects.

Forces
The concept of force is used in describing physical, cognitive and social
processes, in much the same way that space is a characteristic dimension of many
different worlds or frames of reference. The idea of force is not a simple one, though its
meaning seems to be easily understood in everyday terms. Because forces often are
vague, local, changing, observed differently by various observers (in sum, not often
measurable in universally agreed terms) they are often excluded from the design of
formal systems such as information systems. Forces are not as safe and predictable to
work with as are objects and the relations among objects. Yet excluding forces, or not
making a place where forces can at least be acknowledged, may be a shortcoming that
limits the potentials of the systems we design.
The concept of forces has been invoked by several of the authors whose works are
relied upon here. For Alexander, forces are integral to the emergence of patterns, which
form the vocabulary from which his pattern languages are composed. Mark Johnson
suggests "compulsive force" as a fundamental image schema that pervades our structures
of meaning. Buckminster Fuller settled on the interaction between discontinuous
compression and continuous tension as a solution for some of the structural problems he
was trying to resolve. The result was the "tensegrity." This approach is consistent with
his attempt to characterize the world generally in terms of energies and events, rather
than in terms of objects. Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Kohler discussed stability in our
perceptions in terms of the balancing of forces. For John Searle and others involved in

the theory of speech acts, "illocutionary forces" are involved in the performative aspects
of language, and one of these forces is expressed in the form of questions, or
interrogatives.
Several perspectives on forces will be outlined briefly below as they have a
bearing on the present work. The existence of interacting forces is implied by the
resonance metaphor, and how structures may result from interacting forces is described
in the section below.
It is intended that the digital workspace structure presented makes room for the
representation of many diverse interacting forces. If we are inclined to say with Couclelis
that "Information is the relation that connects a sign with an intentionality" (1998, p.
2 11) then this intentionality, a kind of force, should be accounted for, or accommodated,
in the design concept for an information system. In similar fashion, the "commitments"
that Winograd and Flores assert are a defining factor in organizations (Winograd &
Flores, 1986, p. 158) should be accommodated, as well as the many factors of interest
and attention that are part of information processes.
We might begin to think of forces in terms of relationships among objects, that
the structure of these relationships is due to the intersections of forces. Forces somehow
drive the relationships among things located in situated contexts. The relationship
between forces and structures is given by Alexander as the model for the complex
interactions from which patterns emerge.
Alexander was a pioneer in the creation of map overlay techniques for public
infrastructure planning (see Alexander, 1966; Steinitz, Parker, & Jordan, 1976). The
direction he eventually took with this work was very different from that which resulted in
the development of geographic information systems. He generalized the method of map
overlays, not in the direction of quantification of the features on each layer and
calculation of the relations among layers, but toward the recognition of forces and

patterns that were implied in the ensemble of conditions expressed in them. His early
work, leading to his eventual method of "pattern languages," involved complex
environments such as highway and rural village planning. For an early design problem,
siting a highway in Massachusetts, twenty-six criteria or "forces" were charted for the
terrain, then combined to search for a solution. He analyzes numerical, analog and
relational methods of analysis, and then states the problem in the form of this question:

"Given a set of forces, WITH NO RESTRICTION ON THEIR VARIETY, how can we
generate a form which is stable with respect to all of them?" (Alexander, 1966, p. 107).
Alexander defines patterns in the following way: "Patterns have the following
generic form: Context --> System of forces --> Configuration" (Alexander, 1979, p. 253).
"We see, in summary, that every pattern we define must be formulated in the form of a
rule which establishes a relationship between a context, a system of forces which arises
in that context, and a configuration which allows these forces to resolve themselves in
that context." He specifically defines a problem as a "field of forces" (p. 25 1). He uses
the expression, "from a set of forces to a form," to describe the process. Discovery of
what the forces are that are at work in a particular context, toward the creation of
appropriate solutions that express these, is the essence of Alexander's design method.
The usefulness of pattern languages as a way of approaching the complexity of
intercommunity communication and documentation was suggested in several ways
during the discussions of the New Directions project (see Harrap, Journeay, Talway, &
Brodaric, 2001 ; Hunting, 2002).
Alexander cites the earlier work of D'Arcy Thompson, On Growth and Form,
where Thompson calls form a "diagram of forces": "The form then, of any portion of
matter, whether it be living of dead, and the changes of form which are apparent in its
movements and in its growth, may in all cases alike be described as due to the action of
force. In short, the form of an object is a 'diagram of forces,' in this sense, at least, that

from it we can judge of or deduce the forces that are acting or have acted upon it . . ."
(Thompson, 1961, p. 11). Guy Davenport (1987, p. ix) gives the origin of the phrase
"every force evolves a form" as Mother Ann Lee (1736-1784) "founder of the Shakers.
In its practical sense, this axiom was the rule by which Shaker architects and designers
found perfect forms. . . . As an ideal, that form is the best response to the forces calling it
into being has been the genius of good design in our time, as witness Gropius, Le
Corbusier, Rietveldt, Mondriaan, Sheeler, Fuller."
Mark Johnson, the philosopher who has partnered with George Lakoff in
exploring the role of metaphoric processes in our language and structures of thought,
takes the image schema of "compulsive force" as one of the major examples used
throughout his book The Body in the Mind (1987). An image schema is "not a concrete
rich image or mental picture; rather, it is a more abstract pattern that can be manifested in
rich images, perceptions and events" (p. 2). It is a proposition to the extent a "proposition
exists as a continuous, analog pattern of experience or understanding, with sufficient
internal structure to permit inferences." The compulsion schema has "internal structure
consisting of a force vector (with a certain magnitude and direction), an entity acted upon
by the force, and a potential trajectory the entity will traverse" (pp. 3-4). We have seen
that this schema can be implicated in the motivating forces expressed in the pathways
metaphor.
Johnson says that these experiential schema have "internal structures" that exhibit
"gestalt characteristics, that is, their nature as coherent, meaningful, unified wholes
within our experience and cognition'' (p. 41). He then outlines "preconceptual gestalts" in
our "forceful encounters with other objects and persons. Because force is everywhere, we
tend to take it for granted and to overlook the nature of its operation. We easily forget
that our bodies are clusters of forces and that every even of which we are a part consists,
minimally, of forces in interaction." Only when forces are "extraordinarily strong, or

when they are not balanced off by other forces," as in high winds or when walking uphill,
do we notice the forces that are always parts of our lives (p. 42).
Forces always involve interaction, movement in some direction, a single path of
motion, "the vector quality of forceful movement," have origins or sources, "degrees of

power or intensity" (p. 43) and there is always some "structure or sequence of causality
involved" (p. 44). This is the "gestalt structure of force." This "gestalt structure of force"
seems similar to the processes that Alexander identified as the source of his patterns.

R. Buckminster Fuller, another thinker whose ideas were helpful in conceiving of
the design of the heuristic workspace, consistently worked at eliminating material objects
from his worldview, opting instead for an event-based cosmology. "Since physics has
found no solids or impervious continuums or surfaces, and has found only finitely
separate energy quanta, we are compelled operationally to redefine the spheric
experience as an aggregate of events approximately equidistant in a high-frequency
aggregate in almost all directions from one only approximate event (Fuller, 1975b, p.
7 10). Kenner reports that of Fuller's sense of things, his "most important model for
reality is energy radiating@om a center, and being restrained. (The center may be just a
point of reference . . .)" (Kenner, 1973, p. 93). Edmondson recounts Fuller's quest for a
"comprehensive coordinating system;'' what kinds of structure would come about within
it? For Fuller, she says, it had to do with requirements of "minimum energy . . .
necessarily a result of the balance between specific forces and inherent spatial properties"
(Edmondson, 1987, p. 10).
Two structures expressed these interactive forces best for Fuller, the "Dyrnaxion"
(his trademarked word for his applications of a particular Archimedean solid, the
cuboctahedron) and the "tensegrity" that was jointly invented by Fuller and the sculptor
Kenneth Snelson. Fuller also called the cuboctahedron a "vector equilibrium" due to the
equivalence of an "omnidirectional arrangement of forces" unique to it, unit vectors

originating at the center and ending at each vertex are also of the same length as edges
linking vertices (Edmondson, 1987, p. 9 1). Edmondson sketches Fuller's critique of
spheres in the following terms: "The notion of a continuous surface equidistant from a
central point is scientifically unacceptable, that is, inconsistent with physical reality; on
some level of resolution all 'spheres' consist of discrete quanta -- untold numbers of
energy events interconnected by an even greater number of vector-relationships, or
forces" (p. 238). A cuboctahedron is the most central of the three nested polygons in the
workspace described in Chapter 8. See Figure 8 for an illustration of this figure.
The second of Fuller's structures that has relevance here, the tensegrity, exhibits
the "tensional integrity" of relations that involve discontinuous compression elements
and continuous tension elements. The fascinating behavior of tensegrities can be shown
in physical models that show these interacting forces in a way that description and
illustration cannot. The biologist Donald Ingber makes a case for identifying tensegrity
structures as being integral to many of the life forms on our planet, including the internal
structure of the cell and our body's skeleton (Ingber, 1998). A comprehensive overview
of the tensegrity concept, with suggestions on building tensegrities, has been given by
Pugh (1976).
Kenner (1973) says that a tensegrity is a system that looks precarious but is very
resilient, and that it expresses how "the interplay between force and restraint settles into a
spherical pattern" (p. 93). He notes Fuller's observation that tensegrities behave like
balloons (which physical tensegrity models do), and that a "balloon is a successful
restraint of an explosion" (p. 93). In many ways tensegrities demonstrate the same forces
that make up the surface tension that holds a droplet of water together (see description
and illustration at Random House Encyclopedia, 1990, Fig. 4, p. 1504). An image of a
tensegrity is the second of the three nested polyhedra incorporated into the workspace
described below; see illustration at Figure 7. It is the most likely candidate to represent a

"question space," with questions arrayed along the tension members and current
knowledge represented by compression struts.
Forces also are used by linguists to explain certain characteristics of "speech
acts." Speech act theorists consider utterances in terms of the "illocutionary forces" that
are expressed in the conversation: "The 'illocutionary force' or act the speaker intends to
perform in speaking can be expressed explicitly" or more usually through such strategies
as inverted word order, intonation, or leaving parts of sentences out (Dewdney &
Michell, 1997, p. 54). Huddleston (1994, p. 3845) says that sentence types
"grammaticalize" these illocutionary forces. There are many ways in which sentences
can be classified into "different kinds of speech acts -- of acts with different illocutionary
force."
Mark Johnson explains Searle's concept of speech acts through the formula F(p)
where "'p' represents the propositional content of the utterance, while 'F' is the
illocutionary force with which that content is presented." For example, Johnson says
"The utterance 'Did John run away?' can be analyzed as a propositional content (John
ran away) presented with the force of a question." In this way, Searle "has constructed a
taxonomy of speech act types that lays out the kinds of forces there are and the kinds of
conditions that must obtain if the speech act is to be successfully performed" (Johnson,
1987, p. 58). Thus, "in most speech acts there will be a content presented under or by
means of a given force." Johnson further states that a "relevant gestalt . . . will be that for
COMPULSION" and then explicitly links this schema to Reddy's conduit metaphor for

communication, involved with "sending this filled container along a conduit or through
space to the hearer" (pp. 58-59). Questions, of particular interest in the present work, are
an example of "illocutionary force."
Several of these authors refer to gestalt qualities that accompany the expression
of forces. The Gestalt psychologist Kohler asks about the role of regularity, symmetry,

and simplicity in "the distribution of the material and the forces within the system?
There seems to be a very simple answer. When such regular distributions are being
established, more and more components of the acting forces are likely to balance each
other, which means that under these circumstances the equilibrium or a steady state is
quickly or gradually approached. But in a closed system the action of forces does operate
in the direction of equilibrium or a steady state. It is therefore not surprising that during
this operation the distributions within the system become more regular, symmetrical and
simple" (Kohler, 1969, pp. 58-59).
These interacting, balancing forces that together characterize a whole, which is
taken by the Gestalt psychologists as being the unit of perception, again point toward the
close relationship between forces and structures. Some notes on structures are given in
the section that follows.

Structures
What are "structures"? The idea of structure come up throughout this work,
particularly in terms of the internal relationships that may be expressed in frames of
reference. Structure literally means piling up, as of stones; it means the organization of
parts with some relationship to a larger whole; and it means "form," and through form it
directly relates to the word "information."
Structures may result from the interactions of natural forces, or may result from
conscious design decisions. That structures do not need to be thought of in terms of the
piling up of stones should be clear from the previous section, yet this notion of building
with physical materials remains central to our ideas of structure. To the extent that people
build structures, it is legitimate to ask who may be responsible for any structure,
including the forms that are involved with any informational instance or event. A theme

in the overall presentation here is that opportunities should be afforded to individuals and
communities to reassert control over structuring processes.
Weber quotes Arnheim' Art and Visual Perception (1954) on the contributions of
the Gestalt psychologists to the role of structure in perception: "The experimental
findings demand a complete turnabout in the theory of perception. It seemed no longer
possible to think of vision as proceeding from the particulars to the general. On the
contrary, it became evident that overall structural features are the primary data of
perception . . ." (Weber, 2002, p. 20). Kohler (1969) states that "structure" refers to "a
functional aspect of processes, to the distribution of such processes, a distribution which
they assume (and may also maintain) as a consequence of the dynamic interrelations or
interactions among their parts" (p. 92) and that only by being "structured functional
wholes" can the "dynamic structure of the physiological processes in the brain" be
"directly related to organized visual perception" (p. 93). We again see that structure is
involved with perception and processes, as well as the more material forms that the word
brings to mind.
Structure also has to do with stability. Often stability, a dependable "place to put
things" that is relatively known and persistent over time, is needed more than "more
information." This sort of structure is what Wurman (1989) illustrates with his "hatrack"
concept of information organization. Structures allow us at least the representation of
stability. The creation of the tensegrity by Fuller and Snelson demonstrated a structure
that is self-stabilizing, that embodies dynamic forces and change, in fact is made up of
these, but still affords resiliant stability.
If one of the essential aspects of information processes relates to action in several
forms (in making choices and the acts of discriminating, of drawing distinctions, sorting,
and categorizing) then a fundamental informational action can be related to the
construction, evolution or emergence of the structures, which are defined by these

actions. Something must be held stable as environment for this activity - call it context,
or background, or ground in the figure-ground Gestalts that characterize our perceptions
in all frames of reference and their dimensions. Structures help to maintain stability
among the relationships in the frames.
Stability is never permanent. Moments of stability may be attained (such as when
a question is answered, a problem is solved, etc.) but immediately these are introduced
into a new spatial/temporal/material/culturalcontext (or situation, chronotope) that itself
begins the process of instability, creative disequilibrium again.
Fleischaker (1 984, p. 46) observes that stability for Maturana and Varela is an
outcome of what they call autopoietic processes, involving identity, circularity and
integrity (stability as result of interactions). He asserts that Varela and Maturana's view
renders "impossible the position of the system observer external to the human mind, an
element required within the traditional model" (p. 48). The "traditional duality of
external object and reflected internal representation is denied. . . . Indeed, the concept of
reflection is itself denied since all observations orginate within the world of human
cognition: One cannot properly speak of any 'mirror' since there is no 'mirroring."'
Again, paradoxical conditions occur, in fact are the result of human biological and
cognitive processes, from which stabilities result.
All symbols are two-sided in nature, with a formal / structural / material side and
an ideational / semantic / side. Bleier (1987, p. 1) calls these two facets the "ontological"
and the "metaphorical." This is evident in the actual structures we live in and negotiate
daily, such as our homes, workplaces and public buildings. Architecture has selfevidence as material structure, but also is a meaningful arrangement of materials in
space. Wurman (1989, p. 6) suggests that an "airport is an example of how structure and
meaning might work together. In an airport, the space itself should indicate paths and
alternative paths through a series of functions that eventually get you on to a plane.

Designed effectively, this is the architecture of information." This two-sidedness can
perhaps be thought of as structure and semantics, or form and meaning. Always these
aspects are needed in co-relation.
There is another kind of structure that is relevant to the present work, the social
structure, which is one half of the social-cognitive whole and into which the metaphor
and workspace need to be introduced and tested through use. The sociological theories of
structuralism were introduced in the 19th century via Marx and Durkheim, who
according to Heydebrand "conceived of social structure in holistic and nonreductionist
terms, i.e., not as an aggregation of individual actors, but as social facts sui generis,
explainable only by other social facts" (2001, 15230). He asserts that for Marx the
"central social fact" was political economy; for Durkheim it was "social ties and norms."
In anthropology structuralism is identified with the work of Claude Levi-Strauss, and it
shows affinity with Gestalt, understanding through pattern recognition, "games theory,
and the mathematical theory of communications and cybernetics." Barnes (200 1, 15222)
fits this structuralism to "Gestalt psychology with its emphasis on the perception of
patterns . . . . Indeed, games theory, the mathematical theory of communication and
cybernetics are obvious and acknowledged sources of some of his more unquestionably
structuralist ideas." These are ways in which social structuralism and the information
sciences as disciplines have interpenetrated.
Collins calls Durkheim's the "core tradition of sociology" (1994, p. 18 1). In this
structure, "the surface is symbol and ritual, the depths are nonrational and subconscious.
This intellectual tradition focuses on themes of emotional forces, morality, the sacred, the
religious - and declares that these are the essence of everything social." A chart relating
trends in this tradition (p. 182) names Mauss, Levi-Strauss's structuralism, "Goffman's
interaction rituals," Mary Douglas, and Bourdieu's "cultural capital theory" (p. 186).
Forces again are at work, as in "Durkheim's Law of Social Gravity." "Durkheim's key

explanatory factor is social morphology, the structural relationships among people" (p.
187). "There is nothing mysterious about this: by structure, Durkheim means the actual,
physical pattern of who is in the presence of whom, for how long, and with how much
space between them. Differences in this social density have profound effects on people's
ideas and moral sentiments, hence, on their capacity for rational thought, bargaining,
suicide, and anything else one cares to examine. . . . The basic determining factors are the
structural relationships among individuals, not the individuals themselves. Historical
change happens mechanically, independent of individual wills, by a kind of 'law of
gravitation of the social world.'" In this tradition, the phenomenon of "ritual exchange
networks" is identified with Marcel Mauss. These relations include ceremonial
exchanges and gift exchanges including the "everyday politeness that Goffman analyzed"
(p. 229). In these ways societies structure relationships, including the "information
sharing" that is one of the motivating questions in this work.
How we conceive of the global web of social relations as a structure is in
transformation. Heydebrand (2001, 15231) notes that social network analysis is taken to
be a "contemporary sociological structuralism. . . . Networks differ from organizations
and institutions in that they are informal, private, self-organizing, noncontractual,
unregulated, unaccountable, nontransparent, and typically of limited focus, size, and
duration." Representations he includes are Simmel's "web of group affiliations" and
Blau's "theory of structural sociology.-'
The network idea of social organization is also to be found in Castells' "network
society" (Castells, 1996), in the "small worlds hypothesis" (Buchanan, 2002) and in the
importance given to lateral information sharing networks in today's global scene (Meyer,
1997).
In this chapter, discussion of the idea of "forces" has been explored as an
alternative to focus on "objects," part of the overall shift implied by the work that is

reported here. This shift is useful in terms of processes related to information, especially
when alternatives to the information-as-object metaphor are sought. This approach is to
look at objects, entities, structures in a way that goes beyond the fact of their existence,
and to consider such aspects as origins, goals, problems to be solved by means of
particular structures, that may express interrelated forces rather than configurations of
matter.
To attempt to describe the world in terms of the forces that operate rather than the
objects that constitute it is a frame shift. Fuller tried to define and inhabit a world of
events and energies rather than matter, and claimed that his view was in accord with the
results of contemporary physics. There is difficulty in bringing our everyday thoughts
and actions into conformity with alternative worlds. This task reminds of Chrisman's
observations on "the debate between absolute and relative space." Beginning with Kant's
apriori space, and following Newton, "space was taken by most as an immutable,
timeless, immaterial void that had a permanent truth." In this century, modern physics
"has overthrown the concept of absolute space" (Chrisman, 1978, p. 2). The new ideas,
implying a "highly relative approach to frames of reference," have not migrated to
general acceptance in terms of our avaiiable language of spatial relations.
In a similar vein, Buchanan (2002, p. 155) notes that "Physicists in particular
have entered into a new stage of their science and have come to realize that physics is not
only about physics anymore, about liquids, gases, electromagnetic fields, and physical
stuff in all its forms. At a deeper level, physics is really about organization -- it is an
exploration of the laws of pure form."
The notion of "pure form" finally reminds us that the core term in information is
the word "form." Information is one of many words that derive from the Latin forma,
which itself is related to the Greek morphe. Some other words that derive from forma
include form, formal, formulate, conform, reform, etc. These all have mainly to do with

the concept of shape, both in the active sense "to give shape" as in making a figure from
clay, and also referring to the shape of a thing (Shipley, 1984, pp. 66,252). A personcentered view of information might thus see it as an activity that is related to making
order, or giving form, to structures of thought within.
This section provides a transition between the resonance metaphor and
description of the heuristic workspace. Whereas the resonance metaphor has moved from
object-orientation toward focus on relationships and processes, the workspace needed a
structure. Beginning to show how forces and structures are thought to be related is the
key point of this section. The account of forces and structures presented here began with
Christopher Alexander's "from a set of forces to a form." His description of patterns as
the resolution of forces, grounded in contexts, became the vocabulary for an approach to
architectural design. Overall, structures can be seen as the expression of forces, and even
though they may not even be made up of any physical components (Fuller would say that
energy and events compose the world entirely) we still can have stable structures
accounted for in this scheme. Part Two will explain how forces and structures are
coordinated in terms of the resonance model and heuristic workspace, based in the goal
of creating a suitable space for the construction of a question-centered learning
environment.

Part Two

RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Chapter 6
QUESTION-CENTERED LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS

Introduction
The second part of this thesis presents the results and outcomes that are based on
the investigations and perspectives that were presented in Part One. The most tangible of
these is the creation of a structured multidimensional digital workspace, called a
"heuristic workspace," that is described in Chapter 8 below. This workspace
accomplishes the spatialization of the core concepts that are intrinsic to an alternative
metaphor for information processes, termed the "resonance metaphor for information."
This metaphor was introduced earlier, in the concluding sections of Chapter 2, and is
elaborated in Chapter 7. This is intended as a generative metaphor that helps to complete
an integrated view of information processes that are now dominated by the metaphors of
transmission via channels, and of the management of information as a resource object.
Both of these results, the creation of a novel semantic space for organizing and
visualizing relationships among concepts, and advancing a person-centered, cognitive
view of information, resulted directly from a complex set of questions and dilemmas
which first of all accompanied this research effort from the start, and which arose in the
context of ongoing projects organized around efforts to find better ways to share data and
information across organizations, groups and interests. The catalyst for the particular
results derived here was an interdisciplinary effort involving earth scientists, humanists
and practitioners, New Directions Downeast. The background of these contextual
contributions is detailed in the Preface to this paper.

Question-Centered learn in^- Environments

A critical component that was explored in that context was the need for a space in
the digital online environment where many of the interactions might take place that
would be intrinsic to what came to be termed an interactive learning environment.
Conceived initially as a conversation space to support discourse related to the
development of a digital library for sharing documentation and data related to regional
natural resources, this was reconceived as a question space that would accommodate the
central concerns of participants. This question-centered space, intended to be an
alternative to the more customary knowledge-based information systems, is detailed in
the present chapter. An overview of the complexity of question asking and answering
processes is included. This chapter reflects the motivations and goals that are meant to be
addressed by means of the resonance metaphor and the heuristic workspace.
In addition, a simple example of how a narrative might be structured and
represented within the proposed workspace is presented in Chapter 9. Summary
conclusions and suggestions about future directions for this work complete the paper in
Chapter 10.
Read together, the chapters in Part Two present an alternative design approach
that is meant to complement, not replace, other more prevalent concepts and approaches
to the design of information environments. Distilling the many concepts and metaphors
for information that are elaborated in this work, we now suggest that an integrated view
of information will include three primary aspects: communication, documentation and
learning. These approximately correspond, respectively, to the transmission, resource and
resonance metaphors. The suggestion is that a comprehensive view of information
requires that all three aspects need to be represented in the design process.
As components of a design solution, these alternatives are reminiscent of what
Christopher Alexander and colleagues (Alexander et al., 1977) call "patterns," as used in

their pattern languages approach to design. He defines patterns as being the outcomes of
forces that are at work in particular contexts, together pointing toward particular
solutions, the transformation "from a set of forces to a form." This concept of patterns is
itself a pattern, a conceptual landmark that could qualify as being one of Rosch's
prototypical categories, the stable but not completely and formally defined concepts that
are available to us while engaging in the sense-making that characterizes all of our
cognitive activities. Conceiving of structures in terms of forces and contexts as
Alexander does is a theme that is reflected in several of the authors cited here.
These alternatives for the construction of an information system result from an
earlier exploration of questions centered on the spatiality of information sharing
processes. This work largely involved participation in many discussions about digital
information environments across various groups of practitioners, many involved in
community-based use of spatial technologies or having interest in marine and other
natural resource conservation and management issues. The discussions often referred to
different communities or user groups, groups geographically based or defined by their
commercial interests, values or ways of knowing, the coordination of which via
information systems being presumed but the form of those systems very much in doubt.
The need to bridge gaps across these communities and groups, the need for "common
languages," the need for "information" to be passed or accessed across these gaps and
groups was constant throughout these discussions.
Puzzling over the many ways that these problems were stated led to a realization
as to the importance of such existing patterns of thought as the pathways-to-knowledge
and conduit metaphors. The scenario frequently discussed within New Directions
Downeast, for instance, (see also discussion in the Introduction) began with the
perspective of coastal and marine geologists, whose research results are being gathered
into a collection of digital documents called the Marine Realms Information Bank

(MRIB). These scientists wanted to make the results of their work and expertise more
readily available as resources for others among the general public, for instance residents
of coastal communities those engaged in commercial fisheries. The overall goal would be
to expand access to research results for those who might have need for them, in places
where the results would find contexts for application to actual problems of resource
management practice and policy.
Within this scenario, it was often asked, how could community information needs
be identified? Who were the members of these communities of users? What "common
languages" would be needed to help people from these communities in expressing those
needs in terms that could be understood across communities? How could people, in
effect, negotiate a path from their questions to the answers presumed to exist in other
places, produced by other people for other more generally stated or differently situated
purposes? Often implicit in the discussions was the notion that there are some people
who know, and some who need access to what they know, and that these all need to
communicate via a common language that no one yet fully understands. The
development of this common language would seem to depend on the availability of a
setting for the negotiation of shared meanings, a setting that also does not yet exist. In
addition, as long as a distinction is maintained between those who know and those who
need access to knowledge, the chances for creating such a setting and finding people to
interact within it remained unlikely at best.
It began to appear that the framing of the problems would not lead in an effective
way toward answers or solutions. This prior problem, clearly identified by Schon (1979)
as one "problem setting," can according to him best be addressed through understanding
the "generative metaphors" that people bring to the problem solving situation. Much of
the present paper has been aimed at examining some of the generative metaphors that are

now available to those who wish to design and construct systems for information sharing,
toward the goal of expanding the available repertoire.
Within the scenario outlined above, questions such as the following began to be
asked: Why not level the field (so to speak) and assume that there really is not such a
great distinction between those who are asking and those who know; that although what
each of the partners in this process "knows" may be expressed in words that are hard for
others to understand, perhaps what each "does not know," or their questions, might be
easier to frame in mutually intelligible terms. Why not conceive of each partner as being
a mix of questions and answers, that provide mutual context for each other, and that are
both the basis and the consequences for questions and answers that have come before and
will follow in time? Instead of conceiving the problem as one of pathway from questions
to answers, why not conceive of constellations of questions that may be brought into
closer proximity to each other? Why not initiate a process toward building communities
of questions and those who are asking, rather than in emphasizing the (unequal)
relationship linking those who have questions with those who may be in the know?
It was through the effort to visualize these newly conceived relationships, and to
create an actual "space" within which they might be represented, that the outcomes
described here were created. The presentation here is textual, the narrative form of a
"chapter;" two-dimensional, via illustrations attached that are referred to from the text;
and a three-dimensional / multi-dimensional navigable digital space which is described in
the text but which needs to be demonstrated and used in understanding it. The idea of
question-centered learning environments is mainly expressed in narrative form; the
graphic image This Corner of the World (Figure 1) expresses the main ideas of the
resonance metaphor; and the digital workspace is an approach to realizing the idea called
"heuristic workspace."

The purpose of the sections that follow is to evoke in the reader a sense of the
whole through description of a set of integrated parts. Because all positive assertions
vastly underdetermine the worlds to which they can be mapped, resolving uncertainties
about the potential usefulness of the design solutions offered here will depend in some
measure on the possible environments and contexts within which they are applied.

Reframinv the relations hi^ between Questions and Answers
A desire to explore the concept of question-centered rather than knowledge-based
information systems was among the initiating questions that attracted me to this program
of study: "What distinguishes question-oriented from answer-driven information
systems?" (Schroeder, 1995).
Asking and answering questions is a more complex process than is generally
conceived. An ability to reduce our preconceptions about questions that are being asked,
seeing them as expressions of a mix of knowledge and uncertainty, and knowing the
range of possible answers that will satisfy the questioner are learned skills. Since each
person asks and answers questions continuously in everyday life, increasing the
repertoire of skills and available contexts within which these can be applied should be
part of the task of those interested in creating effective information systems design. A
question-centered approach is also person-centered, maintaining the assumption that each
person is in some measure a combination of questions / uncertainties and answers /
knoweldge. In these terms, all knowledge depends on pre-existing questions, and all
answers lead again to new questions.
Dervin and Dewdney (1986) suggest that people who seek to become more
effective in questioning and answering should adopt a particular form that they call
"neutral questioning," that serves both to clarify questions and to keep choices of
outcomes open. Neutral questions are midway between closed (one answer, eitherlor

questions) and open, nonstructured questions. They explain how this approach is helpful
in exploring the three core elements of sense-making: situation, gap, and use. Dervin also
identifies a set of "help categories" that aims to keep choices open in what is always a
dynamic question answering process. She enriches our notion of "answers" with such
concepts as "creating ideas, finding directions or ways to move, acquiring skills, getting
support or confirmation, getting motivated, getting connected to others, calming down or
relaxing, getting pleasure or happiness, and reaching goals" (Dervin, 1992, p. 75). She
further states (1999, p. 44) that the questions always express "an incomplete
understanding of reality (ontology) and an incomplete understanding of what it is to
know something (epistemology)" leading to the challenge of how to bridge various gaps.
This activity, which requires a strategic approach, is not simple. We must "make sense
without complete instruction in a reality" and also must "reach out to the sense made by
others . . ." (p. 45). These examples show that even unproblematic questions may imply a
complex range of appropriate responses. It seems that a place where this sort of activity,
all the dimensions of an individual's "situation stops" (Dervin, 1992, p. 75) could be
gathered into one image, structure or form, would be a "question space" such as may be
required for a question centered learning environment.
Acknowledging these sources and general statements of the problem, the
remainder of this section will discuss the dimensions of questions, generally, and will
introduce aspects involved in building a question-space, or place, that might serve the
requirements of a question-centered learning environment. This could also be considered
to be an approach to creating a digital environment that shares, if only partially, in the
chararacter of a discourse space or a conversation space (Krippendorff, 2002), always
involving people in their human presence, where legitimate questions can be made
visible, where shared meanings may be negotiated. and where each person or community
has the opportunity to take responsibility and control over their own representations.

Imagining an alternative question-centered approach, we can assume that all who
are involved (the public citizen as inquirer, for instance, as well as the research scientist
who has results to share) are motivated by questions; and all who are involved also to
some measure already have answers.
The strategy of approach in a question-centered model could be toward the selfidentification of communities of questioners, in which the shared positions and frames of
reference are found by means of, or implied by, the relative proximities of the questions
that are asked - finding a way to situate the motivations of the scientist, for instance
(which are often not made explicit) near to the motivations of the public citizen. Given
that an important element in the creation and design of digital libraries is some
understanding of the communities to be served (Waters, 1998), one way to redefine these
communities would be through a process of identifying "communities of questions," that
certainly would cut across existing notions of the personal and social identities of those
who are potentially involved as participants.
The first advantage that this approach has is it challenges the idea that someone,
generally the nonspecialist, is the one who "needs" information; and that someone else,
generally the authorized expert or that person's documentary or database surrogate, has
"the answer." Scientific results can instead be explicitly considered as formalized
expressions resulting from a community of questions - into which others may be invited
to join; or which might find itself in proximity to other communities of questioners. The
commonplace would no longer be: to every question its answer; but rather: to every
question its community of questioners. This approach is in line with the emphasis on
"discourse communities" advanced by Jacob and Shaw in their "sociocognitive"
perspective on information (1998, p. 141 ff.).

The sections that follow explore some characteristics of questions, generally, and
begin to suggest a strategy toward removing the apparent distances between questions
and answers, creating a new field that accommodates both within one proximate space.

The Complexities of Questions
An overview of what questions are, situating questions in the context of our
everyday activities, is needed in order to begin to structure a place or space for questions,
or in attempting to refiame the question asking and answering process. The notion of
questions seems to be relatively unproblematic, but is not. Norman (1972, p. 2) reminds
us that a "wide variety of cognitive capabilities are involved in dealing with this
deceptively simple part of our everyday activities." He claims that "considerable
preprocessing precedes question answering" including the exercise of the following
skills: "simple inference; knowledge of causality; understanding of physical laws;
general knowledge of the world; understanding of what the person asking the question
already knows" (p. 3). To answer a question properly "requires that the respondent
understands the requirements of the person who asked the question" (p. 25). "In order to
answer a question appropriately, it is necessary to have a model of the knowledge of the
listener, including knowledge of why the question was asked" (p. 26).
Difficulties in simply identifying a question as such is recognized in the branch of
linguistics concerned with speech acts. Questions might be directly addressed with the
purpose of getting an answer, but "this is not the only thing that one can do in expressing
a question" (Huddleston, 1994, p. 3845). There can also be answers revealed, when there
may have been "no implication that any act of inquiry took place" (p. 3846). These
complexities alone should caution in trying to extract "what exactly is the question" from
open-ended (or, in the present case and Dervin and Dewdney's terms, "neutral") question
exploration settings.

Huddleston explains that the most general sense, the English language has two
subtypes of interrogative, 'Lclosed"and "open" -- the first being of the yes / no, this / that,
or and "or-coordination" such as "'alive' and 'dead"' (p. 3849). For "open" interrogatives
other terms and concepts may be substituted, such as "'information question,' 'special
question,' 'partial question,' 'question-word question,' 'wh-interrogativelquestion'" (p.
3850). To these, answers are generally open-ended, though available choices may be
implicit in the way the question is asked. These are the questions involving who, what,
why, etc. These sorts of questions are commonly held to have implicit presuppositions if it is a who question, there is assumed to be a "who" out there that satisfies as answer to
the question.
Even when we are assured that a question is being asked, in any of its many
forms, a recognition of the underdetermined nature of language must be kept in mind
throughout the question asking and answering process. The resulting ambiguities are not
all "negative." They explicitly require that the listener is asked to engage in work, or
participate, in meaning creation, the essence of the theme of action orientation to
information. Ambiguities provide a margin of dynamic creativity that allows language to
work at all.
The role of context in resolving ambiguities that accompany all expressions,
including questions, are explained by Hall (1976, p. 74) in the following terms. "The
problem lies not in the code but in the context, which carries varying proportions of the
meaning. Without context, the code is incomplete since it encompasses only part of the
message." He further illustrates by saying that language abstracts events which can never
be encompassed by the language. He presents the three dimensions of meaningful
communication: "in real life, the code, the context, and the meaning can only be seen as
different aspects of a single event" (p. 79).

An example that makes the importance of context very clear is in the tale
Nsrretranders tells (1 99 111998, p. 91) of an exchange between Victor Hugo and his
publisher. "The shortest correspondence in history took place in 1862. Victor Hugo . . .
had gone on holiday following the publication of his great novel, Les Mise'rables. But
Hugo could not restrain himself from asking how the book was doing. So he wrote the
following letter to his publisher: '?' His publisher was not to be outdone and replied fully
in keeping with the truth: '!' As The Guinness Book of Records says of the publisher's
reply, 'the meaning was unmistakable."' N~rretranderscalls what is left out of the
message "exformation" (p. 92) and says that creating a short message with great depth
needs much "mental w o r k to take place. "It was not the number of bits transmitted that
was decisive, but the context of that transmission."
Understanding the importance of context, including cultural context (or the
contexts of interpersonal or intercommunity differences), points toward the need to
preserve contextual settings for questions. A designed question-space would be contextpreserving.
How can these observations be translated into something like a map or mental
model of a question space? A multidimensional coordinate system for sociallcognitive
maps can conceivably be developed, onto which any person can establish a place for his
or her question. Responsibility rests with the active inquirer. Because every person, from
his or her own perspective, has limitless "knowledge," to situate oneself on a knowledge
map might be an insurmountable problem. The task might become more tractable on a
question map. This mapping might be assisted through the use of an array of preestablished question discovery templates, formally based on theories and typologies of
questions.

Ouestions Considered as Design
Problems
The preceding paragraphs have indicated many of the complexities involved in
the asking and answering of questions. How can questions be viewed so that these
complexities are organized so that the processes that are initiated when a question is
asked may go forward in spite of lack of clear definition of all aspects of what is going
on? The range of uncertainty that is involved goes well beyond the uncertainties
embedded in the subject of particular questions, and their resolution is part of the process
of sense-making that characterizes all activities involved in communication and
cognition.
It may help both the questioner and those who are addressed to think of questions
as being constructs or compositions that are situated problem solving devices, designed
in an ad hoc manner and aimed toward resolving uncertainty. Questions express contexts,
have force, and point toward potential answers or solutions. In these aspects questions are
structured in a way that is similar to Alexander's patterns, the elements of his approach to
design.
Viewed as patterns, motivations and situational contexts may be seen as being
integral to questions; and answers (however defined) must acknowledge the questions 1
patterns as a whole. Answers need to address the complex sets of forces that questions
express, forces that may even be unknown by those who have brought the question
forward. Creating a space within which the multidimensional nature of any question can
be represented, with room for the many forms of unknowns, might help in accounting for
all of the forces that are involved. This in turn may provide opportunity for solutions, or
answers, that may not otherwise become apparent.
Thinking of questions as constructs that are aimed to resolve interacting forces
also helps us to see that questions are expressions of a disequilibrium, sometimes
unsettling but potentially productive when viewed as creative disequilibrium. Considered

in terms of the resolution of forces, the stability attained through arrival at an answer is
never permanent. The results are immediately then introduced into a new spatial /
temporal / material / cultural context (or situation, chronotope) that itself begins the
process of instability, creative disequilibrium again.

Some Current Approaches to Question answer in^ in D i ~ i t a Environments
l

The notion of question spaces that is presented here should be considered along
with existing approaches to the management of questions in today's increasingly digital
environment. This section reviews some of the approaches that are now in place or under
development.
Brandt examines changes in library reference service that are results of the rise of
online digital technologies, with particular view to the needs of users, their mental
models of systems, the capacities of solutions that are in place, and how these may serve
a model of learning based in a constructivist paradigm. "Resources modeled after
AskJeeves use a fairly simple data engine to serve up facts such as units of measure, but
have a long way to go to actually interpret complex questions, let alone provide answers
to them" (Brandt, 200 1, p. 39). He contrasts the librarian's "mental model of reference,
or information querying" with that of users and asks, why do people "have problems
articulating their reference questions? Do they have a system model for the organization
of reference resources? What mental models do they use to solve information problems
in a networked and information rich environment?" (p. 43).
In the realm of public reference services that are associated with libraries, the
U.S. Library of Congress (2003) has taken initiative in the form of its Digital Reference
Initiative, and the U.S. Department of Education (2003) has a parallel effort in its Virtual
Reference Desk, an initiative related to the ERIC Clearinghouses of educational
documents and research.

The opportunities for providing direct reference service, especially to the K-12
education community, are known as "AskA's" as in, "ask a librarian, ask a
mathematician, ask a geologist." Lankes (1999), who is affiliated with the Virtual
Reference Desk effort, summarized these services and reviews their potential for success.
Using the concept of "anomalous states of knowledge" as conceived by Belkin, Lankes
asserts that "The user's anomalous state of knowledge is operationalized as a question
that needs to be answered" (p. 63). He states that queries are directed to a system, and in
"digital reference services, all information is delivered to a user electronically." Note that
the model he uses is one in which all interactions are via digital media, and that
information is conceived as something that can be "delivered" to users electronically.
Lankes reviews implementations of online question-answering systems, noting
that many managed workflow through use of PERL-based forms and other scripts. His
own contribution to online question management is through the development of a
metadata standard, called Question Interchange Profile, or QuIP. This is intended to be "a
means of representing threads of questions and answers in an electronic record" (p. 68).
QuIP includes components that reflect the conditions of the question (called, "transaction
wrapper") a metadata representation of the question, full-text representations of the
questions and answers, and profiles of users. Overall, QuIP creates an object that may be
used outside the particular question setting from which a QuIP record has emanated.
QuIP may be seen as "foundation for cooperative support and reference services" (p. 69)
and the use of QuIP might facilitate the creation of incentives, including cash payments,
for participation in digital reference services. It allows routing of questions, and may
have application in private services such as computer software support, allowing transfer
of questions from vendors to third party producers.
It is clear that already there are already many choices for users who want to
pursue the answering of questions online. Aside from general search engines for sending

queries to the World Wide Web, there are a number of collections of reference materials
that have been gathered specifically to help organize questions into the framework of
available reference resources. These include the Library of Congress7Virtual Reference
Shelf, the Internet Public Library, the XRefer collection of digital reference works and
the WWW Virtual Library, in addition to the specific services and initiatives aimed at
managing questions such as the AskA services and QUIPmetadata protocol outlined
above.

Conclusions for the Desipn of Ouestion Spaces
Overall, the collections and services mentioned above are built around the
availability of existing resources, and can be viewed as knowledge-based rather than
question-centered systems. They preserve the notion of information as being made up of
objects that exist independently of the persons who use them, available for transport once
identified, and in this way fit the existing models and expectations of users of
information systems including libraries. There is no question that further effective and
efficient development of resources such as these will be welcome and important
enhancements to our information environment conceived in terms of information
resources.
The alternative that is being proposed in this section attempts to address the
questioning process without depending on assumptions that operate in correspondence
with the pathways-to-knowledge and conduit metaphors of information. If we cannot
travel to our information objectives, and if information is not an object that can be
brought to us, how could a system be conceived that still might meet the needs of
questioners, that in fact puts those needs and the forces that interact to produce those
questions into the center?

Instead of directing primary concern toward the management of knowledge, the
identification of who may have it, how to gain access, and interoperability of knowledgemanagement systems, why not conceive of all knowledge as being the embodiment of
sets of originating questions?
Questions may be much simpler to manage than structures of knowledge, and it
may be more efficient to focus on the formulation of questions than to focus on the
management and identification of knowledge. Questions can be considered to be an
abstraction from the world of knowledge. The creative disequilibrium that questions
represent is a central motivating factor in people's participation in information systems.
Putting this motivation to work in creation of "communities of questioners" may be a
more interesting, and more effective, way of organizing the many problems that
accompany the posing of questions, as outlined in the paragraphs above.
There may be a problem, largely unacknowledged, with knowledge-based
information systems in that they are organized around answers that were based in
contexts and motivations that are prior to the new questions that are being asked. There is
an assumption that these pre-existing answers are transportable into new question
situations. This assumption may not hold as consistently as is usually supposed. For
instance, Clark (1993, p. 91) calls attention to the work of Barsalou (1987) in these
terms: "Heraclitus famously claimed that we can never step into the same river twice.
Lawrence Barsalou makes a similar claim about concepts. Barsalou seeks to challenge
the received picture of a concept as a basically invariant structure which explains set
membership and typicality judgments. His skepticism is ba.sed on a series of results
which show that such typicality judgements (the Rosch-style graded membership
cases . . .) are surprisingly unstable across contexts."
The potential for imagination, innovation, creativity, growth and emergence of
the new is not the main objective for knowledge-based systems, thus closing many of the

opportunities that should be present or expected to be available when something as
simple as a question is asked. Focus on data, facts and answers means being closely tied
to the world of "is," while questions ideally open the possibility of conceiving the world
"as desired."
In addition, knowledge based systems are left with the problem of organizing the
universe of knowledge, an endless task, leaving no place for paradox, ambiguity,
incommensurability and the genuinely unknown. Because these cannot be "managed" by
knowledge-based systems, they are not included in the world of possibilities when
something as simply complex as the asking of a question is performed. When the
existence of uncertainty is taken seriously, then questions will point toward a
fundamental condition that is often ignored in the question situation from the start.
Because we usually negotiate our everyday discourse without much effort, we may need
frequent reminders that fundamental uncertainties are implicit in all symbolic
expressions, whether presented in the form of questions or not.
The motivation for rethinking the concept of the information sharing situation
arose from situations in which the distances of interest, motivation, worldview and
language are large. Can these gaps be bridged through refinement of categories and
improvement of interfaces, providing more transparent access to information products of
scientific research? In some measure, yes, but a more interactive approach seems needed.
To the extent the problem to be solved includes an environment for the mutual
negotiation of meanings that would bring many different communities into mutual
understanding, the refinement of information management and access systems as
traditionally conceived will not be sufficient. If all participants are recognized as
possessing knowledge and questions in some measure, and if it is assumed that the
evolution of knowledge and the emergence of significant questions depends on two-way
interaction, why not think of questions as abstracts of the forces at work in any existing

knowledge structure? Then, questions might be brought into closer proximity to each
other, allowing alternative choices for satisfactory answers to arise from a negotiation, or
dialogue, among those who have raised them. Attention to questions in this way may be
an efficient, though indirect, way to organize vast information resources, including the
motivations and goals, situations and contexts of questions and answers.
Focus on questions also might allow people to remain within their own terms and
frames of reference, rather than being compelled to adopt preexisting or universal
knowledge frameworks within which to "navigate."
The following chapters build on these general thoughts about questions, and
situate them within an alternative "resonance metaphor" of information, that
accommodates structures of forces as well as objects, and suggests how a strategy of
bringing questions into proximity, and creating communities of questioners, might be
achieved through the creation of new kinds of space. The "heuristic workspace"
described below is offered as a candidate.

Chapter 7
A RESONANCE METAPHOR FOR INFORMATION

This section suggests a "resonance metaphor" for information that is meant to
complement the two more familiar metaphors detailed in Chapter 2, the "conduit"
metaphor for communication and the "pathways" metaphor for learning. These
metaphors also dominate our images of question answering processes. While the conduit
and pathways metaphors, along with the transmission and natural resource concepts, all
seem to go together in creating a mutually consistent picture or image of information in
its spatial, structural and process aspects - a consistency based in their locating of
information objects and processes in the outside, material world, making information
available independently from any particular person's perceptions and uses - our focus on
a third view involves a sort of figure-ground shift, placing strong emphasis on the
participation of human cognizing subjects as being integral not only to the information
process, but to determining when information has been brought into existence.
This section completes the discussion opened above in the section on imagining
alternative metaphors in Chapter 2 by elaborating one that seems to be consistent with
the constructivist view of informalion. The absence of such a metaphor seems to be one
factor that has prevented the person-centered notion of information from taking hold as
an effective complement to more data-centered approaches. Once this metaphor (or
image, or concept, or pattern of relations) became clear, many examples of the use of
resonance metaphoric thinking were identified and became available as examples. The
origins of this idea and elaboration of its implications through various examples will
occupy the rest of this chapter.

Initial Visualization: This Corner o f the World
The previous chapter, proposing the construction of question-centered learning
environments to complement knowledge-based information systems, provided a rationale
for thinking about asking questions and solving problems in a way that tries to avoid the
implications of movement that are embedded in the conduit and pathway metaphors. The
suggestion here is that, in thinking about information processes, we put a temporary hold
on the notion that as questioners we "go to" a place where knowledge may be "found," as
well as the idea that information which we may need is somehow "delivered" to us. If we
can engage in essential information processes simply by sitting still, what sorts of
relationships and processes might actually work toward satisfactory results in terms of
the problems and questions that motivate action in an informational context?
In part a solution was suggested in terms of "proximities." Rather than traveling
from a region of uncertainty to a place of knowledge, and rather than bringing knowledge
in the form of objects to complete a local work in progress, we conceived of a space in
which questions and answers, or uncertainty and knowledge, are considered to be
interdependent wholes, characterizing all participants in the information process. The
task then became how to effectively bring these question and answer complexes into
some relationship on a "level field." It was hypothesized that focus on questions might be
a more efficient way to abstract any particular participant's status in this learning
environment. How these proximities, fields and stable (non-moving) situations might be
visualized, and then operationalized, was not addressed.
The resonance metaphor presented here, and the graphic image that evoked it
(Figure I), provided an integrating structure for much of the discussion that went forward
in the Orono component of the New Directions Downeast project. Discussions that
framed the creation of this graphic occurred in July and August, 2002 (discussion
summaries are available online, see New Directions Downeast, 2001-2003). Presentation

and discussion of this graphic among the entire NDDE project occurred at a meeting in
Rye, New Hampshire in September, 2002 (New Directions Downeast, 2002) is included
at the end of the summary of the Rye NH meeting of Sept. 7,2002. The presentation and
discussion of the graphic at that meeting led directly to the concept of a "resonance
metaphor." A summary and extracts from these discussions that outlines the ideas that
the graphic was meant to evoke and points toward the overall results reported have been
provided in the Introduction.

From This Corner o f the World to the Resonance Metaehor
Although the graphic This Corner of the World was thought to be a good
candidate to express the various ideas that had been discussed generally within the topic
of coordinating questions, it was a nearly random connection offered during the
presentation of the graphic in Rye that opened the possibility of linking the graphic to a
consistent set of theoretical considerations about information processes generally,
particularly the concept of "dissemination" of information.
How the graphic was conceptually linked to the work of Sarah Michaels,
particularly in terms of information behavior that evokes the concept of "reverberation, is
recounted in the Introduction. Michaels' concern was with the dissemination of natural
disaster information, particularly earthquake information (1 992). How does information
actually travel, and in what forms, among the many people and institutions that make up
the constituency for natural disaster earthquake information? These include scientific
researchers, land use managers, building code enforcement officials, and many others
including the general public. Whereas some information is general and is used in policy
making and disaster preparation, other information is very timely, specific to emergency
situations. She contrasts an "information issue networks" model with the more customary
"producer-user" model. The issue networks approach critically evaluates the notion of

stable roles for information producers and users and suggests a more dynamic set of
information relations (1992, pp. 160-161).
Michaels bases her adoption of an issue networks approach on the work of
political scientist Hugh Heclo, who "characterizes issue networks as a voluntary and fluid
configuration of people with varying degrees of commitment to a particular cause." Not
only are roles fluid, often several networks are interacting simultaneously. In terms of her
investigation of natural disaster information, particularly earthquake information, many
networks make up the "earthquake policy community," fiom scientists who publish in
technical and research journals to those many people involved in disaster management
who are not part of the scientific "information web" (p. 162). Much important
communication takes place outside "formal participatory arrangements," thus minimizing
many formal transaction costs (p. 163). Viewing the earthquake policy community as a
whole, Michaels states that "information does not flow through such communities, it
reverberates among various nodes of the networks and often gets lost along the way" (p.
161).
Her single use of the word "reverberates" remained with Marincioni as a
particularly apt term to describe the informal intersecting processes that were identified
by Michaels. Her article did not include a graphic to illustrate the process she had
described. Yet the relationships and processes described by her fit well the kinds of
relationship we were exploring as our own graphic emerged. It should be noted that the
way our discussions were connected to Michaels' work, through a mental comparison
made by one person between a graphic image and the presentation of a theory in a text,
fits with Paivio's "dual coding" approach to memory involving language and images,
discussed above, and also is a demonstration of "small world" effects that often have
much more importance in the actual operation of information dissemination processes
than would be apparent fiom the structure of formal information systems.

Other Expressions In K e e ~ -i with
n ~ the Resonance Metaphor

Once the notion of resonance entered our vocabulary, many examples in which
these words conveyed meanings similar to those we were striving to express were
noticed. Some of these disparate contexts, perhaps united only in their evocation of a
nonlinear process of communication and understanding that finds expression as
resonance and reverberation, are summarized in this section. These examples show that
as a way of speaking, the resonance metaphor is a common form of expression. Relating
them here is intended to make a broader sense of the scope of this metaphor available to
the reader, and to relate its use in the domain of information processes to other contexts
where the metaphor serves a similar role.
The examples begin with Roediger's survey of memory metaphors (1980) that
has been detailed in Chapter 2. Most images for memory involve images of actual spaces
and the objects that are in them. Among the 36 memory metaphors he describes he
claims that "no other general conception of the mind or memory" that rivals "the
conception of the mind as a mental space in which memories are stored and then
retrieved" (p. 238). With particular relevance to a resonance metaphor, Roediger
identified three analogies "based one way or another on auditory imagery" (p. 240).
Roediger states that the "basic idea of retrieval as a matching or resonance process has
been used by a number o f . . . psychologists." For some, retrieval is compared to "the
operation of a tuning fork. When a tone of a particular frequency is sounded in the
presence of a bank of different-sized tuning forks, the appropriate one will vibrate
sympathetically" (p. 241). In everyday speech, we might say that a retrieval cue "rings a
bell." Roediger observes that resonance models may be "formally identical to spatial
storage and search theories if one assumes an unlimited capacity, parallel search process
(p. 241).

Anthony Judge (1 996) questions the adequacy of the "highway" metaphor for the
"emerging information society" and suggests as an alternative the "songlines" of the
Australian aborigines. Songlines define pathways for members of the indigenous culture,
allowing travel across great distances over lands occupied by different language and
tribal groups. Each person only holds a portion of a songline. Relying on Chatwin, Judge
states that the "land first exists as a concept in the mind and is given form through the
singing" that brings the landscape into existence. He considered this to be a "fimdamental
act of creative aesthetics" (p. 8 of 10). This also represents an entirely different way of
conceiving of the 'land' and landscape than ours. Referring to geographer Yi-Fu Tuan,
Judge introduces the concept of resonance. "Hyperlink pathways could also be used to
map out patterns of resonance between the points of significance in a poetic construct.
For it is possible, as with certain chemical molecules (resonance hybrids) that certain
configurations of insight could only acquire stability as a gestalt by resonance of their
parts between quite distinct alternative structures -- the dynamics of resonance providing
the basis for stability rather than any one of the particular structural configurations of
pathways (all of which may be unstable). Yi-Fu Tuan says of resonance in aesthetic
context: 'Experience, unless it carries resonance, is shallow and transient. Resonance is
the result of the extension of one field of meaning to another -- a change and enlargement
of context so that a phenomenon is more than how it first appears. What makes resonance
possible is the human capacity for metaphorical perception and thought"' (Judge, quoting
Yi-Fu Tuan's Passing Strange and Wonderful, p. 30, at p. 4 of 10).
The connection that Judge and Tuan suggest between songlines / resonance and
our connection to the land reminds of Spitzer's classic work, analyzing the German word
Stimmung (1963). He claims that "what is missing in the main European languages is a
term that would express the unity of feelings experienced by man face to face with his
environment (a landscape, nature, one's fellow man) and would comprehend and weld

together the objective (factual) and the subjective (psychological) into one harmonious
unity" (p. 5). "For a German, Stimmung is fused with the landscape, which in turn is
animated by the feeling of man -- it is an indissoluble unit into which man and nature are
integrated" (p. 5). There is also the notion of gestimmt sein, "to be tuned . . . which in its
inference of a relative solidarity or agreement with something more comprehensive (a
man, a landscape, is tuned to 'something'), differentiates it from state of mind. . . and
presupposes a whole of the soul in its richness and variability . . ." (pp. 5-6).
Judge's reference to Australian songlines also reminds us of the traditional
methods of navigation practiced in Micronesia, where essential information literally
comes in the form of propagation of waves. The example of South Sea navigation is used
in many works devoted to maps and cartographic practice. Hutchins has studied
navigational practices aboard modern naval vessels as exemplary of cognitive processes
(1995). He also studied indigenous navigational practices in the Caroline Islands, and
illuminates many of the hidden assumptions that separate western from traditional
navigational practices. These included reliance on diverse information sources, including
color of water, local swells, swells interacting with islands, winds, birds, and stars
(Hutchins, 1983).
Edward T. Hall, whose work explores relationships between space and culture at
various scales (his science of proxemics), provides a chapter on "rhythm and body
movement" (Hall, 1976, pp. 6 1-73). Hall reports the observations made by William
Condon, who by means of frame-by-frame analysis of films studied people moving
together when interacting. Condon found that verbal behavior and movement are often
closely synchronized, as in performance and dance. He quotes Condon in recommending
that our image of people as "isolated entities sending discrete messages" (p. 63) should
be abandoned in favor of a bond that is "the result of participation within shared
organizational forms. . . . This means that humans are tied to each other by hierarchies of

rhythms that are culture-specijk and expressed through language and body movement"
(P. 64).
Pratt's essay on the work of Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Kohler, notes that
Gestalt perceptions that cannot reduce wholes into discrete parts include "contours, the
various constancies, chords, melodies, speech, rhythm, diminuendos and crescendos, etc.
Such phenomena are Gestalten, not sensations, and they have their own laws and
methods of investigation that have little resemblance to the principles and procedures of
classical psychology" (Pratt, 1969,2 1-22).
A memorial address given recently at the University of Maine by historian Joan
Wallach Scott, titled "Feminist Reverberations" (since published, see (Scott, 2002))
identified the word reverberation as one way to begin to understand the significant global
links that are being made by small, local groups who are only affiliated in informal,
nonhierarchical but nonetheless powerful ways. After describing an increasingly
fractured world, and suggesting "echoes" as being a metaphor for certain forms of global
awareness, she suggests that "in these days of cataclysmic transmission, it would be
better still to talk about reverberations, seismic shock waves moving out from dispersed
epicenters, leaving shifted geological formations in their wake. The word reverberation
carries with it a sense both of causes of infinite regression--reverberations are re-echoes,
successions of echoes--and of effect--reverberations are also repercussions" (p. 1I).
A specific example she gives is the movement called Women in Black. These
groups have autonomously appeared in many settings around the world, standing
variously for end of occupation of Palestine, against mafia, against neo-Nazi violence,
against "religious fundamentalists' mistreatment of women" (p. 16). Overall, they are "an
improvisational strategy, locally deployed, but not as a branch of any centralized
association" (p. 17). Most importantly, the Women in Black movement does not presume
sameness among feminisms, but "presumes fundamental differences among feminists,

differences of context, differences of history, differences of understandings of the
feminine and of feminism itself' (p. 19). "The reverberations of feminism have not
usually been earth shattering, but they have created all kinds of disturbances, laterally
and longitudinally" (p. 20).
Many other examples have been collected since our attention was directed toward
resonance aspects of human interactive process, including information. The examples
above are provided in order to establish that their place in a total concept of information
is not idiosyncratic here.

Summarizin~the Resonance M e t a ~ h o r
The potentials that may be available through adopting a "resonance metaphor of
information" emerged as an unexpected solution to a set of problems that were being
resolved among paticipants in an interdisciplinary project, New Directions Downeast. In
that project, the idea of creating a digital library was generalized by some participants to
encompass the notion of an interactive learning environment, within which the
information needs of participants from many different user communities might be served
through processes of mutual awareness and negotiation of meaning.
Both predominant metaphors for information process, conduit and pathway,
evoke movements in the external world, either in the form of information objects that
traverse time and space, from places of storage to places of use, or in the form of
information seekers who traverse paths in their quest. Shelving these, at least
temporarily, the problem was set as one of having something happen to create the
possibility of change, in informational terms, without having to conceive that movement
of objects is needed to effect this change. The notion of wave propagation was adopted as
a way of allowing movement, but a very different sort of movement, as the basis for the
representation of information process and change.

A spatial characteristic implied through this metaphor, in addition to introducing
an alternative sense of how movement may be conceptualized in our understanding of
information processes, is the appearance of centrality, of a center or centers. Though the
conduit and pathway metaphors imply the existence of places and of movements across
and among these places, resonance can be taken to imply a place of origin from which
the resonance emanates. This is inherent in the image of a pebble tossed into a pond, as
the initiating act of inquiry or questioning. The waves that travel outward imply the
center from which they have come. Whereas the conduit and pathways metaphors can be
conceived as being situated in limitless networks of an infinite universe, one can
conceive of a stable and centered directionality by means of the resonance metaphor.
Because there may be multiple resonant events simultaneously present (as already
implied in the graphic This Corner of the World, Fig. 1) a possibility arises of
coordinating the relationships among multiple resonant events, conceived in terms of
standing waves or harmonics. This centeredness is represented in the structure of the
workspace described in the next chapter.
Once identified, the resonance metaphor was found to be commonly used for
interactive processes among people in many similar settings. It was often associated with
words that are auditory rather than visual (especially as relating visual perception with a
world of space filled with objects). Such words and phrases as harmony, in tune, rings a
bell, vibes, echoes, pings, standing waves and so forth are related expressions of this
concept.
Also of importance is the affordance given via the resonance metaphor in terms of
the constructivist view of information described in Chapter 2. An essential perspective
given by those who hold to this idea is that information does not exist at all unless it is
perceived by a human subject. A concise statement of this perspective is given by Wilden

(1987, p. 76): "Information may be symbolic, imaginary, or real and does depend for its

existence on being perceived by living creatures or human minds or senses." This is an
action orientation to information, and points toward the ways in which information
always involves creative acts. People create order through the constant processes of
sense-making said by Dervin to characterize our information activities. She theorizes
(1 999) that information "is made and unmade in communication" thus we must "create
an information system to assist people in designing their own information and in
particular, in sharing with each other the ways in which they have struggled individually
and collectively to both create order out of chaos and create chaos out of order when
order restricts or constrains them. . . . The system would allow not only the factizing that
permits regimentation as a sometimes useful way of making sense but also the myths and
storytelling that permit us to tolerate and muddle through diversities and seeming
incompletenesses" (p. 43).
In this way, an information environment that is conceived as being made up of
loci of mutual resonance may point toward the opportunity for perception, conceived
primarily as active listening, to be the occasion for creative acts, the necessary though
often unacknowledged negentropic attitude taken by people in our world. Information, as
resonance, brings nothing to the perceiver except a signal that an act is required. This
frame may be helpful in resituating responsibility for the existence of information in the
person of the cognizant human subject. The concept of listening also reminds us of a set
of factors that is important in all reception of information: attention, receptivity, the
readiness to listen. Placing the information process in a frame that emphasizes listening
may make us more able to enhance the receptivity and readiness aspects of information
processes.

Chapter 8
STRUCTURING A MULTIDIMENSIONAL HEURISTIC WORKSPACE

This chapter describes a digital space that has been structured in a way that is
intended to be consistent with the person-centered approach to information as well as the
resonance metaphor. The structure is composed of three nested polyhedral forms that are
arranged around a common center. These forms are translations of three figures that
already are well established: two regular polyhedra (cuboctahedron and icosahedron) and
a "tensegrity" that shares some characteristics with the other two forms as well as with
the octahedron. The figures on which this structure is based can be physically modeled,
and physical models of each were constructed prior to creating the structured digital
space. The final configuration as based on such physical models is shown in Figure 3. In
addition, there are some aspects of these figures that are not visible in the physical
models. These nonphysical elements including center, central angle vectors and
redundant chords are illustrated in Figure 4. This new structured space is the most
tangible outcome that is presented in the present work. It is termed a "multidimensional
heuristic workspace," and will usually be referred to simply as "the workspace."
This structured workspace organizes an otherwise undifferentiated space that is
available in an existing software application, the Axon Idea Processor (Axon Research,
2003). After a briefly review of some of the motivations that led to the creation of this
space, some of the primary characteristics of Axon's generic space will be described.
Then, the specific elements that make up the digital structure will be enumerated and
described, followed by elaboration of some of the various conceptual relationships that
might be represented in terms of the structural relationships provided here. The chapter
will conclude with a summary of the characteristics of the workspace in terms of future
development and in relation to perspectives of other researchers.

Figure 3. Overview of the workspace structure. These include cuboctahedron,
expanded octahedral tensegrity, and surrounding icosahedral
"context sphere."

Figure 4. Nonphysical elements of the workspace structure. These
include the center, central angle vectors to vertices of the
cuboctahedron and tensegrity, and redundant tension elements.

Motivations for the Desim of the Workspace
This space suggests a solution that attempts a synthesis of the problems and
perspectives that are outlined in the preceding sections. It is intended to provide a setting
where the concepts of "question-centered" and "resonance" can be operationalized. It is
distinguished from most of the preceding discussion in that it is a real space, not a
metaphoric space or theoretical narrative. As such, its characteristics, properties, and
affordances may be easier to demonstrate than to describe in narrative form.
The same generative metaphor stands behind this workspace as that which led to
an appreciation of the metaphoric role that resonance offers: consider that asking a
question might be like tossing a pebble into a pond. This space resulted from a desire to
solve the problem of representing that metaphor graphically in the most open and robust
manner, allowing for full expression of the multiple dimensions that are implied by it.
Because the workspace includes three nested figures that are each three-dimensional, all
of which can be viewed simultaneously, this can be considered to be a multidimensional
rather than a three-dimensional space.
The convergence of two sets of problems led to the creation of this space. The
first was an ongoing attempt to display the meaningful relationships among terms that
characterize space and information sharing as discussed in a set of open-ended interviews
and small group discussions. This set of terms is given in Appendix A, and the project
within which these texts were collected is summarized in the background section of the
Introduction. These code terms have now been organized progressively in linear, network
and three-dimensional arrays, the last of which is supported within this workspace.
The second primary source suggesting this solution arose from needs of the New
Directions Downeast (NDDE) project. In particular, there was a desire to visualize a kind
of space that might supplement the document access and retrieval functions of a proposed
distributed digital geospatial library, the Marine Resources Information Bank (U.S.

Geological Survey. Coastal and Marine Geology Program, 2003). Again, some
background about the NDDE project are provided in the Introduction. The conceptual
relationships of the suggested online space, variously conceived as a conversation space,
a question space, or an interactive learning environment, were first visualized in the
graphic This Corner of the World (Figure 1). The form of the present workspace resulted
from the attempt to extend into three dimensions the conceptual relationships that were
being explored and discussed in terms of that two-dimensional graphic.
Both of these motivating sources shared in the intent to make relationships among
concepts more visible, and thus more intelligible, through extending their display into a
three-dimensional environment. In the first case, for display of codebook term
relationships, the result could be conceived as a complex graphic that would allow more
meaningful relations to be displayed than was possible through the alphabetical and
simple tree hierarchical lists and networks available in the text coding software being
used, AnSWR: Analysis Software for Word-Based Records (U.S. Centers for Disease
Control, 2003). The multilevel concept network management software Axon was chosen
for this purpose, after initially using the semantic network creation and management
package SemNet (Semantic Research Inc., 2002). Whereas SemNet required explicit
links among semantic conceptual objects, and was limited in the numbers of nodes and
links that could be simultaneously displayed, Axon allows the clustering of concepts
without requiring explicit links, and allows the entire array to be viewed in its entirety.
Through this application, the capabilities of Axon became familiar and were
available for the second motivating application, creation of a space that would support
the primary goals imagined to be part of an interactive learning environment within a
digital library. The two streams merged when the undifferentiated, multilevel space of
Axon was chosen as the medium within which to create a three-dimensional realization
of the This Corner of the World graphic.

Many of the theoretical motivations underlying this space have been presented in
the sections above devoted to question-centered information environments, the resonance
metaphor for information, and the cognitive constructivist approach to understanding
information processes. In broadest terms, the environment that results should allow the
greatest amount of autonomy for the structuring of problems and meanings among all
participants, while allowing transparency and the discovery of conceptual relationships
across diverse participants and groups. In terms emerging from the New Directions
project, the question became one of linking diverse sets of communities of users, all with
different frames of reference, without requiring the establishment of a unified
vocabulary, or common language, as prerequisite to the discourse. In terms of questioncentered approaches to information and learning, the problem became one of how to
bring questions and communities of questioners into proximity without assuming that any
of the participating members of these communities has privileged knowledge which it
then becomes the task of others to access or otherwise obtain. Abstracting questions from
the knowledge of all participants is conceived as one way to level the field across
communities of inquiry.
The structure that is offered here can be conceived as a single instance in a
universe of many similar structures which are created and maintained autonomously by
participants in a shared community of inquiry. These similar structures would not need to
be crafted with the same figures and relationships as suggested here. Local workspaces
could be structured to meet local needs. These local constructs could then be federated
for particular purposes, such as the identification of common questions, through
emerging standards such as the Topic Map standard (Biezunski, Bryan, & Newcomb,
1999). The strategy of federating workspaces is outlined below in the section on future
work in Chapter 10.

Steps in Buildinp the Workspace

This section provides a brief review of how the particular form of the workspace
was crafted given the visual precedents, theoretical goals and available software
described above. The graphic This Corner of the World suggests that questions, or the
complex mix of knowledge and uncertainty that aims toward greater certainties or
answers, involves processes that propagate from a stable originating space. This
propagation was represented by wavelike forms intersecting across a surface that is
limited by three curves that suggest the intersection of great circles on the surface of a
sphere. Discussions around the graphic also included reference to standing waves as
being symbolic of the places of particular meaning, or of gaps in meaning, that are
experienced in discourse.
At the beginning, the candidate structure that was considered for expanding this
image into three dimensions was the tetrahedron, which would result from multiplying
the graphic image four times, and joining the multiples at the edges. A tetrahedron is the
simplest 3-dimensional space, and its form begins to suggest a sphere or globe. Thus, a
promising simple form for expressing the surfaces and intersections implied by the
graphic would seem to be a tetrahedron.
Though a form such as the tetrahedron might be useful in spatializing the graphic,
it was not clear how this might accommodate complex sets of conceptual relationships
and allow these to be explored or made mutually visible in a coherent way. The result,
three nested three-dimensional forms, is many steps removed from the tetrahedron
(although eight tetrahedra are to be found in its central structure, the cuboctahedron; see
the application example presented below in Chapter 9).
The steps involved in merging these concepts began with the recognition that the
polyhedral subdivision of the earth's surface as found in the global map projections
designed by R. Buckminster Fuller were visually similar to each face of the elementary

tetrahedron being crafted here. Fuller's approach also had the advantage of being an
attempt to create a unified coordinate scheme that would include both geophysical and
conceptual mapping, his "geometry of thinking," see Fuller (1975b) and Edmonson
(1987, pp. 2-3). Exploring the many approaches to designing innovative architectural
spaces led to the suggestion that the "tensegrity" structure, developed by Fuller in
collaboration with sculptor Kenneth Snelson, might also afford a useful vehicle for
charting paths or navigational exploration of the kind of space we were trying to define.
The particular internal dynamics of the Archimedan solid cuboctahedron, namely the
equal central vector lengths from its center to each vertex, suggested that this figure as a
stable solid for our expanded visualization. Finally, the desire to include context as part
of the structure led to the inclusion of an enveloping "context sphere" that has the form
of an icosahedron.
These development steps went forward on several parallel tracks. One was the
construction of physical models and exploratory drawings that served to provide
background on the actual physical relationships among the various figures under
consideration (Figures 5 and 6). The second was an experiment in creating the
visualization of a polyhedral space within Axon. The structure, or set of consistent,
nested, discontinuous figures, as it stands today is the result of these approaches taken
together.
Concepts derived from the work of R. Buckminster Fuller have entered into the
design of the workspace in several ways. First, a recognition that the wave propagation
pattens in the graphic This Corner of the World (Figure 1) looked very similar to Fuller's
approach to global geographic projection based on intersecting great circles and
displayed in polyhedral nets reinforced the idea that both geographic and conceptual
coordinate systems might be integrated into a single structure, and suggested a solution.

Figure 5. Octahemioctahedron, or octatetrahedron. One of the tetrahedra in
this figure is used in the sample application described in Chapter 9.
Figure 6 . Tensegrity model under construction.

Second, Fuller with sculptor Kenneth Snelson originally conceived of a structure that
embodies the concept of "tensional integrity," or tensegrity. A particular form of
tensegrity, the expanded octahedron, was the first figure to be introduced into the
workspace (Figure 7). Third, Fuller gave great attention to a particular Archimedean
solid, the cuboctahedron (or truncated cube) which he gave the trademarked name
Dymaxion when applied to his own work. Due to the symmetries of this figure, including
the existence of four great circle circumferential paths and the equal lengths of vectors
from the center to the verticies and connecting vertices across the chords, the
cuboctahedron has found a place within the workspace (Figure 8).

I have relied on the works of Edmondson (1987), Kenner (1973; 1976), Critchlow
(1970), Loeb (1991) and Fuller himself (1975a; 1975b; 1979), among others, for
explanations of Fuller's work. I found that Fuller's geometry not only would help solve
the problems of expanding the graphic This Corner, but it also fit my sense of what might
be needed to visualize the resonance metaphor of information in multidimensional space.
The particular structure that I found useful was the tensegrity icosahedron (more
exactly an "expanded octahedron," see Pugh, 1976, p. 1I), in which three parallel pairs of
compression struts are held in stable orthogonal three-dimensional relationship - without
any of them touching the others. (Figure 7). This was seen as being a solution for the
attempt to surround or intersect a tetrahedron with a pair of parallel trefoil knots. As it
turns out, the resulting structure does not seem to provide any consistent relationship
with a tetrahedron - at least, this is not preserved in the figure within the workspace. The
important point here is that the sort of figure that is expressed by the This Corner graphic
can also be expressed, in physical 3D, by the tensegrity expanded octahedron, which
provides a stable structure that is composed of forces in balance ("Tensegrity describes a

Figure 7. Expanded octahedral tensegrity. Tension elements are represented
by thin curved lines; the straight members are three pairs of
compression struts.

Figure 8. Cuboctahedron showing central angle vectors.
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structural-relationship principle in which structural shape is guaranteed by the . . .
continuous, tensional behaviors of the system and not by the discontinuous. exclusively
local compressional member behaviors." (Fuller as quoted by Edmondson 1987, p. 244).
The use of tensegrity as a form of nondirected graph seems similar in intent to an
established graph layout called the "Spring Layout." According to Herman, Melanqon
and Marshall (2000) this "stands for all nondeterministic layout techniques, also called

Force-Directed Methods. They report that Eades was the first to propose this approach in
graph drawing, modeling nodes and edges of a graph as physical bodies tied with springs.
"Using Hooke's law describing forces between bodies, he was able to produce layouts for
(undirected) graphs" @. 29). Further description of the spring layout may be found in a
recent article that reviews spatialization methods for nongeographic information
visualization (Skupin & Fabrikant, 2003, p. 103).
It should be noted here that the tensegrity figure in this workspace is only an
image, and does not have the capacity to behave in the digital environment as a physical
tensegrity would. The figure included here was created based on observation of an
existing physical model. The great advantage of the physical tensegrity structures is that
the relationships among the forces that determine the structure and the physical stability
that results creates an immediate understanding of the whole system. Realizing these
characteristics in the digital environment, rather than just representing them, is suggested
as an objective of future work.

Elements and Affordances of the Heuristic Works~ace

The workspace is composed of elements and features that are available in Axon,
an off-the-shelf computer application. A brief description of Axon's features precedes a
description of the specific elements of the workspace. This will be followed by
discussion of the affordances or apparent possibilities that this configuration suggests or

allows. The term affordances derives from Gibson's assertion that objects and conditions
of the physical environment may be perceived directly in terms of their use values for the
organisms that perceive them (Gibson, 197911986, p. 127 ff.).
Axon (Axon Research, 2003) provides three basic entities (objects, links and
shapes) to which a large number of relationships and actions can be assigned. Axon
provides a large 2D workspace (20,000 pixels square) arranged in a multilevel
environment (500 available levels). Each level of the Axon workspace can be seen in a
single view, and multiple levels can be viewed simultaneously. Axon's multilayer
approach is reminiscent of coverage layers in a geographic information system. Zooming
allows easy contraction or expansion of views. Axon's objects can contain text, or can
be assigned actions such as opening external text, running programs, opening other Axon
objects, following link pathways, etc. Objects can be connected by explicit links within
and across levels, and operations such as computation and simulations can be
programmed into object and link relationships. Other Axon features include: location of
objects by name and contents by means of full text search; turning levels on and off,
including specifying ranges of visibility for multiple levels; selection by color including
hiding or visibility of all objects and links by color; manual and various automated
choices for sequencing objects; full text output of the contents of objects by means of
manual or automated sequencing. Every object in Axon has an x, y, z coordinate position,
based on bitmapped pixels and the level at which the object is located. Different objects
are allowed to have identical names, but all are distinguished by the automatic
assignment of unique object identification numbers.
Though Axon provides a very robust and flexible environment, and comes
packaged with dozens of templates for visual arrays and computation across networks of
objects, its multilayered space is undifferentiated. First-time users are often inhibited by
the unlimited possibilities of the space. Lacking internal structure, effective distribution

of Axon's capacities across its multiple levels is difficult to imagine. It was an
experiment in creating an actual three-dimensional structure within Axon's
undifferentiated multilevel space that led to the structure proposed here. This attempt was
based within the intuition expressed by Herman, Melangon and Marshall that 3D "lends
itself to the creation of real-world metaphors that could help in perceiving complex
structures" (2000, p. 3 1). Until Axon's undifferentiated multilevel space could be
subdivided in an understandable way, through using forms that have cognitive
plausibility (in this case, with regular polyhedra) the potential for effective use of this 3D
space can be only partially realized.
Moving on from the particular elements and features of Axon, the structured
workspace as it stands now contains the following figures: a center point, along with
representations of a cuboctahedron, a tensegrity icosahedron / expanded octahedron, and
a regular icosahedron. The process of introducing these figures began with the direct
translation from a physical model of an expanded octahedral tensegrity (for identification
and illustration of this figure, see Pugh, 1976, p. 11) into Axon across 25 levels. This was
accomplished over several days of close inspection of the actual relations between the
tensegrity's compression struts and vertices, placing them in corresponding relationships
within the Axon workspace. A center was established on Level 12, coordinate (0, 0) that
also is the center for the two additional nested polyhedra that were introduced into the
model. These were a "context sphere" (which actually is a regular icosahedron) and a
cuboctahedron.
Other elements of the workspace include the following: vectors, from center to
vertices, for all figures; compression struts, vertex endpoints, and tension links or
polyhedral edges connecting them; landmarks such as center points on each level and
facet markers; and differentiation among objects by means of choices of colors, sizes and
fonts for text, graphic objects, etc., provided as part of the Axon toolbox.

The workspace intends to afford the coordination of small and large scale spaces,
in physical/geographic and social/cognitive domains. All of the structures that make up
the workspace in its present state are based on regular polyhedra, not on the sphere. Any
of the figures that are in place, however, might be projected upon a sphere, and it is in
this that they provide the basis for a unified coordinate system, a theme of this overall
work.
When the new space was first conceived, before its eventual construction within
the Axon environment, the question of how a basic tetrahedral space might be traversed
or navigated was considered. An exploration was undertaken to find what sorts of figures
might be available to help define paths that would consistently intersect with the vertices
or edges of the figure, or that might penetrate it in a way that would allow systematic
scanning of the space and its contents. Such a pathway might allow viewing from all
perspectives but embodying some constraints against simply random pathways for
viewing.
An attempt that was made to use a trefoil "torus knot" or similar interlacing
figures pointed toward the difficulties in creating patterns of traverse, penetration or
intersection that would be consistent with tetrahedral space. Drawings of various
solutions seemed to point toward paradoxical behavior of the figures, such as figureground and front-to-back shifts in perspective depending on how the intersecting figures
were arranged. While no direct solution to the problem of designing consistent "scanning
orbits" was found, this exercise suggested the potential usefulness for tensegrity
structures as part of the proposed space. The compression struts of tensegrities are
discontinuous, held in stable relationship with each other by means of continuous tension
elements. This relationship of continuity and discontinuity seemed a good potential
match with the character of the resonance metaphor. It seemed to be a possible
environment an environment for spatializing the concepts of the This Corner of the

World graphic that seemed unavailable through expansion into a tetrahedral form. Thus,
the first figure of the workspace structure that was created was the tensegrity. The center,
cuboctahedron and icosahedral "context sphere" were all added afterward. These figures
will be described further below in the section on elements of the workspace.
Given this review of the situational contexts which motivated the creation of the
heuristic workspace, the character of the general space of which it is a part, and its
structural elements, details about the kinds of relationships that are reflected in its
structure will now be given.
The workspace is intended to support the work of an individual, group or
community when confronted with the need to structure complex problems. No particular
standard structure to assist in problem solving should be assumed at the beginning. It is
assumed that every problem situation is unique, and that the perspective of each person
who shares in this problem situation will also be unique. A space for structuring
problems should suggest and allow for many possible approaches, and should not depend
on the approaches taken in other settings as being required or even as models for local
inquiry and learning. Nevertheless, the skills and experiences of different communities
whose concerns may intersect with each other may often be of great value, and should be
made available as resources. Though primarily conceived as providing an environment
for clarification and resolution of issues of immediate local concern, making these
structured workspaces available for public inspection and exploration may increase the
likelihood of learning and the emergence of creative solutions.
Toward ends such as these, the present workspace offers a number of features and
structural relationships reflecting many of the commonly accepted ways of structuring
conceptual relationships, as well as some that are more unorthodox. The following brief
notes summarize what might be considered the affordances of the structures in this space:

The workspace has "cognitive plausibility." All of its elements can be constructed
and demonstrated as physical models, and although the concept of tensegrity or
even knowledge of polyhedra in general may not be common, the relationships
among of such structures is easy to describe and understand.
There is a center, a point of reference to which all the other figures of the
structured space are mutually related. This may be used to represent the spatial
concept of centrality in its many forms: as primary conceptual landmark, as point
of highest certainty, as locus of accepted assumptions, or negatively, as the place
of ultimate unknown, the nave about which the wheel of knowledge turns.
Undefined as well as definable spaces are provided. All of the figures are
transparent and consist only of nodes and links. While the figures in the structure
provide many possibilities for defining and creating internal differentiation within
the workspace, the entire region outside the context sphere is totally undefined,
and definitions within the structure are the product of the workspace user.
The importance of context is represented by means of a surrounding icosahedral
"context sphere" which is structured to suggest that context is permeable,
dynamic and interpenetrates the rest of the structure; see Figure 9. This structure
reflects Mark Johnson's discussion of Searle's concept of a Background that
permeates intentional meaning Networks. Johnson (1987, p. 188) states "if the
Background really does permeate and shade ofinto the Network, then it must
have a character, a structure, somewhat akin to structure in the Network. . . .
Where we draw the line as we move along the continuum of structures will
depend upon our purposes, values, and other assumptions. But no line of
demarcation will exist 'in the nature of things."'

Figure 9. Icosahedral "context sphere." This is shown with are the
surrounding central angle vectors to vertices of cuboctahedron
and tensegrity.

The workspace as it is now structured suggests an arrangement for the display
certainty and uncertainty relationships. The most well defined position in the
structure is the center, located at coordinate (0,O) on level 12. The most well
defined figure is the closest to the center, the regular Archimedean solid
cuboctahedron. The next figure away from the center, the tensegrity, is stable
over time, while maintaining this stability through constant dynamic distribution
of changing tensions across the tension elements. The context sphere, the farthest
from the center, is intended to be minimally defining and maximally porous.
Outside the context sphere the space is undifferentiated and undefined. Through
this ordered progression, objects and concepts might be arrayed in terms of their
relative uncertainty or definiteness.
Multiple frames of reference can be displayed consistently in one view, without
the need to have direct translation or transformation across frames. In the current
example, three sets of three dimensions can be displayed simultaneously in this
multidimensional workspace.
Objects that populate this space can be displayed as single entities, or they can be
formally linked as networks, arrayed in clusters suggesting fields, or arranged
along vectors suggesting the directions of operation of forces within the space.
The meanings of the symbolic objects that are managed in this space can be
represented in several ways: explicitly, by embedding definitional text within the
objects, or by assigning values to links across objects; or implicitly, through
relational arrays, with significance of the array determined through analysis of the
object clusteres.
Networks may be represented by the chords that connect the vertices of the
polyhedra. A graph representing "small world" phenomena can be seen in the

tensegrity, with the tendons representing local "strong ties" and the crossstructure compression elements representing the long-distance "weak ties."
Manipulability and multiple location of objects / tokens makes this a space for
sorting, a fundamental cognitive activity, and also a place for discovery of the
emergence of formal and informal categories (prototypes, in Rosch's sense) that
are used in the sorting process; thus, a place for cognitive learning and discovery.
Containment and inside / outside relationships can easily be represented here. The
context sphere provides a structural boundary which suggests an inside and an
outside to the space as a whole. Containment can be conceived as the confinement
to a physical container, or as cohesion due to compressive forces. Such forces are
found in the tendon elements of the tensegrity. Forces of expansion may be
represented by vectors from the center outward to vertices of the figures.
Structural dynamism can be inferred. Though the structure, composed of nested
polyhedra and a tensegrity, are in fact static (though future software modification
may allow transformations and rotations) there is a dynamism about the structure
as a whole, that makes it into a "charged" space that can energize the work
performed within it.
Frequencies and periodicity are present in the physical tensegrity structures.
Tension elements are always actively adjusting and redistributing changes in
tension across the entire structure. The same elements in the tensegrity figure of
the workspace can be used for the placement or representation of concepts that
involve dynamic change and periodic events in time.
Relationships implying opposition and bi-polarity can be represented. Polarity
relationships are found in both physical and conceptual dimensions. These may be
represented in many places throughout the structured space, including across
opposing central angle vectors, across the length of the compression struts in the

tensegrity (three pairs of two struts are available, suggesting the opportunity to
represent cyclically alternating opposing forces), and in the opposite-facing facets
of the figures. Because the structure suggest an overall dynamic stability, the bipolar forces are also most likely to be represented as being in balance. However,
any of the vectors, edges, struts or facets may be changed in length, width,
numeric value, etc. allowing for the emergence of nonsymmetric structures that
could represent imbalances in opposing forces.
The structures allow groupings in several different numeric patterns. Patterns that
occur in various multiples can be represented by parts of the structure. These
include the numbers one (the center as single point of reference; as individual
symbolic objects), two (bipolarity of compression struts, hemispheric symmetry),
three in many forms (intersecting planes, three-dimensionality of each
polyhedron); four (tetrahedra, available within the cuboctahedron; which figure
also provides six square faces, the number of faces in a cube), eight (group of
eight tetrahedra making up the cuboctahedron), 12 (vertices of the icosahedron,
central angle vectors to vertices), 14 (facets of cuboctahedron), 20 (faces of
icosahedron), 30 (edges of icosahedron) and so forth. Of particular potential
usefulness is the availability of intersecting planes, either three planes intersecting
orthoganally at 90 deg., or four planes intersecting at 60 deg. The orthogonal
planes also can represent the Cartesian x, y, z coordinate system; see Figure 10.
There is potential for simultaneous display of cognitive and geographical maps.
These may be coordinated through rotation of the figures to match conceptual and
locational relationships along central vectors. Although a consistent geography
could not be introduced in the workspace as it stands as limited by Axon's current
capabilities, the potential for creating this capacity based on the conceptual model
of the workspace will be explored in future work.

ing

Figure 10. Three orthogonal intersecting planes. These are intrinsic to
the cuboctahedron, and are used here to illustrate the Three
Dimensions of Information.

Because the figures are nested but non-intersecting, relationships that are
characterized by discontinuity may be expressed. Just as clustered objects may
indicate meaningful relationships even without the presence of explicitly defined
links, the structure's figures are seen to be in relationship without requiring direct
paths or correspondences to be present. Since each of the figures can be taken to
represent a separate frame of reference, the present configuration allows three sets
of three-dimensional frames to be viewed simultaneously, without requiring prior
definition of terms across them. Discontinuity is also represented through the
presence of compression struts in the tensegrity figure, which by definition
represent discontinuous fields of compression distributed in continuous fields of
tension.
Given the representation of structural discontinuity, what keeps the discontinuous
elements in stable relationship? One concept that applies to this is gravity. The
concept of gravity is one way to account for stable proximity relationships when
physical connections are not in place. In conceptual as well as physical structures
gravity effects are understood to be present, if only metaphorically, as in the
clustering of concepts around categorical prototypes. Within the workspace, the
clustering of concepts without requiring explicit links, as well as the array of
tension elements that are the contraction forces of the tensegrity figure can
represent gravity relations.
The user is in charge of the environment. This is essential for a truly 'subject
centered' system. This affords an environment for different cognitive 1 learning
styles, such as "holists" vs. "serialists" (Pask, 1975). In learning about cognitive
aspects related to the creation of a space such as this, several writers cited
motivations related to recognizing and supporting different learning styles; for
example, Canter, Rivers and Storrs (1985, p. 101), "It is easy to imagine two

expert users with different characteristics, one methodical in his approach to
work, the other more erratic and inspirational. While both might be successful in
achieving their aims within a data-base / expert system, it is likely that they would
be more effective if operating in a software environment that was more
sympathetic to their individual styles." For a general discussion of the
relationships between "multiple intelligences" and learning processes, see
Gardner (1983).
Many of the relationships suggested above as being the affordances of this
workspace may overlap with each other in some measure. To some extent all are
speculative at this point, and not all may be effectively realized by means of the Axon
development environment available today. It would be helpful to attempt a consistent
classification of the structural elements and the relationships they may best be used to
display. The emergence of a well-ordered range of visualization approaches along these
lines will be the result of future development of the workspace in actual application
settings.
One of the most important features of the workspace is that it provides a place to
put things, a place to gather the many factors of problems and concepts, a place to sort
and arrange these according to local requirements. This gathering, placing and arranging
is part of a general process of orientation that must be undertaken when any problem is
being solved or similar process is underway. It was the purpose of the developers of
Axon to provide such a space, which made it suitable as a choice for the environment
within which the workspace could be built. What has been added here, by introducing the
figures that make up the workspace, is the availability of a flexible set of graphical and
structural elements that plausibly may be associated with a wide variety of conceptual
and physical relationships. See Figure 11 for an example of the workspace as populated
by conceptual objects.

Discussion and Summary of the Heuristic Workspace

An originating question that motivated this space asked, if an interactive learning
environment were to be created as part of a digital library, in what sort of space would
this activity take place? What might actually happen in this learning environment, and
how might it be different from the sorts of spaces that are now conceived as models for
collaborative online workspaces? The present approach attempts to avoid some of the
major intractable problems of creating shared knowledge systems, such as the
assumption that "common languages" across communities of inquiry are prerequisite to
rather than being the consequence of interactions within and across the spaces.
The workspace is intended to fit well with the resonance metaphor for
information, replacing the concept of transfer of information objects with dynamic,
connotative, relational structures that may be brought into visible proximities. The
workspace intends to accommodate the coordination of small and large scale spaces in
both the physicallgeographic and social/cognitive domains. As detailed in the bulleted
paragraphs on affordances above, the spatial relations that can be expressed through
relationships, regions and components of the workspace include: centrality; objects in
context; bi-polarity; outward-expanding forces; containment and containing forces;
network relationships; discontinuity; intersecting x, y, and z coordinates; intersecting
planes; inside and outside; and event frequencies, among others.
The overall approach to information presented in this work is an action
orientation, seeing information as manifesting in the continuous creative work of people,
who are always generating information and informational contexts as part of their
ongoing problem solving, sometime very informal and sometimes approaching
formalization through the articulation of questions. This space puts primary importance
of the person, or collaborative community, in the creation, definition, linkages within the
space. It is meant to be one component in an integrated overall approach to encouraging

Figure 11. Populated workspace. This view is from Level 12 (center) and shows entities
clustered at the center, as well as all structural elements beyond Level 12.

autonomy and diversity of work, in a dynamic structure with problem-solving built into it
as a core idea. The space also serves the goal of a providing a single coordinate system
within which multiple frames of reference can be simultaneously realized and visualized.
In this case, the workspace affords simultaneous potential of physical geographic and
socialcognitive approach to mapping, presented in frames of reference that are
discontinuous but whose relationships can be coordinated within a single view. This is a
very different approach from the established geospatial base approach, which attaches
non-spatial or non-geographic aspects to a geographic base, creating a hierarchy of
frames rather than a coordination of frames as is intended here.
The space that is presented here is both familiar, in that it is based on regular
geometric forms that people already understand, and unfamiliar, in that the configuration
is not a natural system, and at least part of the structure (the tensegrity) is nearly
unknown to the general public. This tension between familiarity and the need for
discovery may be an asset of this structure, since part of the intent is to create a space
where creative problem solving might occur, rather than a space in which established
understandings are simply represented.
To this extent, the approach taken here does not hlly share assumptions such as,
"The objective in creating a geographic analogy is to generate an information landscape
based on experiential properties of the real world (Fabrikant & Buttenfield, 200 1, p.
265). This space is not map-like, in the sense presented by Skupin (2002) who notes the
importance of meeting user expectations as related to issues involving map-like,
geographically-based visualizations for abstract spaces. "Users expect map-like
visualizations of non-geographic information to function like geographic maps, at basic
and higher-levels. Any mismatch between this expectation and the reality of an interface
should be of concern and at the very least be communicated to the user" (p. 166). In the
geometrical approach taken here, user expectations would be expected to be fewer and

less critical, due to the unfamiliarity of the space. Though it is assumed that this will be
made up for in the relative ease in interpreting the space as given, testing the reactions of
users on first confronting the space would be expected to be helpful in future
developments.
Physically viewing an object, and conversation among people while viewing an
object (such as a map) together, is an important aspect of understanding even abstract
concepts. This is cognitively related to what was discussed as "kinesthetic memory" or
motor learning in the section on action orientation in Chapter 4 above. This kinesthetic
mode, complementing verbal and imagistic, has not been adequately expressed in digital
environments -perhaps one day to be reclaimed through true virtual reality. The object
manipulations allowed by Axon also enhances this important hands-on requirement.
Shared viewing and work based on shared objects is recognized by Hutchins (1995) as
the necessary social aspect of all cognition. The social aspect of knowledge was
particularly clear to him in his ethnographic study of navigational systems for ships, and
their use by the people who navigate with them. That charts are visible in shared
interpresonal space is an important part of these social cognitive systems. Our model of
cognitive processes needs to include this public factor. "The model of human intelligence
as abstract symbol manipulation and the substitution of a mechanized formal symbolmanipulation system for the brain result in the widespread notion in contemporary
cognitive science that symbols are inside the head. . . . When the symbols were put
inside, there was no need for eyes, ears, or hands. Those are for manipulating objects, and
the symbols have ceased to be material and have become entirely abstract and
ideational" (p. 365). The hands-on character of interaction with the workspace, as well as
the possibility for groupwork around and across such spaces, reflects this perspective.
It is easy to conceive that separate workspaces could be built for different
problem solving situations. To call this a "heuristic workspace" puts focus on the idea

that it is a place to work, not a place where work is somehow done by a machine for the
worker. Emphasizing the concept of workspace also implies the contingent, tentative,
work-in-progress nature of what may be found by anyone exploring such spaces.
One of the outstanding features of the workspace structure is the inclusion of
multiple three-dimensional figures that are in a stable though not fixed and
predetermined relationship with each other. This has been accomplished through nesting,
with all three polyhedron-based figures centered on a common origin.
The importance of distinguishing spatial frames of reference from spatial
vocabulary was discussed above in Chapter 3. The use of such frames of reference is
required in order to properly contextualize all forms of expression, including expressions
about space. The need to provide reference frames for any set of related concepts pointed
toward the nested multidimensional set of structures that are present in this space. Just as
frames are mutually untranslatable ("three distinct frames of reference are
'untranslatable' from one to the other, throwing further doubt on the idea of correlations
and correspondences across sensory and conceptual representational levels," Levinson,
1996, p. 152) so the nested polyhedra do not intersect and are not presumed to reflect
common coordinates, except in terms of being defined by vectors emanating from a
shared central origin. The strategy taken here is to bring multiple views 1 multiple frames
into a single simultaneous view; rather than attempting to accomplish translation across
the figures. Here, frames of reference are provided in a spatial context, without
predetermining the values that might be assigned to places, regions or relationships in
this space.
The nested polyhedra of this space can be viewed as approximations for spheres,
and can be projected onto spheres. Anthony Judge (198011984) suggests that
"spherically-oriented presentations" may lead to "greater comprehensibility and
communicability" than flat tabular presentations of concept schemes. He posits a "link

between prime number factors and polyhedral spherical approximations. Nested concept
sets may then be envisaged as 'encoded' by nested polyhedra or their topological
features. The relationship between symmetrical forms and memorability has been
explored." Of more significance to him is the hypothesized transformation of concept
sets via "'transformation pathways' between certain polyhedra thus maintaining
structural continuity" (pp. 10-11 of 13). We recall the mnemonic approaches of Lull and
Bruno, described above in the section of Chapter 4 devoted to the spatial organization of
knowledge. The present work as a whole can be seen as a contemporary extension of the
classical method of loci.
Given the organization of Axon into discrete layers, the creation of geometric
spheres is not possible. Spheres are implicitly represented in the workspace as the
bounding figures for the regular polyhedra. The subdivision of spherical surfaces by
means of great circles is reflected here in the form of the edges (chords) of the
cuboctahedron. The availability of hemispheres suggests the representation of
complementary relationships, which bear some similarity to polarities mentioned above.
Hemispheres are approximated in this space in the cuboctahedron, whose edges or chords
can be projected onto great circles upon a sphere. Because the space can be entered from
front to back (or from lower-numbered levels to higher) a viewing position can be
attained that sees the space as if it were the inside of a concave hemisphere. This would
be similar to the natural view people have of the world, with an approximate half sphere
visible and another, "behind us," not visible. Overall, the inability to construct spheres is
compensated by the increased regular subdivisions of space afforded by the polyhedra,
both on their surfaces and internally.
There are a number of features that are missing from the Axon-based workspace.
Some of these are intrinsic to the available functions in Axon, and some are simply
incompletely realized in the current state of the space. "Scanning orbits" or other

prescribed routes for traversal of the space have not been created. There is no 3D
rotation, including the independent rotation of nested structures, a feature that would
have to be available in a fully realized version. Definitions of dimensions are absent,
such as the meaning of a token object's being in proximity to any particular vertex or
facet. It is not yet possible to put weights on the various compression and tension
elements - though this may possibly be accomplished by means of the simulation
operations that are built into Axon.
Many elements of the solution offered here were "tripped over" in a way similar
to the creative design process described by Storm as "eolithism" (1953). He presents
three major approaches to the creation of structures: design methods, "tropismatic"
activity and "eolithism." Whereas "designers" must know what they want, and must
specify their materials beforehand, the tropismatic nest building of birds is thoroughly
constrained in terms of materials and outcomes but not particular choices and methods.
The most open-ended and unexpected is the "eolithic" based on the metaphor of
"stumbling upon" a rock or other available material, which then can be put to inventive
use by the creative builder.
Overall, this space provides an approach that is responsive to the call presented by
Anthony Judge in many writings, and in the Yearbook of World Problems and Human
Potential coordinated by him, stating need to move toward "multipolarization." There it

is asserted that many problems are described in polar terms: inequality vs. equality etc.
"This suggests the need for 'conceptual' devices to reconfigure the relationship between
opposing positions, categories or paradigms into a more complex pattern of counteracting
viewpoints. . . . Such patterns should be sufficiently complex to reflect appropriately the
recognized multipolar relationships that are obscured by the powerful conceptual
dynamics associated with a focus on polarization. In this way they contain variety rather
than ignoring it. . . . Given the ambiguity of words in representing fundamentally

contrasting viewpoints, it is appropriate to use a non-verbal representation system to
denote such alternatives and to indicate the nature of their relationship to each other"
(Union of International Associations, 1986, Secs. TM, XTM).

Chapter 9
A SAMPLE APPLICATION ILLUSTRATED

The workspace described in the preceding chapter is intended to provide a robust,
flexibly structured digital environment within which the relations between such entities
as concepts, objects and places may be brought into meaningful visual arrangement.
Because the structure as presented is only one of many possible similar approaches, and
because the particular forms and relationships that are included will be unfamiliar to
potential users, a simple application is suggested here that illustrates how this space
might be used.
This example incorporates an existing narrative that was presented through use of
graphics and figures of speech based structured in the form of a triangle and a
tetrahedron. The essay in which those figures appeared, "GIS Without Computers:
Building Geographic Information Science from the Ground Up" by Helen Couclelis
(1997), aimed at creating for its readers an image of the conceptual relationships that
exist in the discipline of geography, and then to relate these to a recent addition to the
realm of geography, the geographical information sciences.
Couclelis' essay presents these concepts in a traditional form, narrative text with
two-dimensional illustrations. The illustrations are not reproduced here, but the structures
used in them will be described. In her essay, four graphic illustrations are presented,
representing a deconstruction of the concept of GIS, a "geographic triangle," "the 'other'
geographic triangle," and the "GIS tetrahedron." The first is a web that seems to be
directed toward, or emanating from (more likely, given the aim of illustrating the process
of "deconstructing"). The second, "geographic triangle," is a standard downwardpointing triangle with the three angles or nodes labeled "empirical," "experiential," and
"formal" with the sides or edges labeled "geographic concepts," "geometry & topology,"

and "geographic measurements." The general impression given by this graphic is that
there are three basic orientations toward the discipline of geography, and particular
classes of geographic practice link or occupy an intersection across pairs of these
orientations. The simplicity of the figure suggests that the concepts it represents could
also be given in the form of a Venn diagram.
Couclelis provides interpretation for the graphics in the body of her text. In the
text, the key words in the graphics are highlighted by means of italics. This directs the
reader's attention to the places in the text where key concepts are discussed, and makes
for easy cross-referencing between the text and the illustrations. Without the illustrations,
the complex sets of relationships among the orientations and practices of geogrpahers
and geographic information scientists would be nearly impossible for the reader to grasp.
The next two illustrations presented by Couclelis show a progressive
transformation of concepts from the realm of geography to the geographic information
sciences. While the first two are well suited to two-dimensional display, the next two
move into a three-dimensional realm. The triangle represented three orientations to
geography by means of a two dimensional figure. In adding a fourth conceptual
dimension, named the "social," the sorts of relationships that could be displayed in an
orderly way via labels on nodes and links became more complex. Couclelis chose a
tetrahedron, the simplest regular polyhedron, for this representation.
This choice presented problems for display on the two-dimensional page. The
edges and faces of the tetrahedron are represented by the addition of a dashed line, for the
edge "hidden" at the back of the figure, and by shading the faces. In addition, the
methods that link the orientations are not given in the figure at all. The reader needs to
rely upon the text for the substance of her argument, and the text has become quite
complex, given the multidimensional conceptual relations she is presenting.

Nevertheless, those relationships can be represented by a figure as simple as a
tetrahedron.
At this point some advantages may be gained if it were possible to adopt a threedimensional space for representing these relations, rather than a two-dimensional
projection of a three-dimensional figure. In the present example, the figures provided by
Couclelis have been reconstructed within the heuristic workspace. Two illustrations of
the resulting figure are given here: the first is a closeup of the "GIScience Tetrahedron"
as presented in Couclelis' terms, and the second zooms out from the first view and shows
where this is situated within the entire structure of the workspace. See Figures 12 and 13.
It is not being suggested that the conceptual relations that are shown in this twodimensional representation of yet another three-dimensional construct should replace the
originals in an essay such as Couclelis'. Rather, these relationships can be explored
within the digital workspace itself. In that space, conveniently, the tetrahedral form is
already available. The central polyhedron of this workspace is a cuboctahedron, which
includes eight regular tetrahedra in its internal structure, all meeting at the central vertex
and joined to each other at their edges. -4physical model of this figure, showing available
tetrahedra, is shown in Figure 5. These tetrahedra do not fill the space of the
cuboctahedron; the spaces between the eight tetrahedra of the figure are occupied by
pyramids, whose square faces are six of the facets of this polygon; the other eight facets
are the outward facing triangles of the tetrahedra. Because the cuboctahedron has an
important characteristic regarding its central and edge vectors, namely that the vectors
from the center to each vertex, and the vectors connecting all of the vertices around the
polyhedron, all are the same length. For this reason of this we are assured that the figure
chosen for the translation of Couclelis' image is in fact a tetrahedron.

sides and three new faces to the original geographic triangle. Let us
examine them in turn. Connectingthe soclal and the empirical are the
simple and complex geographic constructs that society imposes on the
world. These include the formal and informal boundaries of various
sorts, the counties and the census tracts, but also the hierarchies of
'good' and 'bad' reglons and neighbourhoods,the classifications of
place into ordinary and special, protected and not, sacred and profane,
yours and mine, public and prlvate. Connectlng the social and the
experiential, on the other hand, are the diverse cultural perspectives and
ldeologles that distingulsh one group's (and tlme's) taclt vlew of the
geographic world from that of another. The entire social-empirlcalexperiential face is the realm of geographic social theory, a counterpart
to t h e formai-emplrlcal-experientialface better compatible with
geographic science." (p. 223i

Figure 12. GIScience Tetrahedron. Hypertext embedded in the entity
"Social" as found in Couclelis' text is expanded.

Figure 13. GIScience Tetrahedron showing other workspace figures.

As restructured in the workspace, all of the vertices and all of their connecting
edges have been labeled according to the discussion provided in Couclelis' essay. In
addition, relying on capabilities built into Axon, the workspace allows the embedding of
hypertext within any object, or symbolic token, that is included in the figure. In the first
illustration provided here, the node "social" has been expanded, showing part of the text
provided in the text of Couclelis' essay. More or less text, or the entire text parceled out
to the object tokens, could be included. In this way, a reader would have the ability to
explore the text in terms of the exact spatial relationships that were assigned by
Couclelis, without leaving the workspace.
Of course, this form of presentation is a significant departure from the standare
illustrated text. Nevertheless, for purposes of adequately representing distinctions as well
as commonalities among many concepts, moving into a multidimensional digital space
for explanation and understanding (our intended "interactive learning environment") this
approach provides possbilities.
It is also apparent that the tetrahedron we have used only occupies a small portion
of the available structural relationships in the workspace. There is no need to populate the
entire space, in any case. The space affords a rich variety of relationships, of which the
single tetrahedron is one (and a convenient one, in this case). It would be easy to
visualize a more populated space, for instance by illustrating relationships from other
disciplines using the other tetrahedra, for easy conceptual contrast with the description
provided by Couclelis for GIScience. Other narratives from other authors could also be
collected, who might explain the conceptual relations of GIScience differently from the
way Couclelis has chosen - these may not occupy tetrahedra; they may have been
conceived in terms of tensions among various practitioners, and so would perhaps be
arrayed across the tensegrity. Since many tensional elements are represented, a setting for
a more complex description of the discipline is available than is needed for illustrating

Couclelis' work. If an alternative description of the discipline were made in terms of
intersecting planes, each plane featuring an important dimension of the conceptual
structure of the narrative, this could be accommodated through the available planes
internal to the same cuboctahedron from which the tetrahedron was extracted. See Figure

10 for an illustration of the three intersecting planes.
It should now be clear that an additional advantage of this structure is that
multiple different structural relationships can be accommodated without conflict within a
single view. This essentially is the ability to include multiple frames of reference
simultaneously, without requiring exact transformational procedures to link them. Since
the space includes three three-dimensional structures that are discontinuous from each
other, at least three simultaneous frames of reference can be portrayed. The actual
number is much higher. Recall that the example in the paragraph above uses tetrahedra
and intersecting planes, used totally independently of each other, that are both found
within the cuboctahedron's internal structure. Similarly, the many affordances outlined in
the previous chapter could simultaneously be put to work within one workspace.
In addition, though the essay being used here as an example essentially portrays
the geometry of a discipline, there is no reason why the geography of the discipline, or
particular elements of it (such as the locations of home institutions of practitioners who
represent the orientations given in the conceptual overview) could not be represented,
also. The surrounding icosahedron, called "context sphere" in the present workspace,
could be used for a global geographic projection, on which such points could be located.
These then could, if desired, be lined up along central vectors with the orientations
named, though only one at a time. Simultaneous rotation of figures such as those
described here could bring multidimensional physical, social and conceptual factors into
comprehensible simultaneous relationships that could be interpreted with little difficulty.

These multiple relationships have the potential for the user, or explorer, to create
new information or connections, or to observe inconsistencies, much in the way that
geographic information systems allow discovery of new spatial relationships. In
reconstructing the "GISc tetrahedron" into this workspace, based on the original text,
several potential terminological and relational inconsistencies were observed, though not
enough time was spent to assert that there were inconsistencies in the text narrative. What
is asserted is that a space organized in this way is very robust in terms of the many sorts
of relations that can be simultaneously displayed, and also provides potential analytic
capabilities that could be called informal graphic logic.
That Couclelis conceived of the figure she presented as being a model for a more
expansive structure of representations was explicitly stated. "The finiteness suggested by
the geometric analogy is of course misleading, since any small region may be explored in
arbitrarily fine detail: imagine a fractal polyhedron!" (Couclelis, 1997, p. 224).
Her choice of tetrahedron may have been somewhat arbitrary, and her purposes
served by another figure, but there is an elementary logic to the choice. She is presenting
GIScience as a system, and R. Buckminster Fuller, who asserted that all systems can be
represented by polyhedra, observed that the tetrahedron represents the minimum system.
Anthony Judge (1978, p. 5 of 22) quotes and comments on Fuller in the following terms,
in describing an "operational space" he was considering: "The space is first conceived as
distinct from its external environment. Fuller states, 'A system is the first subdivision of
Universe. . . . Oneness, twoness, and threeness cannot constitute a system. . . . Systems
are unpredicted by oneness, twoness or threeness.' Namely it takes a minimum of four
vertices to define a set of planes giving insideness and outsideness, the basic requirement
to ensure that a system is distinguished from its environment."
Again, we should remember that the particular form as well as the particular
conceptual relationships chosen by Couclelis to illustrate her text are hers alone. That

does not prevent us in any way from bringing them into juxtaposition with other
conceptual schemes, even of the most contradictory variety, within one working space.
To create a way to simultaneously view and relate of multiple autonomous systems of
relationships, allowing for a system of systems, all brought into relationship even when
they are discrete and discontinuous, is one of the main objectives motivating the creation
of this workspace. The next step is to imagine multiple instances of such space, all
created for different purposes but sharing commonalities in some measure, that can
themselves be brought into juxtaposition. This then would become the "polycentric"
design that is our goal. It is hoped that this simple sample implementation has indicated
the potentials available within this approach.

Chapter 10
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Summarv
This work originated with an interest in access to public information resources
and in the sharing of information, particularly geospatial data, across communities of
interest and geographic communities. In particular, it was of interest to learn about how
concepts of space and spatial relationships might be involved in information sharing
processes. An outline of the background stages of this work is presented in the
Introduction.
The unique character of each information situation within which issues of access
could be framed led to the conclusion that the use of a geographic metaphor for
visualizing information access would not be an adequate approach, except in the most
schematic of terms. Many questions arose surrounding the theoretical frame from which
issues of information access were being addressed. These included the perception that
many of the terms being used, from information to access to sharing, were not well suited
to the processes at hand. For instance, if a "transfer" metaphor for information is
questioned, then the meanings of such terms as "sharing" and "exchange" need to be
critically evaluated. The first part of this paper reports on many of the results of this
evaluation. The result has been a ground-up rethinking of access issues based on an
expanded, more complete and realistic idea of information than is now embedded in
prevailing approaches, concepts and metaphors.
The outcomes of this process include the products, both tangible and conceptual,
that have been described in the second part of this paper. These include the concept of a
question-centered learning environment, the resonance metaphor for information, and the
multidimensional heuristic workspace. All of these address a perceived inadequacy of the

prevailing metaphors and concepts of information, described here in terms of the
transmission concept and conduit metaphor for communication, the information as object
or resource concept, and the pathways-to-knowledge metaphor. These do not provide
room for a person-centered view of information that sees information processes
beginning and ending with the cognizant human subject.
The overall goal of the system design process has been to find solutions that will
preserve the autonomy of individuals and communities at local levels, where control
should be situated regarding the terms, categories, frames of reference, values and
questions of relevance. The space suggested here is an innovation created within an offthe-shelf commercial software, the Axon Idea Processor. The workspace is an
autonomous, stand-alone environment that affords the possibility of being federated with
similar spaces through use of emerging facilities such the I S 0 Topic Maps standard
(Biezunski et al., 1999).
This local autonomy should ideally be structured so that the values expressed will
be available for the exploration and interpretation of others. A particular motivating
question here has been how people who share in questions may be brought into closer
proximity with each other through a shared working digital environment. The result
offered here ultimately implies the creation of a federated constellation of autonomous
workspaces that would seem to be structured more in the form of galaxies and clusters
than in terms of a well defined network. A gravitational approach would seem to be an
appropriate concept in terms of the forces that may bring related clusters into proximity.
What seemed to be needed, and is attempted here, is a robust structure that allows many
different sorts of relationships, yet constrains them in such a way that observers might
begin to correctly interpret those relationships on their own terms.
A candidate for structuring the question spaces that would be part of the questioncentered learning environment is the tensegrity. The tensegrity, as a stable structure

balancing forces of tension and compression, provides a useful spatial frame for
questions. Questions embody uncertainties that could be represented by tension elements,
while the vast knowledge that accompanies every question, usually implicitly, can be
represented by the compression struts of the tensegrity. Questions have origins,
motivating contexts and central goals, all of which can be represented by the set of
figures that make up the heuristic workspace. In this way, the workspace is offered as a
candidate for the spatial structuring of question spaces.
A significant aspect of the present approach, autonomous workspaces in which
information relationships are grounded in a resonance metaphor, is the existence of a
center that is integral to the space. The other prevailing metaphors for information
processes, conduits and pathways, do not carry any implication of centeredness, or
groundedness. Instead there is the intimation of infinite networks across which any sort
of movement might be possible, where the choices are many and the results are often
unpredictable. The existence of centers within the constructs that are offered here afford
possibilities for stability and orientation that are not available in the alternative
approaches.
The other spatial aspect which differentiates the present approach from the
dominant metaphors is the character of movement within it. Whereas both the conduit
and pathways metaphors imply movement of objects or persons across information
terrains and through networks, the movement implied in the resonant environment is one
of propagating wave forms, and locations are defined by the interactions among
simultaneous waves expanding from multiple sources. These sources are another kind of
center available in the imagery offered here.
The importance of frames of reference, especially spatial frames of reference as
expressed in language, has become increasingly apparent during the course of this work.
Whereas the attempt to ground the study in an empirical approach rested on the analysis

of spatial vocabulary, the terms of that vocabulary depend on reference frames for their
meanings. Identification of frames of reference must accompany the interpretation of
particular expressions.
Taken together, these design aspects, including the overall pluralistic goals, are
what is meant by "polycentric" in the title of this work. Rather than seeking to replace the
existing concepts and metaphors for information processes, the results offered here
provide a third, complementary aspect. Taken together, we now can conceive of
information as having three primary dimensions: communication, documentation and
learning.
Many other advances were made conceptually during the progress of this work. In
most cases these have not achieved a well defined form, and can be considered to be
intuitions, working hypotheses or conceptual landmarks that will be useful in guiding
future work. These include a growing understanding that one of the most important
distinctions to be made in information environments is that of in-groups and out-groups,
issues of social inclusion and exclusion generally. The consequence of this understanding
has been to reframe issues of access in terms of transparency and visibility.
Very informally, awareness of "threeness" has grown during this work. People, at
least modern urbanized English-speakers, like to present conceptual relations in terms of
threes. Playing off of George Miller's "nlagical number seven plus or minus two"
(Miller, 1956), I have begun thinking of dimensionality in terms of "the magical number
three plus or minus one." A collection of concepts grouped in three has been started,
quickly numbering in the dozens. The proposed three facets of information offered here,
communication, documentation and learning, is an example; see Figure 10. Others
include Cassirer's three models of understanding, the affective I emotive, the intuitive
and the conceptual (Entrikin, 1977); Levinson's three spatial frames of reference, the
intrinsic, relative and absolute (Levinson, 1996); and my own suggestion of adding a

third coding approach, the kinesthetic, to Paivio's theory of dual coding by means of
visual and verbal processes (Paivio, 1979). Spatial structuring of concept relations must
accommodate groupings of three in many forms, and the heuristic workspace does this.
It has become apparent that when representing social networks, people should be
considered to be both links and nodes in the network. No links among people or ideas
exist independently of the people doing the linking. People are responsible for the
particular associations that compose their environments of meaning, and information
systems or learning environments should allow maximum ability for people to create and
maintain their own links.
This work also has implied an alternative approach to learning. Learning is the
word that has been chosen to characterize a complementary but integral facet of the
information concept. Our approaches to learning will vary depending on the metaphors
we have chosen. Is learning largely conceived as a building-up of structure from pieces?
Or is it more a matter of finding correspondences and convergences among many
sometimes surprising elements, and then making efforts to strengthen the perceived
linkages? In terms of the structures offered here, there is a shift in the concept of learning
that is similar to the one that Fuller made when substituting the tensegrity form for the
common form of building structure.

Discussion

This work supports the emergence of a new approach to information processes
based on a resonance metaphor for information. In addition, a novel multidimensional
space for organizing and displaying relationships among concepts, places and other
entities. These originated in the search for resolution of a set of problems related to the
more established alternative views about information generally, and about how spatial
concepts might influence our thinking about information processes. Overall, this work

attempts to conceive alternatives to "information transfer systems" by situating the
production of information in human, cognizing subjects. A significant portion of this
work, including most of Part One and many references in Part Two, presents relevant
research that points toward or strengthens the human-centered approach to information
processes that is being advanced here.
The text of Chapter 8, describing the digital workspace, suggests one solution by
which these alternative views might be implemented in practice. A digital space has been
crafted that could be called a "multidimensional heuristic workspace" (a functional
name) or "Ptolemaic nested polyhedral space" (if viewed structurally in terms that may
begin to evoke familiar images).
Details about the research background and related project contexts for this work
are provided in the Introduction. In particular, the resonance metaphor and the heuristic
workspace were conceived within conversations among participants in New Directions
Downeast. These are rooted in the quest for an actual space where an "interactive
learning environment" might be realized as part of the overall concept of a digital library.
As such, this space is aimed toward interactions among the users or participants in the
library, rather than toward management or access to the data and documents that are part
of its collections. Many discussions centered on the need to bridge different communities
and values within such a system through building shared ontologies or "common
languages." The present design in many ways is an attempt to shortcut such immense and
intractable problems by abstracting the positions both of system "users" and information
"providers" through the creation of shared "question spaces." Though some bridges or
binding points would be needed in order to connect such spaces or allow them to be
mutually visible, the requirement for extensive sharing of assumptions or vocabularies as
a prerequisite for participation might be mitigated through implementation of this
approach. Rather than needing to be established as prerequisites to discourse across

cornmnities of questioners, the development of shared perspectives would be expected to
result from the negotiation of uncertainties and meanings that could take place in such an
environment of federated, partially autonomous, spaces.
The present work intends to illustrate the importance the use of appropriate
metaphors might have for problem setting, as required before problem solving can take
place. This perspective is explained by Schon in his essay on generative metaphors

(1979) and finds support in works such as those of Benking and Judge (1994) and Kuhn
(1993). It was largely through an attempt to imagine alternative metaphors that could
assist in the design of an "interactive learning environment" that the usefulness of the
resonance metaphor for information processes became clear. Once the resonance concept
emerged, many instances were encountered in the literature of memory, communication
and information. The nested polyhedra of the heuristic workspace are a direct expansion
into three dimensions of a basic graphic that attempted to portray the forces that would be
involved in such a "resonance metaphor" for information.
The innovations suggested here often involved a reframing of concepts already in
general use, similar to the figure-ground reversals that capture our attention in Gestalt
demonstrations of visual perception. The foremost of these was the shift from a data I
resource centered view of information to one centered on the cognizant human subject.
Attention was also given to frames of reference, including contexts, motivations and
intentions, over and above the identification and definition of discrete information
objects. For instance, this was found in the shift of focus from spatial vocabulary to
spatial frames of reference. The concept of "information sharing," firmly grounded in an
object and resource concept of information, was set aside, with new emphasis given to
visibility and transparency as goals of system design. Similarly, there is a growing sense
based in this work that the concept of access to information could productively be
replaced by one that emphasizes inclusion, shifting focus from physical barriers and

technical solutions toward understanding the important role played by social inclusion
and exclusion, and the importance of in-groups and out-groups in understanding
information sharing processes.
More fundamentally, during this work distinctions between the cognitive and the
social are realized to be less clear than is often imagined. Similarly, maintaining clear
distinctions between the social-cognitive and the geo-physical realms seems to be
increasingly difficult. This leads us toward the search for solutions that presume we live
in a unified world, a single field that is person-centered, and is simultaneously material
and symbolic, cognitive and social, physical and mental. Legitimate distinctions still may
be made among these facets. The present position simply asserts that we live within a
single field within which many dimensions may be defined. The model of nested
polyhedra offered in the structure of the workspace is a step toward allowing such
coordinated, discontinuous, multidimensional frames to be viewed within one view,
toward allowing a more unified view of our existence and the problems it involves.
Finally, the need to create inclusive, participatory environments for the mapping
of information environments of all sorts was made clear at many points during this
research process. In terms of social outcomes and policy intent, the overall goals of this
work may now be expressed as: preserve autonomy, increase transparency.
In addition to topics that have been given more extensive and explicit treatment in
the body of the text above, several themes should be mentioned that have been touched
upon in various contexts throughout, including:

The concept of "gestalt. The importance and relevance of the work of Gestalt
"

psychologists became clear through many of the readings that were consulted in
preparation of this work. The concept of gestalt appears in the work of Lakoff and
Johnson, whose approach to metaphor has been relied on here. For instance, in a
chapter on "The Coherent Structuring of Experience" (1980, p. 77 ff.) they speak

of "experiential gestalts and the dimensions of experience." The idea of gestalt
generally refers to perceptions understood as wholes rather than as sums of their
parts, for instance in discrete sensations. In the present paper, the use of terms
such as figure-ground inversion, the need to choose among frames of reference as
part of interpreting symbolic expressions, and the realization that we live in an
underdetermined world from which our understandings are always composed by
means of strategic inference all are related to the approach taken by the Gestalt
psychologists.

Indirect approaches, crookedpaths and discontinuities. Participation in many
group discussions and observation of groups engaged in collaborative work made
it clear that the most direct distance between two points, at least in the social
world, is often a crooked line. One of the fundamental distinctions that people
make in evaluating the usefulness of information offered by others is whether
those others are part of in-groups or out-groups, and the many obstructions,
blockages and social distances that are thus put in place are among the most
difficult challenges for information sharing systems. Social distances are seen as
positive values, and distances among groups in traditional societies cannot be
attributed to geographical barriers only (Picken, 1975, p. 609) The value of the
"small world" phenomenon is that it in many ways overcomes the insularity of
local in-group clustering through identification of global weak links.
Discontinuity is intrinsic to the constructivist view, and is explicitly given as a
basis for Dervin's "sense-making" method. Effective information system design
should make the most of these sorts of phenomena. Elements within a
discontinuous universe are held in rzlationship through various forces that can be
conceived as being akin to gravity. Accommodating the representation of such

forces, and eventually modeling them, is intended through the heuristic
workspace as based on the resonance metaphor.

The importance of context. All symbolic expression is situated and contextual. It
is a significant shortcoming of many information systems, from broadcasting to
the Worldwide Web, that context is not transported as effectively as are data. The
part of a message that might only be located in such missing contexts is termed
"exformation" by Narretranders (1991/1998), who emphasizes that messages with
the most depth usually include significant effort directed toward composing
context as well as message. The use of metadata is one approach toward
providing context to information resources. In contrast, the creation of relational
spaces such as the heuristic workspace is an attempt to keep information elements
or objects, here called symbolic tokens, situated within local contexts that do not
require the universalizing standards underlie the metadata approach. Although a
figure called a "context sphere" is available in the workspace, the context should
be considered as interpenetrating the symbolic space, within which meaning is
contextualized through local relations. These relations may be expressed through
local clustering or through assignment to structures in terms of planes, bipolarity,
centrality, and so forth. In any case, the importance of context has never been far
from this discussion.

.

Information processes are closely related to making choices. The phrase
"information processes" is frequently used in this text, rather than use of the word
information on its own, as an attempt to emphasize the action orientation of the
information concept, and a way to step back from metaphors that focus on the
object nature of information. The actions that are involved are generally related to
making choices. First of all, choices are always made in deciding what
information to accept, and what to reject, in terms of any particular information

situation. Why is "information" important to us at all? The ability to participate in
information processes helps us to resolve uncertainties, helping us to make
choices based on an informed interpretation of our world.
Creativity and the new. Most information systems are answer-based, and support
the re-use of results that have been gathered for other purposes by other people.
Gaining higher precision in data-based models and increasing the correspondence
between such strategies as matching cognitive maps and the environment that is
being mapped are the dominant goals of knowledge-based information systems.
There is little place in these systems for the emergence of creativity and the new.
This situation as expressed in GIs first came to my attention through a paper by
Schrnitt and Brassel (1996). In contrast, the human-centered view of information
stresses that information processes are continuously creative. Dervin states that
people should be aware that they are always engaged in information design
(1999). Couclelis and Gale (1986, p. 9) assert that "the possibility to create new
concepts by combining existing ones is among the most striking properties of
cognition." The affordance of spaces for creativity and the new should be among
the objectives of information systems design. This is a subtheme throughout the
present discussion.

Future Work
Based on the results reported here, future work is suggested in many areas. First
of all, the workspace is not yet complete. Explicit and consistent assignment of
meaningful regions and relationships, in keeping with the affordances listed in Chapter 8,
has not been accomplished. Branching trees and dendritic structures, intimated in the
originating graphical concept (Figure 1) have not been included. A consistent symbology

has not been devised, and identification of these relationships and symbols by means of a
legend is not done.
Most of the choices related to these features, because they involve the
arrangement of meaningful relations, will depend on particular applications to which the
space is put. At least one example that exhibits how choices could be made in these areas
needs to be constructed. The conceptual nature of the space, given the particular
structures that are included in the present instance, should allow the creation of a wide
repertory of choices.
This workspace offered here is a visualization that uses relationships implicit in
related geometric figures. The primary relationships are meaningful, or semantic, and
these can be classed among the "nongeoreferenced visualizations" being explored by the
ADEPT group (Alexandria Digital Earth Prototype Project) (Ancona, Freeston, Smith, &
Fabrikant, 2002, p. 205 ff.). The importance of research in visualization for nongeographic information was outlined in a recent review article by Skupin and Fabrikant
(2003) that outlines a research agenda for cartographers in this field. The present
outcomes point toward further exploration of visualization options. For instance, the
"spring models" described by Skupin and Fabrikant (p. 103) could be candidates for
managing the visualization of the tension elements in the tensegrity figure.
Nearly all of the topic areas touched on in this research merit further
investigation. In particular areas the limits on my understanding have become very clear,
such as comprehension of the concepts behind Shannon's approach to information.
Further investigation of the dimensions of the concepts and metaphors set out in Chapter
2 will also help in making my own vocabulary more consistent. The concepts of
information and communication are intertwined in the Shannon model; now we can see
that communication is just one of three main facets of the information concept. Keeping

these distinctions clear should help in developing a consistent vocabulary with which to
speak of information processes.
I plan to look again at the heuristic methods suggested in in Polya's How to Solve

It as a guide for future restructuring of the space (Polya, l946Il957). The first candidate
application that suggests itself is the construction of a "question space" that corresponds
with the concept of question-centered learning environments set out in Chapter 6. The
use of the word "heuristic" in naming this workspace is a gesture toward the question
space concept. The term heuristics refers broadly to problem solving, both in terms of
evaluating problems as they present themselves, and in terms of evaluating possible
alternative solutions when complete knowledge is not at hand. The autonomous creation
and management of such problem-solving spaces is not far removed from the structuring
of a question space that might serve as a template for learning and discovery purposes
generally.
Because the question space concept seeks to maintain autonomy of questions and
questioners, but bringing communities of questions together into proximity and
juxtaposition for mutual discovery, an important future advance will be designing a
means for federating workspaces. One approach to integrating conversations across
communities of interest (such as land use planners on Maine islands, citizens of coastal
communities interested in balancing commercial uses of marine resources with
sustainable conservation, and scientists located in research centers) that was discussed
within New Directions Downeast (NDDE) involved use of the emerging Topic Map
standard (Biezunski et al., 1999). A summary of part of the NDDE discussion is available
at (New Directions Downeast, 2002). In particular, the XML version of Topic Maps,
designated XTM, was explored and a document outlining how this approach could be
implemented in this setting was written by one of the developers of the XTM standard,

Sam Hunting (2002) Explanation of topic maps in practical terms for implementers may
be found in Park and Hunting (2002).
A topic map approach also is a good candidate for purposes of federating the
heuristic workspaces that are proposed here, through identification of subjects they may
hold in common. The topic map approach has been described as subject-centered, as
distinguished from the more established "resource-centric" approach to data discovery as
expressed in the use of metadata. "It is normal to think of metadata as being somehow 'in
orbit' around the data about which the metadata provides information" (Newcomb, 2002,
p. 40). Alternatively, the "topic maps paradigm recognizes that everything and anything
can be a subject of conversation, and that every subject of conversation can be a hub
around which data resources can orbit" (p. 43).
Topics as found in topic maps are local expressions of subjects, generally defined
as being anything that can be the subject of a conversation. These may or may not be
digital resources, and may be systematically defined as in controlled vocabularies or
based in agreements involving local participants. These "subject identity points" can be
used as binding points that not only can connect topics across conversations (or
workspaces, or digital documents generally) but can serve to merge them if certain
minimum conditions are fulfilled. The topic map approach relates what can be thought of
as three kinds of spaces, in this case represented by the workspaces and its contents
(symbolic tokens, that in the topic frame are the topics), the set of subjects and their
definitions, and the topic map itself that serves as federating utility. Part of the advantage
of the topic map approach is that these spaces are not necessarily discrete, but may exist
in various degrees within each other; a topic map may overlay a single workspace or a set
of them, subject identity points may be topics within a workspace, and so forth. The
particular arrangement would be the result of design choices for the particular application
at hand.

The tensegity concept has been used by several authors toward discovery of new
organizational forms and toward optimizing creative working relationships among people
in existing organizations. Stafford Beer's Team Syntegrity (Beer, 1994) seeks to exploit
the dynamism of the tensegrity toward self-discovery within organizations. The
workspace as structured here could conceivably be put to use in managing and
documenting the group exercises conducted by Beer and his group. Anthony Judge has
been suggesting for many years the development of "tensegrity organizations" that would
go beyond the limitations of hierarchical and network organizations. Judge's description
of the evolution and dimensions of his concept (Judge, 1979) shows a striking
resemblance to the progress of thought that has resulted in the present outcome.
Extending applications of the workspace into support for the development of tensegrity
organizations is to be counted among possibilities for further work.
One of the motivations for creating the workspace was the quest for a more robust
environment for visualizing the relationships among code terms for purposes of
qualitative text analysis. One particular research group has been identified, Busch and
colleagues in Australia (Busch, Richards, & Dampney, 2001), who have undertaken
several related long-term studies that appear to have made use of many of the methods
attempted here. The report the use of the text analysis software Atlas.ti which allows
network representations of the relationships among code terms. They have assigned
dozens of terms to each of two broad classes, "articulable tacit knowledge" and
"inarticulable tacit knowledge." They emphasize that their concern is not data or
information, but "knowledge, that combination of data and information with attached
human processed meaning. In other words we consider knowledge to incorporate a 'tacit'
component, whereas information is purely articulate in nature and words. . . . It is tacit
knowledge, which underpins much of our understanding of codified knowledge. In other
words, what begins as a pool of tacit knowledge, leads to some becoming articulated,

then categorisation and finally codification based on emergent principles taking place"
(p. 39). Through coding of "64 primary text documents, which contained separately the
refined definitions of previous author's attempts at defining this knowledge type" they
derived a "region occupied by tacit knowledge . . . together with the implication of some
diversity in the term's meaning" (p. 40). Seeing this research program and result are
encouraging that the methodological approach I have taken to this point, for the empirical
portion of this study, can be the basis for further work along these lines.
A theme that has recurred throughout this paper points toward relating the

physical-geographic world with the social-cognitive world through one consistent
coordinate system. Existing GIs does this in some measure by creating a detailed and
accurate geographic base to which various attributes and features are related. The nongeographic attributes are in a sense conceived to be appendages and subsidiary to the
geography, which is the most stable part of the structure. Most people, however, view the
world the other way around, from the perspective of their own social and cognitive
understandings or "positions." Recent work in the geographic information sciences points
toward strategies for relaxing the dominance of the geographic base in creating a unified,
coordinated system of representations. This particularly includes the work of researchers
into "geodesic discrete global grid systems" (Sahr et al., 2003) and "planetary polyhedral
tesselation" (Dutton, 1991; 1999). They are investigating the use of global coordinate
systems based on regular polyhedra, as a complement to those based on traditional
latitude and longitude. Of particular interest here is the idea that global geograpahic
polyhedral projections could easily be incorporated into the proposed heuristic
workspace. Two of the figures already included in the workspace structure presented
here, the cuboctahedron and the icosahedron, have already been used for such projections
by R. Buckminster Fuller, with more contemporary implementations under development
for purposes such as global environomental monitoring. These researchers all

acknowledge the work of R. Buckminster Fuller in terms of inspiration, as is the case in
the present work. A direction for future work would be toward integrating these
approaches.
The availability of Axon as an environment for the workspace was a critical
factor in its realization. The figures that have been constructed here are an innovation in
the use of the multilevel undifferentiated digital space provided by Axon. These figures
have been shared with Chan Bok, developer of Axon, who has included a sample
polyhedron (dodecahedron) among the templates that are now distributed with Axon. The
figures of the workspace will be distributed in a forthcoming release of Axon, making
them available to users of this software worldwide. It is hoped that evaluation of the
potential of this approach will be aided through expected feedback from Axon's active
user community. There is a possibility that Axon may be modified in the future to
support some operations that are not possible at present in that environment, such as
reversal and rotation of figures.
Finally, cooperative work will continue with the marine geologists, community
planners, art historians and others who have been part of the New Directions Downeast
project. Motivation for much of the thinking and its products as reported here was
derived from the problems and goals expressed in NDDE, and these remain. There is an
emerging effort to supplement the Marine Realms Information Bank with a "discourse
engine," that bears similarity with what are called "interactive learning environments"
and "question spaces" here. It is hoped that continuing cooperation with these developers
will allow the emergence of an approach to information management, discovery and
creation that inclusive of the three fundamental aspects of communication,
documentation and learning.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
SPATIAL TERMS FROM CODEBOOK 3

Items in Caps are transfers from AnSWR; items in lower case were added during
development of Codebooks 1-3.

Absolute

destinations

Indexical Expressions

Access

Dimensionality

information flows

adjacency

dimensions

Inside / Outside

Allocentric

Directions

Intrinsic

Asymmetries

Distance

Invisibility

barrier processes

Districts

Landmarks

Barriers

Down

Local

Borders

Edges

Locales

Boundaries

Egocentric

Locations

Centrality

Elsewhere

Lynch's Elements

Chorography

existential space

Map and Territory

chorology

Figure-Ground

Mapping

chronotope

Frames of Reference

Mental Tours

Conceptual Landmarks

Friction Surface

Names and Naming

container / contained

Front / Back

Near / Far

schema

Geographic

Neighborhoods

Contiguity

Geometrical Space

Nests

contiguity processes

Here

network processes

Coordinate Systems

Home

Networks

Deictic

Horizon

Nodes

Objective Expressions

Situation

one-hour rule

Size

Orientation

Social Inclusion and

Origin

Exclusion

Passageway

Space

Paths

Space and Time

percolation up

spatial analysis

Periphery

spatial transfer

Perspective Systems

processes

Perspective Taking

territories

Perspectives

There

Place Names

Topistics

places of thought

Topography

Places, Place

Topography 2

Private

transparency

Proximity

transparency tests

Reach

UP

Referent

verbal geography

Regions

Verticality

Relative

Visibility

Relatum

Visual Space

Representative Space

way

Retinal Space

Window

Right / Left
Scale
shortest distance

Appendix B
PERMISSIONS

Permission to reproduce Peter Bennett's untitled illustration that first appeared in
(Lessig, 2000, p. 27) was obtained by electronic mail. Permission was requested and
received July 30,2003. The permission letter reads as follows:

Wed., 30 Jul2003 12:04:20 EDT
Paul,
I grant you permission to use the requested illustration (March 27 - April 10
American Prospect, page 27: emptying basket of bits into a machine) for a one
time usage, with the understanding that you will not profit from its publication.
Now that the legal part is done, thanks for including my work in your thesis.
Good luck!
Peter Bennett

In a separate message Mr. Bennett stated that this illustration is "untitled."
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